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A B S T R A C T
According to the traditional Bayesian view of credence, its structure is that of
precise probability, its objects are descriptive propositions about the empirical
world, and its dynamics are given by (Jeffrey) conditionalization. Each of the
three essays that make up this thesis deals with a different variation on this
traditional picture.
The first variation replaces precise probability with sets of probabilities. The re-
sulting imprecise Bayesianism is sometimes motivated on the grounds that our
beliefs should not be more precise than the evidence calls for. One known prob-
lem for this evidentially motivated imprecise view is that in certain cases, our
imprecise credence in a particular proposition will remain the same no matter
how much evidence we receive. In the first essay I argue that the problem is
much more general than has been appreciated so far, and that it’s difficult to
avoid without compromising the initial evidentialist motivation.
The second variation replaces descriptive claims with moral claims as the ob-
jects of credence. I consider three standard arguments for probabilism with
respect to descriptive uncertainty—representation theorem arguments, Dutch
book arguments, and accuracy arguments—in order to examine whether such
arguments can also be used to establish probabilism with respect to moral un-
certainty. In the second essay, I argue that by and large they can, with some
caveats. First, I don’t examine whether these arguments can be given sound
non-cognitivist readings, and any conclusions therefore only hold conditional
on cognitivism. Second, decision-theoretic representation theorems are found
to be less convincing in the moral case, because there they implausibly com-
mit us to thinking that intertheoretic comparisons of value are always possible.
Third and finally, certain considerations may lead one to think that imprecise
probabilism provides a more plausible model of moral epistemology.
The third variation considers whether, in addition to (Jeffrey) conditionaliza-
tion, agents may also change their minds by becoming aware of propositions
they had not previously entertained, and therefore not previously assigned
any probability. More specifically, I argue that if we wish to make room for
reflective equilibrium in a probabilistic moral epistemology, we must allow for
awareness growth. In the third essay, I sketch the outline of such a Bayesian ac-
count of reflective equilibrium. Given that (i) this account gives a central place
to awareness growth, and that (ii) the rationality constraints on belief change
by awareness growth are much weaker than those on belief change by (Jeffrey)
conditionalization, it follows that the rationality constraints on the credences
of agents who are seeking reflective equilibrium are correspondingly weaker.
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For this is action, this not being sure
— John Ashbery
Part I
T H E M E
1
B AY E S I A N I S M
1.1 introduction
Will it rain tomorrow? Is humanity still going to be around in a thousand
years? Will global temperatures rise by more than 0.5◦C over the next decade?
Is there intelligent life elsewhere in the observable universe? Am I going to get
to the station in time to catch the last tube home?
For these questions and many others, uncertainty seems like a sensible re-
sponse. The world is complicated and our evidence limited. It would therefore
seem foolish to invest all of one’s confidence in a particular answer to one of
these questions.
How should we reason when we are uncertain? We can distinguish between
normative theories of reasoning under uncertainty by their different answers
to the following questions:
(1) structure How does it represent the agent’s doxastic attitude?
(2) object What are the objects of uncertainty? What are we uncertain about?
(3) dynamics How should our uncertainty change as we receive new evidence?
The most influential normative theory of reasoning under uncertainty has been
the Bayesian theory. Traditional Bayesianism, as I will understand it, provides
the following answers to our three questions: (1) with a single probability
function; (2) empirical states of the world; and (3) in accordance with (Jeffrey)
conditionalization. Traditional Bayesianism provides the theme for this thesis,
the starting point for our investigations. Each essay explores the consequences
of giving a different answer to one or more of these questions. As such, they
constitute Bayesian variations, in the musical sense of the term: they are ”ver-
sion[s] of a theme, modified in melody, rhythm, harmony, or ornamentation,
so as to present it in a new but still recognizable form“ (Oxford Dictionaries).
The first essay, “Imprecise Bayesianism and Global Belief Inertia,” considers
a variation in the structure of credence: the so-called imprecise Bayesianism
which models a rational agent’s doxastic attitude with a set of probability
functions instead of a single one. More specifically, it appraises a difficulty
that arises for a particular evidentialist way of motivating imprecise credences.
The second essay, “Moral Uncertainty and Arguments for Probabilism,” exam-
ines a variation in the object of credence, and asks whether probabilism can
9
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also be expected to hold when the domain of uncertainty is moral rather than
descriptive. Finally, the third essay, “Bayesian Moral Epistemology and Reflec-
tive Equilibrium,” considers a variation in the dynamics of credence, asking
whether a Bayesian moral epistemology can accommodate reflective equilib-
rium. I argue that it can, provided that we depart from traditional Bayesianism
by allowing for awareness growth, i.e. allowing for agents to become aware
of propositions they had never considered or entertain before. Given that the
ordinary Bayesian update rules are not applicable here, this raises the question
of what, if any, constraints there are on the credences of agents who undergo
awareness growth.
Although the three essays each deal with somewhat independent topics, some
recurring themes and general lessons nevertheless emerge. These are sum-
marised in the concluding chapter. The remainder of this chapter lays out the
traditional Bayesian approach to epistemology in a bit more detail. In the next
section, I first situate Bayesianism within a broader class of models of belief.
In 1.3 I present the two core norms of traditional Bayesianism. In 1.4, I dis-
cuss the charge that the traditional Bayesian theory is excessively subjective,
and present some further proposed constraints on rational credence. Finally,
in 1.5, I discuss practical applications of Bayesian epistemology in the form of
Bayesian decision theory.
1.2 the structure of belief
When you are uncertain, there is something you are uncertain about. You may
be uncertain about what the weather will be like tomorrow, about what will
happen a thousand years hence, about what distant regions of the universe
look like, and so forth. These objects of uncertainty are required to have a
particular structure. At the most general level, we will model them as elements
of a σ-algebra.
σ-algebra. A σ-algebra F on a set Ω is a collection of subsets of Ω which
contains Ω and is closed under complements and countable unions:
1. Ω ∈ F .
2. If A ∈ F , then Ω \ A ∈ F .
3. If Ai ∈ F for i = 1, 2, . . . , then ∪∞i=1Ai ∈ F .
The underlying set Ω is called the sample space and its elements are called out-
comes. Elements of F are called events. For example, suppose we are modelling
an agent’s beliefs about the possible outcomes of an experiment, such as the
throw of a die. We can then interpret the conditions on σ-algebras as follows.
The first condition says she must be able to entertain the proposition that some
outcome or other occurs. The second condition says that if she is able to enter-
tain some proposition, she must also be able to entertain its negation. Finally,
the third condition says that if an agent is able to entertain some number of
propositions individually, she must also be able to entertain their disjunction.
Closure under countable unions is only necessary if the algebra has a count-
ably infinite number of elements. This can only happen if the sample space Ω
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is itself infinite. But sometimes we will be working with a finite Ω. In that case,
we only need to assume closure under finite union, which gives us an algebra
of sets.
In explaining the conditions on a σ-algebra, I appealed to logical notions like
negation and disjunction. But of course strictly speaking such notions are
not well-defined, because the objects we’re concerned with are sets and not
propositions. But there is another way to model the objects of uncertainty on
which such notions are well-defined.
boolean algebra. A Boolean algebra is a six-tuple 〈L ,∧,∨,¬,⊥,>〉 where
L is a set such that for any A, B, C ∈ L :
1. identity A ∨⊥ = A and A ∧> = A.
2. commutativity A ∨ B = B ∨ A and A ∧ B = B ∧ A.
3. distributivity A ∨ (B ∧ C) = (A ∨ B) ∧ (A ∨ C) and A ∧ (B ∨ C) =
(A ∧ B) ∨ (A ∧ C).
4. complements A ∨ ¬A = > and A ∧ ¬A = ⊥.
We can now define an implication relation  on L as follows:
A  B⇔ A ∨ B = B⇔ A ∧ B = A.
Using this implication relation we can instead define a Boolean algebra simply
as the pair 〈L ,〉. In what follows, when I give formal definitions I will do so
in terms of σ-algebras. However, informally I will often refer to the elements of
a σ-algebra as propositions or simply claims. Sometimes philosophers favour
Boolean algebras over σ-algebras because the elements of L can naturally be
interpreted as sentences rather than propositions, thereby allowing us to poten-
tially get around Frege’s puzzles and related issues. For example, given that
“Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” refer to the same celestial body, standard possi-
ble worlds semantics will identify the proposition “Hesperus is not Phospho-
rus” with the empty set, i.e. the contradictory proposition. But someone who
believes that Hesperus is not Phosphorus seems to believe something different
from someone who believes that 2+ 2 = 5. In a sentence-based approach, we
can represent these possibilities with distinct sentences, thereby making it pos-
sible for agents to rationally take different attitudes towards them. However,
such intensional aspects of belief will not play a central role in our investiga-
tions, and I will therefore mainly stick to the set-based approach.
For philosophers, it is perhaps natural to think of Ω as a set of possible worlds.
For that makes the algebra F a collection of sets of possible worlds, and we
can then understand those sets of possible worlds as propositions in accor-
dance with the familiar possible worlds semantics. We can think of F as the
set of propositions of which the agent is aware, and I will therefore sometimes
refer to F as the agent’s awareness set. To say that an agent is aware of a propo-
sition is to say that she is able to entertain it, i.e. that she is in the position
to have propositional attitudes towards it. Typically, not much is said about
which possible worlds go into Ω. Are they meant to be genuinely possible
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worlds, i.e. maximally specific ways the world might be? And if so, does Ω
have to contain all such maximally specific ways the world might be? Further-
more, is it possible for an agent’s state of awareness to change over time? We
will return to questions about awareness in chapter 4.
We now turn to the three main types of belief models. These models differ
in how much structure they ascribe to our doxastic judgments, i.e. in how
fine-grained they make those judgments out to be.
1.2.1 Categorical Belief
First, we have the traditional notion of full, or categorical, belief. An agent’s
categorical belief state is modelled as a (categorical) belief set B ⊆ F . For any
A ∈ F , we say that she believes A iff A ∈ B, disbelieves A iff ¬A ∈ B, and
suspends judgment about A otherwise. Categorical belief is therefore a very
coarse-grained notion of belief, allowing only for three types of doxastic atti-
tudes.
We can ask various questions about the rationality of belief sets. Plausibly, any
rational belief set should be consistent. It will be helpful to spell out consistency
and some other related notions in a bit more detail here.1 Let Cn(B) be the
closure of her belief set under logical consequence. The belief set B is
• strictly inconsistent iff there is some A ∈ F such that A,¬A ∈ B.
• logically non-omniscient iff there is some A ∈ Cn(B) such that A /∈ B.
• implicitly inconsistent iff there is some A such that A,¬A ∈ Cn(B).
For example, I am strictly inconsistent if I believe both that it’s going to rain to-
morrow and that it’s not going to rain tomorrow. I am logically non-omniscient
if I believe both that it’s going to rain tomorrow and that if it rains then I won’t
go for a run tomorrow, but I don’t believe that I won’t go for a run tomorrow.
And I am implicitly inconsistent if I again believe both that it’s going to rain
tomorrow and that if it rains then I won’t go for a run tomorrow, but I also
believe that I will in fact go for a run tomorrow.
Let us introduce a bit more terminology. Say that a subset S of F is maximal
just in case for every A ∈ F , either A ∈ S or ¬A ∈ S (or both). And let a
completion C of B be a maximal subset of F such that if A ∈ B then A ∈ C. We
can now say that an agent’s beliefs are coherently extendable just in case there is
some strictly consistent completion of her belief set. When an agent’s beliefs
are coherently extendable, this means that she could become fully opinionated
(in the sense of coming to believe either A or ¬A for every A ∈ F ) while
holding on to all of her current beliefs, and remain consistent.
1 These definitions are taken from Bradley (2017:219–223).
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1.2.2 Relational Belief
Some of our beliefs are more fine-grained than the categorical model allows.
For example, I believe that it’s more likely to rain tomorrow than it is to snow,
and I take either of these two scenarios to be more likely than a hurricane.
These are examples of relational belief. The basic judgments of relational belief
are comparative confidence judgments, such as the judgment that A is at least as
likely as B. We will let AD B represent this judgment. We model a relational
doxastic state as a relational belief set BD ⊆ F × F containing all comparative
confidence judgments she accepts.
This means that we can define all the same consistency concepts as before.
However, in order to do so we must first specify what notion of consequence
the closure operator CnD appeals to. In effect, the consequence operator will
be provided by the axioms that we settle on for the comparative confidence re-
lation. Hence for any relational belief set BD, Cn(BD) will be its closure under
comparative confidence consequence. For example, you might think that com-
parative confidence relation should be transitive, i.e. that if I believe that rain
is more likely than snow and that snow is more likely than a hurricane, then I
should also believe that rain is more likely than a hurricane. We will return to
the question of which axioms to adopt for the comparative confidence relation
in section 3.4.2.
1.2.3 Quantitative Belief
However, it seems that some of our beliefs are still more fine-grained than is
allowed for by the relational model. For example, I might believe three times
more strongly that it will rain tomorrow than that it will snow. To capture
beliefs of this sort, we need a notion of quantitative belief. The basic judgments
of quantitative belief are judgments of the form: “I believe A to degree x.” We
model a quantitative doxastic state as a quantitative belief set BQ ⊆ F ×R.
Again, we can define all the same consistency concepts, only now with respect
to quantitative belief consequence. In the approach to quantitative belief with
which we shall chiefly be concerned—the Bayesian one—this amounts to prob-
abilistic consequence, i.e. consequence with respect to the probability axioms.
For example, if I have 0.3 credence that it will rain tomorrow and 0.1 credence
that it will snow, then it follows by probabilistic consequence that I should also
have 0.4 credence that it will either rain or snow (assuming that it cannot do
both).
1.2.4 How the Models Relate to One Another
The relational model is the most general, as it encompasses both the categorical
and the quantitative as special cases. The categorical model can be viewed as a
relational model that only distinguishes between two levels (or perhaps three,
depending on how we treat suspension of judgment). Similarly, the probabilis-
tic model can be viewed as a relational model that recognizes as many levels
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as there are real numbers. Although the categorical model is useful for many
purposes, for many others it is too coarse-grained. On the other hand, it seems
the quantitative model may sometimes be too fine-grained. Perhaps relational
belief can provide a happy middle ground. As we shall see, coherent extend-
ability will have an important role to play in showing how relational belief and
quantitative belief should hang together. But we are getting ahead of ourselves.
Let us now turn our attention to the particular model of quantitative belief that
we shall be concerned with, namely the probabilistic model.
1.3 the two core bayesian norms
1.3.1 Probabilism
Anyone familiar with games of chance will have some fluency in probabilistic
reasoning. Suppose that you are about to throw a six-sided die. We let each
side be an outcome, so that the sample space is Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. When the
sample space is so small, it is easy to let the algebra be the whole power set,
i.e. F = 2Ω. This means that every subset of Ω is a proposition that you can
entertain and assign probability to. For example, {1} will be the proposition
that the die comes up 1, {1, 2} will be the proposition that it comes up either 1
or 2, {2, 4, 6} will be the proposition that it comes up even, etc.
Suppose we adopt the convention that the minimum degree of confidence is 0,
and the maximum degree of confidence is 1. How should you then distribute
your confidence among the possibilities? First of all, given that 0 is assumed
to be the minimum degree of confidence, clearly no claim should receive confi-
dence smaller than this. Second, we know that some side or other must come
up, and hence the sample space Ω itself should receive maximum confidence.
Finally, if two events are disjoint—that is, if they both cannot occur at once,
such as the events {1} and {2}—then one’s confidence that one or the other
will occur should be the sum of the degrees of confidence one assigns to them
individually. In reasoning about this case, we have more or less stated the
axioms on a probability function.
probability function A probability function on 〈Ω,F〉 is a function P : F 7→
R such that:
p1. non-negativity P(A) ≥ 0 for each A ∈ F .
p2. normalization P(Ω) = 1.
p3. finite additivity If A ∩ B = ∅ then P(A ∪ B) = P(A) + P(B).
The ordered triple 〈Ω,F , P〉 is called a probability space. The first axiom says
that every outcome must receive probability greater than or equal to zero. The
second axiom says that the probability that some number or other comes up
is 1. The third axiom says that if two outcomes are disjoint—that is, if they
cannot both occur at once—then the probability that one or the other occurs is
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just the sum of their individual probabilities.2 Let us briefly review some of
the main consequences of the probability axioms:
1. P(∅) = 0.
2. P(A) ≤ 1 for each A ∈ F .
3. If A = {A1, . . . , An} is a subset of F such that Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for each
Ai, Aj ∈ A, then P(∪ni=1Ai) = ∑ni=1 P(Ai).
These should all be fairly intuitive. The first says that the empty set—which we
can think of as the contradictory proposition—should receive probability zero.
This follows from p2 and p3. The second says that no proposition receives
probability greater than 1. The third generalises p3. It says that for any num-
ber of mutually disjoint propositions, the probability of their union should be
equal to the sum of the individual probabilities. For example, in the case of
the six-sided die this means that P({1, 2, 3}) = P({1}) + P({2}) + P({3}).
With the notion of a probability function in place, we can now state the first
normative claim of traditional Bayesianism:
probabilism A rational agent’s quantitative belief state can be represented as
a probability space 〈Ω,F , P〉.
Probabilism thus makes demands both on how the agent represents the pos-
sibilities (namely that these form a σ-algebra) and on her doxastic attitudes
towards these possibilities (namely that they satisfy the probability axioms).
In many philosophical treatments of probabilism, the second demand is usu-
ally given more space than the first, but I will argue that scrupulous proba-
bilists should also pay attention to the demand on representational capacities.
This will be most evident in chapter 4, where I discuss the phenomenon of
awareness growth.
1.3.2 Conditionalization
Often, we are interested in the probability of one event given that some other
event has already occurred. For example, what is the probability that the die
came up 1 given that it came up odd? To answer this, we must introduce the
notion of conditional probability.
conditional probability If P(B) > 0, the probability of A conditional on B is
P(A | B) = P(A ∩ B)
P(B)
The second core normative claim of traditional Bayesianism specifies how
agents should revise their probabilistic beliefs as they receive more informa-
tion:
2 Sometimes p3 is replaced by countable additivity: If Ai ∩ Aj = ∅, then P(∪∞i=1 Ai) = ∑∞i=1 P(Ai).
See e.g. Easwaran (2013) for further discussion.
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conditionalization If a rational agent with probability function P(·) learns
proposition E with certainty and nothing else, her new probability func-
tion is given as PE(·) = P(· | E)
Probabilism is a synchronic norm: it concerns the agent’s degrees of belief at
a given point in time. Conditionalization, on the other hand, is a diachronic
norm: it concerns the relation between her degrees of belief at one point in
time and her degrees of belief at another point in time. As the formulation
above makes clear, conditionalization is only applicable when the learning ex-
perience takes the form of some definite proposition learned with certainty.
Some have claimed that all learning experiences are of this form, but this much
more contentious claim is by no means a necessary component of the Bayesian
picture. On the contrary, I believe Bayesians should recognise that there are
many kinds of learning experience and that some of those kinds may require
responses different from Conditionalization. Of particular interest is uncertain
learning, i.e. learning without there being some proposition of which the agent
becomes certain. When the agent learns some proposition E with certainty,
what happens is that all probability is shifted to the first element of the par-
tition {E,¬E}. One way to generalise this is as follows. Let {Bi}ni=1 ⊂ F be
a partition of Ω.3 Now let the learning experience have the effect of shifting,
for each Bi her old probability assignment P1(Bi) to a new one, P2(Bi), which
need not be extremal.
How should the agent revise her other degrees of belief, i.e. those not included
in the partition, in light of this shift? Jeffrey conditionalization provides an
answer:
jeffrey conditionalization If a rational agent with probability function P1(·)
undergoes an uncertain learning experience which has the effect of shift-
ing, for each element of some partition {Bi}ni=1 ⊂ F of Ω, her probability
assignment from P1(Bi) to P2(Bi), then for any proposition A ∈ F her
new credence is given as:
P2(A) =
n
∑
i=1
P1(A | Bi) · P2(Bi)
.
It is easy to see that ordinary conditionalization is a special case of Jeffrey con-
ditionalization. Let our partition be {B,¬B}, and let P2(B) = 1. The formula
for Jeffrey conditionalization then gives us
P2(A) = P1(A | B)P2(A) + P1(A | ¬B)P2(¬B)
= P1(A | B) · 1+ P1(A | ¬B) · 0
= P1(A | B).
Jeffrey conditionalization is appropriate when we have learned something with-
out being able to specify exactly what it is we have learned. Consider Jeffrey’s
(1983:165) own original example:
3 That is, the elements are mutually exclusive (for any i 6= j, Bi ∩ Bj = ∅) and jointly exhaustive
(∪ni=1Bi = Ω).
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The agent inspects a piece of cloth by candlelight, and gets the
impression that it is green, although he concedes that it might be
blue or even (but very improbably) violet.
In better light conditions, the agent would perhaps be able to conditionalize
on some proposition about the colour of the piece of cloth. But now that she is
only able to get a faint impression, there does not seem to be any proposition
available for her to conditionalize on. Hence Jeffrey conditionalization seems
more appropriate: perhaps she assigns 0.8 credence to it being green, 0.19 to
blue, and 0.01 credence to it being violet.
To better understand the relationship between conditionalization and Jeffrey
conditionalization, we can break down conditionalization into two compo-
nents. For any E, H ∈ F :
rigidity PE(H | E) = P(H | E)
certainty PE(E) = 1
Intuitively, Rigidity says that learning that E should not change how strongly
you take E to support H. Certainty says that you must assign credence 1 to
any proposition you have learned. Jeffrey conditionalization preserves Rigid-
ity, but of course it violates Certainty.4
In summary, traditional Bayesianism is characterized by probabilism and (Jef-
frey) conditionalization. However, that still leaves a lot to settle.5 It will there-
fore be useful to survey some disputes within traditional Bayesianism, particu-
larly as they will become relevant later on. First, we shall investigate whether
there are any further norms on rational credences, beyond probabilism and
conditionalization.
1.4 subjective versus objective
In order for the Bayesian machinery to get going, we must have some proba-
bility function in place to begin with. If we don’t have any values for P(A)
and P(B), the conditional probability P(A | B) will also be undefined and we
will be unable to update on the evidence we receive. Of course, the values we
assign to P(A) and P(B) will usually be based in part on evidence we have
received in the past. But in order to have been able to update on that past
evidence, we must already have had some probability function in place. The
general point is this: no body of evidence (in the sense of a set of propositions
that are assigned probability 1) is sufficient to determine a unique probability
function.6
4 For more details on Jeffrey conditionalization, see Diaconis and Zabell (1982).
5 Good (1971) famously quipped that there are 46,656 varieties of Bayesians.
6 Except in the trivial case when the body of evidence includes, for every proposition in the
algebra, either that proposition or its negation.
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To put the point vividly, we can imagine a “superbaby” who is logically om-
niscient but lacks all empirical evidence.7 Before she begins receiving any em-
pirical evidence, the superbaby must somehow assign probability to all propo-
sitions of interest. These are her prior probabilities. Of course, you and I did not
start our epistemic lives as such superbabies. However, consider an agent who
satisfies probabilism and updates by standard conditionalization. For such an
agent, their body of evidence E = {E ∈ F : P(E) = 1} is the set of all propo-
sitions to which they assign credence one. As I will discuss in section 2.5, for
any probability function P and body of evidence E , there is a prior probability
function P0 such that P(·) = P0(· | ∩E). This means that any Bayesian agent
can be represented as having some prior probability function, and we can ask
what if any rationality constraints there are on priors.
This question of priors is an instance of the general debate over uniqueness, i.e.
over whether for any given body of evidence there is a unique rational doxas-
tic attitude to adopt in light of that evidence (White 2005). When the doxastic
attitude in question is probabilistic, the question becomes a question of priors:
in order for there to be a unique rational probability function to adopt in re-
sponse to any body of evidence there would have to be a unique rational prior
probability function.
Probabilism and conditionalization still leave a significant amount of freedom
in the choice of credence function. The credence function has to satisfy the
probability axioms and be updated in accordance with conditionalization. But
how are we to choose among the vast number of probabilistic credence func-
tions? According to strict subjectivism, this is the end of the matter as far as
rationality is concerned: every probabilistic credence function is as good as
any other. Some worry that without any further rationality constraints on
prior probabilities, Bayesianism becomes a hopelessly subjective theory. Two
agents may both be perfectly rational and receive the same evidence yet draw
vastly different conclusions. Insofar as we find this worrying, there are two
main kinds of responses. First, we can impose further rationality constraints
on prior probabilities, so that the frequency of rational disagreement is reduced
to an acceptable level. Second, we can argue that even if different agents start
out with vastly different priors, they will eventually—assuming they both ob-
tain the same veridical evidence—converge on the same opinion. Let us begin
with the first strategy.
At the other end of the spectrum from strict subjectivism, we find fully objective
Bayesians who believe that there is a unique rational prior probability function.
As a result, they believe that for any body of evidence, there is a unique ratio-
nal posterior probability function to adopt: namely the one that would result
from conditionalising the unique rational prior on that particular body of evi-
dence. However, I take it that most Bayesians fall somewhere in between these
two extremes: they accept some further constraints on rational belief, without
going so far as to say that there is always a uniquely most rational probability
7 Hájek (2012:418) attributes the term to David Lewis.
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function to adopt. We shall now briefly survey proposed constraints that will
be relevant for us later on.
1.4.1 Regularity
The non-negativity axiom requires that P(A) ≥ 0 for every A ∈ F . But con-
sider now the following strengthening:
regularity principle. For all A ∈ F , if A is possible, then any rational prior
probability function P0 on F is such that P0(A) > 0.
This principle entails that if P0(A) = 1, then A is necessary. So a regular
probability function will assign zero to all impossible propositions, one to all
necessary propositions, and some number strictly in between to any contin-
gent proposition. That sounds like a plausible constraint on prior probability
functions: in particular, it can be seen as a way of being open-minded. Sup-
pose that I initially assign credence zero to A. This means that no matter what
evidence I then go on to receive, if I update by standard conditionalization,
I will never be able to revise my credence in A one bit: if P0(A) = 0 then
P0(A | B) = 0 whenever it is defined. Nor will I ever be able to conditionalize
on A directly, because P0(B | A) will be undefined for every B ∈ F .
So an irregular prior probability function forces the agent to forever remain
probabilistically certain that some propositions are false come what may. More-
over, it does so on the basis of no evidence whatsoever. Therefore, we should
ensure that agents begin their inquiries with an open mind by requiring their
prior probability functions to be regular. 0 and 1 are rather different from all
other probability assignments, because once a classical Bayesian agent has as-
signed probability 0 or 1 to some proposition, it is impossible for her to ever
change her mind.
Of course, in order to evaluate this principle we must first specify which type
of modality we are concerned with. There have been formulations in terms of
logical possibility (Shimony 1955, Skyrms 1995), and metaphysical possibility
(Lewis 1980). But perhaps the most plausible choice is doxastic possibility (Hájek,
manuscript). A proposition is doxastically possible for an agent if it is logically
consistent with what she believes. We can make this notion more precise as
follows: a proposition A is doxastically possible for an agent just in case it is a
non-empty element of her algebra F . This gives us:
doxastic regularity principle. For any rational prior probability function
P0 on F and any non-empty A ∈ F , P0(A) > 0.
Suppose we are throwing darts at the unit interval, so that Ω = [0, 1]. And sup-
pose we let the σ-algebra simply be the power set of the sample space: F = 2Ω.
There is no countably additive P such that P(A) > 0 for all A ∈ F . Any prob-
ability function defined on an uncountable algebra will be irregular. Hájek
suggests that the the failure of regularity means that the ratio analysis will not
do as a definition of conditional probability. According to that analysis, the
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conditional probability P(A | B) is only defined when P(B) > 0. As we have
seen, it is impossible to assign non-zero credence to each of an uncountable
number of propositions. Nevertheless, it still seems intelligible to speak of the
probability conditional on such a proposition.
For example, suppose we are now throwing darts on a two-dimensional board,
specified by Cartesian coordinates (x, y). It seems perfectly sensible to say
that P(y ≥ 0 | x = 0) = 1/2. That is, conditional on hitting the board at
x = 0, the probability of hitting above the origin is one half. But of course
P(x = 0) = 0, so the ratio analysis cannot make sense of this conditional prob-
ability. Nor can it make sense of the intuitive idea that the probability of any
proposition conditional on itself should be 1: if P(B) = 0 then P(B | B) will be
undefined. Furthermore, if it is sometimes necessary to assign credence zero
to doxastically possible propositions, then it may happen that an agent learns a
proposition she previously assigned credence zero. What should she do then?
Conditionalization tells her to replace her old probabilities with conditional
probabilities. But if we maintain the ratio analysis, these will be undefined
when she learns a probability zero proposition. In response, some have sug-
gested that we should take conditional probability to be the primitive notion
and define unconditional probability in terms of conditional probability rather
than the other way. This way we can ensure that the ratio formula still holds
whenever the probability of the conditioning proposition is non-zero while
also making room for conditional probability in cases where this condition is
not met. We shall return to the regularity principle in section 2.5 when we
discuss a problem for imprecise Bayesianism.
1.4.2 Chance-Credence Principles
Suppose we think there is such a thing as objective chance. Perhaps a coin be-
ing flipped has some genuine objective chance of coming up heads. Or perhaps
there is objective chance at the quantum level.8 If we do believe in objective
chance, it’s natural to think that knowledge of objective chance should influ-
ence our credences in some way. In particular, if you know what the objective
chance of some event is, then it seems you should set your credence that the
event will occur to equal the objective chance. Something like this idea seems
to be at play in the way we usually think about coin flips: it is reasonable to
assign probability one half to heads precisely because we take that to be the
objective chance of heads. Various so-called chance-credence principles make this
intuitive idea more precise. The most famous such proposal is the principal
principle (Lewis 1980).
principal principle Let P0 be any rational prior probability function. Let ti
be any time. Let chi(A) = x be the proposition that the chance at ti
8 For an argument that objective chance at some level of description is compatible with determin-
ism at a lower level of description, see List and Pivato (2015).
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of A is x. Let E be any proposition consistent with chi(A) = x that is
admissible at ti. Then
P0(A | chi(A) = x ∧ E) = x.
To fully unpack this, we need to say what it is for a proposition to be admissible
at a time. Among other things, Lewis intended for the criterion to rule out
cases of foreknowledge: if you are somehow able to know, before the fact, that
the coin will come up heads, then your credence in this proposition should
clearly be 1, even if you know that its chance is 0.5. The details of this debate
are not central to our discussion, although chance-credence principles will also
become relevant in section 2.5 when we consider what constraints to impose
on imprecise priors.
1.4.3 Reflection Principle
The principal principle is an example of a deference principle, or an expert
principle: it tells us to defer to the expertise of objective chance. Another
expert principle is van Fraassen’s (1984) reflection principle:
reflection principle If P1 is the agent’s credence function at some time t1
and P2 her credence function at some later time t2, then for any A ∈ F ,
P1(A | P2(A) = x) = x.
Of course, we rarely get information about our future credences other than
through the passage of time. And there are cases where the principle clearly
shouldn’t apply, at least as stated. For example, even if I know that when I
get drunk tonight I will believe that I’m a fantastic driver, I should not now
conclude that I will be a fantastic driver tonight. Even so, there may be some
use for reflection. Here is how van Fraassen (1995:25–26) views the principle:
Integrity requires me to express my commitment to proceed in
what I now classify as a rational manner, to stand behind the ways
in which I shall revise my values and opinions.
As we shall see in chapter 2, some object to imprecise Bayesianism on the
grounds that it occasionally violates a generalised version of the reflection
principle.
1.4.4 Principle of Indifference
Unlike the previous principles, the principle of indifference seeks to narrow
down the range of rational prior probability functions to just a single one. It
starts with the plausible-sounding idea that if one has no reason to think that
A is more likely than B or vice versa, then one should treat them as equally
likely; and it gives this idea a precise formulation: whenever there is some fi-
nite number of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities and one
has no reason to think that any one of them is more likely than any other, then
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one should assign all of them equal probability.9 10
Various justifications of the principle of indifference have been proposed. White
(2009) argues that the principle provides the correct way of responding to ev-
idence. Jaynes (1957) argues that of all prior probability functions one might
adopt, the indifference prior encodes the least information. Williamson (2017)
argues that the indifference prior is in a certain sense the most cautious one.
And Pettigrew (2016b) gives an accuracy-based argument.11
As is well-known, this principle yields different verdicts depending on how
the possibilities are described. How likely is it to rain tomorrow? If the possi-
bilities are rain and no rain, the probability is 1/2. But if the possibilities are
moderate rain, heavy rain, and no rain, the probability is 2/3. So on the face
of it, the principle of indifference appears to give inconsistent advice.
If we wish to defend the principle against the charge of inconsistency, we have
two options: either claim that there is some privileged way of describing the
possibilities and that the principle of indifference should only be applied to
this description, or claim that the principle is a description-relative constraint
which only comes into play once we’ve settled on a particular description. The
first option avoids inconsistency because it takes the principle to only ever
issue a unique recommendation, so there can never be multiple recommenda-
tions that may conflict with one another. The second option avoids inconsis-
tency because it takes the principle to be applicable only after we’ve specified a
description of the possibilities. Once we have such a description, the principle
will issue a unique recommendation and the fact that it would issue different
recommendations for other descriptions is neither here nor there.
Although there have been several ingenious attempts to show that many prob-
lem cases for the principle of indifference do in fact have a privileged descrip-
tion (e.g. Jaynes 1973), I take the current consensus to be that such a strategy
is unlikely to succeed across the board. Indeed, among recent defenders of the
principle, many have explicitly endorsed the second response to the charge
of inconsistency.12 If we go for the description-relative formulation, then the
propositions that are to be assigned equal prior probability must be elements
of the agent’s algebra F that together form a partition of Ω. Of the various
9 Here I intentionally set aside issues that arise when the number of possibilities is either count-
ably or uncountably infinite.
10 For example, the early Wittgenstein appears to have advocated a version of this view (cf. 5.15–
5.154 of the Tractatus).
11 See Jaynes (2003) for an extended discussion and defense of the principle.
12 For example, Pettigrew (2016: 57), who offers an accuracy-based argument for indifference,
writes that “the Principle of Indifference will make different demands on [an agent] depending
on the set of propositions she entertains.” Similarly, in his defence of the different but closely
related Maximum Entropy Principle, Williamson (2010: 156) writes that “[t]here is no getting
round it: probabilities generated by the Maximum Entropy Principle depend on language as
well as evidence.”
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partitions available, I take it that the natural choice is the most fine-grained
one.13,14 This gives us the following:
principle of indifference. A rational agent with algebra F over Ω should
assign equal prior probability to each cell of the finest partition A of Ω
such that A ⊂ F :
P0(A) =
1
| A | for each A ∈ A.
15
The principle of indifference will be especially important in the next chapter.
As we shall see, Joyce (2005, 2010) argues that even if we could formulate the
principle in a way that avoided inconsistency it would still be objectionable, be-
cause it commits us to very definite beliefs when there is no evidence available
to support such beliefs. This rejection of the principle of indifference forms
part of the argument for his for the brand of evidentially-motivated imprecise
Bayesianism we will examine in that chapter.
1.4.5 Washing Out Theorems
We have now surveyed some putative further constraints on rational probabil-
ity functions. How worried should we be if it turns out that very few of these
are acceptable? Would it make Bayesianism unacceptably subjective? Some
think that so-called washing out theorems can still vindicate the objectivity of
Bayesian epistemology. Roughly speaking, such theorems show that under
certain conditions, agents who begin with different prior probability functions
will, as they acquire more and more evidence, in the long run converge on the
same posterior probability function. So although the choice of prior is subjec-
tive, as agents acquire more and more evidence their priors play a smaller and
smaller part in determining their posteriors until they eventually converge on
the same posterior. In the long run, therefore, the subjective aspect of Bayesian-
ism is weeded out.
One influential convergence theorem is due to Blackwell and Dubins (1962).
Consider two agents who assign probability to the set of all infinite binary
sequence. At each step, they both observe and conditionalize on one new el-
ement of the sequence. Let their respective prior probability functions be P1
and P2. Say that P1 is absolutely continuous with respect to P2 just in case for any
A ∈ F , P1(A) > 0 implies P2(A) > 0. And say that two sequences of probabil-
ity functions merge if the values they assign eventually stay within some e of
13 Given that we are assuming that F is finite, there will always exist a unique most fine-grained
partition P of Ω such that P ⊂ F , provided only that we exclude the trivial algebra F =
{∅,Ω}.
14 Most defenders of the description-relative principle of indifference also seem to endorse this
way of applying it. For example, Pettigrew (2016: 57) writes that the principle of indifference
requires of an agent that she “divide her credence equally over the possibilities grained as finely
as the propositions she entertains will allow” (emphasis in original).
15 Given that A is the finest partition of Ω contained in F , every element of F can be written as
the union of some elements of A (all of which are disjoint), and hence PI determines a unique
prior probability assignment for each element of F .
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one another. What Blackwell and Dubins found is that if P1 is absolutely con-
tinuous with P2, then they will eventually merge with P1 probability 1. This
means that if I assign probability zero to every proposition that you assign
probability zero, then I will be certain (in the sense of assigning probability 1)
that you and I will eventually merge. Correspondingly, if you also assign prob-
ability zero to every proposition that I assign probability zero, then you will be
certain (in the sense of assigning probability 1) that you and I will eventually
merge.
You may wonder, especially in light of the objections to the regularity principle
that we discussed, whether it’s plausible to require that the agents only assign
probability zero to the same propositions. Or you may wonder about the fact
that merging is only guaranteed in the sense that the agents themselves are cer-
tain that it will happen—couldn’t they be mistaken? Finally, you may wonder
what relevance results like these have for agents like ourselves, who will only
ever receive finite amounts of evidence. Granted, it is better from the view-
point of objectivity that this result is indeed a theorem than it would be were
its negation a theorem. But just how much reassurance we derive from this
result and others like it will depend on our assessment of their conditions.16
This concludes our survey of subjectivism versus objectivism. Next, we turn
to some practical uses for Bayesian epistemology.
1.5 decision theory
Although this thesis is primarily concerned with Bayesian epistemology and
not Bayesian decision theory, the two often go hand in hand. And I take it
that if you find the former compelling as an account of theoretical rationality,
you will be predisposed to find the latter compelling as an account of practical
rationality. Moreover, some very influential arguments for probabilism are in
fact arguments for Bayesian decision theory—i.e., arguments for expected util-
ity maximisation—of which probabilism is a consequence. Furthermore, the
formal framework we shall use for representing moral claims draws heavily
on some aspects of decision theory. Therefore a refresher may prove handy.17
Decision theory starts with decision problems: situations in which an agent faces
a choice between different options. For example, suppose you are considering
whether or not to bring an umbrella as you leave the house. The relevant
question, of course, is whether it’s going to rain or not. We can represent this
decision problem using a state-consequence matrix as follows:
So the picture is this: agent chooses between some number of options, and
those options have certain consequences. Which particular consequence will
follow from the exercise of a given option depends on the state of nature.
Whether leaving the umbrella will have the consequence of getting soaked de-
pends on whether it’s raining or not. If you are certain that it will rain, the
16 Another important result is due to Gaifman and Snir (1982). See Earman (1992, chapter 6) and
Hawthorne (2008) for further discussion.
17 See Jeffrey (1983), Joyce (1999) and Bradley (2017) for detailed accounts of Bayesian decision
theory.
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Clear Rainy
Umbrella Dry, carrying umbrella Dry, carrying umbrella
No umbrella Dry, no umbrella Wet, no umbrella
Table 1: State-Consequence Matrix
decision problem is easy: just bring the umbrella. Similarly, if you are certain
that it won’t rain, you’ll know not to bother. But if you’re uncertain, things
aren’t quite as straightforward. There’s some chance that it will rain, in which
case you would strongly prefer having the umbrella to not having it. But
there’s some chance that it won’t, in which case it would be a minor nuisance
to have to carry an umbrella around. How should you make up your mind?
Bayesian decision theory answers that you should maximise expected utility.18
The core idea is that what you should do depends both on your level of uncer-
tainty and how strongly you desire the different possible outcomes. First, we
represent the agent’s uncertainty as a probability function over states, in this
case simply Rain and No Rain. Second, we use a utility function to represent
how desirable the agent finds the various possible consequences. Given that
having to carry an umbrella around on a cloudless day is mild inconvenience
compared to the serious frustration of getting your new business suit soaked,
this should be reflected in the numbers that the utility function assigns to these
consequences.
0.5 0.5
Umbrella 9 9
No umbrella 10 1
Table 2: Probability-Utility Matrix
We can now give expected utility maximization a rough first mathematical
formulation. There are various ways of doing so, and I will be using the frame-
work of Jeffrey (1965). The differences between this framework and others will
not concern us here. The probability function P is defined as before. The util-
ity function U : F 7→ R assigns a number to each possibility, indicating how
desirable the agent finds that possibility. Given that we are uncertain about
the consequences of our options, we can think of an option as a probability
distribution over outcomes. So in deciding between her options, the agent is
deciding between different probability distributions over consequences. Let
O = {O1, . . . , On} be her options. Then for any proposition A ∈ F , P(A | Oi)
18 The idea of expected utility maximisation is as old as probability theory itself. In the Port-Royal
Logic we learn that “to judge what one ought to do to obtain a good or avoid an evil, one must
not only consider the good and the evil in itself, but also the probability that it will or will not
happen and view geometrically the proportion that all these things have together.” (Arnauld
and Nicole 1662/1996).
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will be the probability of A conditional on having performed option Oi. The
expected utility of a given option O can now be written as:
E(O) = ∑
A∈F
U(A)P(A | O).
And the norm of expected utility maximisation now says that rationality re-
quires agents to always choose an option whose expected utility is at least as
high as that of any other available option.
1.6 overview
Let us summarize. Recall the three questions with which we began:
(1) structure How does the theory represent the agent’s doxastic attitude?
(2) object What are the objects of uncertainty? What are we uncertain about?
(3) dynamics How should our uncertainty change as we receive new evidence?
Traditional Bayesianism gives the following answers:
(1) The agent’s doxastic attitude is represented as a probability space.
(2) The objects of credence are descriptive propositions.
(3) The agent should update her credences by (Jeffrey) conditionalization.
We have seen that this still leaves room for a lot of disagreement. Strict subjec-
tivists believe that there are no other constraints on rational credence, whereas
moderate subjectivists and full-blown objectivists accept further constraints,
such as the regularity principle, chance-credence principles, the reflection prin-
ciple, or the principle of indifference. And some think that convergence results
can help us evade the charge of subjectivism even if there are only relatively
few constraints on rational credence. We have also seen that Bayesian episte-
mology goes well together with Bayesian decision theory, according to which
rational agents perform the action that maximises expected utility relative to
their probability and utility functions.
In the next part of this thesis, we will consider three variations on these three
answers. In chapter 2, we consider what happens when the structure of cre-
dence is given as a set of probability functions rather than a single one. In
chapter 3 we examine whether probabilism can be justified when the objects
of credence are moral claims rather than descriptive claims. And in chapter 4
we attempt to provide a Bayesian account of reflective equilibrium by allow-
ing the agent’s credences to change over time by awareness growth as well as
by (Jeffrey) conditionalization. Although these three chapters concern some-
what different topics, some general lessons nevertheless emerge. These are
summarised in chapter 5.
Part II
VA R I AT I O N S
2
I M P R E C I S E B AY E S I A N I S M A N D G L O B A L B E L I E F I N E RT I A
2.1 introduction
Our first variation concerns the structure of credence. In the traditional Bayesian
framework, agents must have precise degrees of belief, in the sense that these
degrees of belief are represented by a real-valued credence function. This may
seem implausible in several respects. In particular, one might think that our
evidence is rarely rich enough to justify this kind of precision—choosing one
number over another as our degree of belief will often be an arbitrary decision
with no basis in the evidence. For this reason, Joyce (2010) suggests that we
should represent degrees of belief by a set of credence functions instead.1 This
way, we can avoid arbitrariness by requiring that the set contains all credence
functions that are, in some sense, compatible with the evidence.
However, this requirement creates a new difficulty. The more limited our evi-
dence is, the greater the number of credence functions compatible with it will
be. In certain cases, the number of compatible credence functions will be so
vast that the range of our credence in some propositions will remain the same
no matter how much evidence we subsequently go on to obtain. This is the
problem of belief inertia. Joyce is willing to accept this implication, but I will
argue that the phenomenon is much more widespread than he seems to real-
ize, and that there is therefore decisive reason to abandon his view.
In the next section, I provide some reason for thinking that the precision of
the traditional Bayesian framework may be problematic. In Section 3, I present
Joyce’s preferred alternative—imprecise Bayesianism—and attempt to spell out
its underlying evidentialist motivation. In particular, I suggest an account of
what it means for a credence function to be compatible with a body of evidence.
After that, in Section 4, I introduce the problem of belief inertia via an example
from Joyce. I also prove that one strategy for solving the problem (suggested
but not endorsed by Joyce) is unsuccessful. Section 5 argues that the problem
is far more general than one might think when considering Joyce’s example
in isolation. The argument turns on the question of what prior credal state
an evidentially motivated imprecise Bayesian agent should have. I maintain
that, in light of her motivation for rejecting precise Bayesianism, her prior
credal state must include all credence functions that satisfy some very weak
constraints. However, this means that the problem of belief inertia is with us
1 Although Joyce is my main target in this essay, the view is of course not original to him. For an
influential early exponent, see Levi (1980).
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from the very start, and that it affects almost all of our beliefs. Even those
who are willing to concede certain instances of belief inertia should find this
general version unacceptable. Finally, in section 6 I consider a few different
ways for an imprecise Bayesian to respond. The upshot is that we must give
up the very strong form of evidentialism and allow that the choice of prior
credal state is to a large extent subjective.
2.2 the problems with precision
As we saw in the previous chapter, traditional Bayesianism is committed to the
following two normative claims:
probabilism A rational agent’s quantitative belief state can be represented as
a probability space 〈Ω,F , P〉.
conditionalization If a rational agent with probability function P1(·) learns
proposition E with certainty and nothing else, her new probability func-
tion is given as P2(·) = P1(· | E).
Some philosophers within the Bayesian tradition have taken issue with the
precision required by probabilism. For one thing, it may appear descriptively
inadequate. It seems implausible to think that flesh-and-blood human beings
have such fine-grained degrees of belief.2 However, even if this psychologi-
cal obstacle could be overcome, Joyce (2010) argues that precise probabilism
should be rejected on normative grounds, because our evidence is rarely rich
enough to justify having precise credences. His point is perhaps best appreci-
ated by way of example.
three urns There are three urns in front of you, each of which contains a
hundred marbles. You are told that the first urn contains fifty black and
fifty white marbles, and that all marbles in the second urn are either
black or white, but you don’t know their ratio. You are given no further
information about marble colours in the third urn. For each urn i, what
credence should you have in the proposition Bi that a marble drawn at
random from that urn will be black?
Here I will understand a random draw simply as one where each marble in
the urn has an equal chance of being drawn. That makes the first case straight-
forward. We know that there are as many black marbles as there are white
ones, and that each of them has an equal chance of being drawn. Hence we
should apply some chance-credence principle and set P(B1) = 0.5.3 The sec-
ond case is not so clear-cut. Some will say that any credence assignment is
permissible, or at least that a wide range of them are. Others will again try to
identify a unique credence assignment as rationally required, typically via an
application of the principle of indifference. They will claim that we have no
2 Whether this is implausible will depend on what kind of descriptive claim one thinks is involved
in ascribing a precise degree of belief to an agent. See for instance Meacham and Weisberg
(2011).
3 Hardcore subjectivists may insist that, even in this case, any probabilistically coherent credence
assignment is permissible.
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reason to consider either black or white as more likely than the other, and that
we should therefore give them equal consideration by setting P(B2) = 0.5.
However, as is well-known, the principle of indifference gives inconsistent re-
sults depending on how we partition the space of possibilities.4 This becomes
even more evident when we consider the third urn. In the first two cases we
knew that all marbles were either black or white, but now we don’t even have
that piece of information. So in order to apply the principle of indifference,
we must first settle on a partition of the space of possible colours. If we set-
tle on the partition {black, not black}, the principle of indifference gives us
P(B3) = 0.5. If we instead think that the partition is given by the eleven basic
colour terms of the English language, the principle of indifference tells us to
set P(B3) = 1/11.
How can we determine which partition is appropriate? In some problem
cases, the principle’s adherents have come up with ingenious ways of iden-
tifying a privileged partition. However, Joyce (2005:170) argues that even if
this could be done across the board (which seems doubtful), the real trouble
runs deeper. The principle of indifference goes wrong by always assigning
precise credences, and hence the real culprit is (precise) probabilism. In the
first urn case, our evidence is rich enough to justify a precise credence of 0.5.
But in the second and third cases, our evidence is so limited that any precise
credence would constitute a leap far beyond the information available to us.
Adopting a precise credence in these cases would amount to acting as if we
have evidence we simply do not possess, regardless of whether that precise
credence is based merely on personal opinion, or whether it has been derived
from some supposedly objective principle.
The lesson Joyce draws from this example is therefore that we should only
require agents to have imprecise credences. This way we can respect our ev-
idence even when that evidence is ambiguous, partial, or otherwise limited.
My target in this paper will be this sort of evidentially motivated imprecise
Bayesianism. In the next section I present the view and clarify the evidentialist
argument for adopting it.
2.3 imprecise bayesianism
Joyce’s (2010:287) imprecise Bayesianism makes the following two normative
claims:
imprecise probabilism A rational agent’s quantitative beliefs can be repre-
sented as a triple 〈Ω,F ,P〉, where P = {P1, P2, . . . } is a set of probability
functions on F .
4 Widely discussed examples include Bertrand’s (1889) paradox, and van Fraassen’s (1989) cube
factory.
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imprecise conditionalization. If a rational agent with credal state P learns
proposition E with certainty and nothing else, her new credal state is
given as PE = {Pi(· | E) : Pi(·) ∈ P}.5
Each individual credence function thus behaves just like the credence func-
tions of precise Bayesianism: they are probabilistic, and they are updated by
conditionalization. The difference is only that the agent’s degrees of belief are
now represented by a set of credence functions, rather than a single one. As a
useful terminological shorthand, I will write P(A) for the set of numbers as-
signed to the proposition A by the elements of P , so that P(A) = {x : ∃P ∈ P
s.t. P(A) = x}. I will refer to P(A) simply as the agent’s credence in A.
Agents with precise credences are more confident in a proposition A than in
another proposition B if and only if their credence function assigns a greater
value to A than to B. In order to be able to make similar comparisons for
agents with imprecise credences, we will adopt what I take to be the standard,
supervaluationist, view and say that an imprecise believer is determinately
more confident in A than in B if and only if P(A) > P(B) for each P ∈ P . If
there are P1, P2 ∈ P such that P1(A) > P1(B) and P2(A) < P2(B), it is indeter-
minate which of the two propositions she regards as more likely. In general,
any claim about her overall doxastic state requires unanimity among all the
credence functions in order to be determinately true or false.6
Imprecise Bayesianism has been objected to in several ways. In cases of so-
called dilation, imprecise Bayesianism entails that a rational agent’s credal state
will foreseeably become less precise as she acquires new evidence (Seidenfeld
and Wasserman 1993, Bradley and Steele 2014). Some find this objectionable,
either because it seems to violate a reflection principle for imprecise credences,
or because of a conviction that evidence should serve to make our credences
more rather than less precise. Others have argued that any decision theory for
imprecise probability is either implausible or collapses into a decision theory
for precise probability, thereby calling into question the need for imprecision
in the first place (see e.g. Elga 2010 and Mahtani 2018). However, the objection
I will present is specific to an evidentially motivated imprecise Bayesianism.
Let us therefore try to spell this out in a bit more detail.
Joyce defends imprecise Bayesianism on the grounds that many evidential sit-
uations do not warrant precise credences. With his framework in place, we
can respect the datum that a precise credence of 0.5 is the correct response in
the first urn case, without thereby being forced to assign precise credences in
5 As stated, the update rule doesn’t tell us what to do if an element of the credal state assigns zero
probability to a proposition that the agent later learns. This problem is of course familiar from
the precise setting. Three options suggest themselves: (i) discard all such credence functions
from the posterior credal state, (ii) require that each element of the credal state the regularity
principle, so that they only assign zero to doxastically impossible propositions, thereby ensuring
that the situation can never arise, or (iii) introduce a primitive notion of conditional probability.
For my purposes, we don’t need to settle on a solution. I’ll just assume that the imprecise
Bayesian has some satisfactory way of dealing with these cases.
6 This supervaluationist view of credal states is endorsed by Joyce (2010), van Fraassen (1990),
and Hájek (2003), among others.
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the second and third cases as well. In these last two cases, our evidence is
ambiguous or partial, and assigning precise credences would require making
a leap far beyond the information available to us.
This raises the question of how far in the direction of imprecision we should
move in order to remain on the ground. How many credence functions must
we include in our credal state before we can be said to be faithful to our ev-
idence? Joyce answers that we should include just those credence functions
that are compatible with our evidence.7 We can state this as:
evidence grounding thesis At any point in time, a rational agent’s credal
state includes all and only those credence functions that are compatible
with the total evidence she possesses at that time.
To unpack this principle, we need a substantive account of what it takes for
a credence function to be compatible with a body of evidence. One such pro-
posal is due to White (2010:174):
chance grounding thesis Only on the basis of known chances can one le-
gitimately have sharp credences. Otherwise one’s spread of credence
should cover the range of possible chance hypotheses left open by your
evidence.
The chance grounding thesis posits a very tight connection between credence
and chance. As Joyce (2010:289) points out, the connection is indeed too tight,
in at least one respect. There are cases where all possible chance hypotheses
are left open by our evidence, but where we should nevertheless have sharp
(precise) credences. He provides the following example.
symmetrical biases Suppose that an urn contains coins of unknown bias, and
that for each coin of bias α there is another coin of bias (1− α). One coin
has been chosen from the urn at random. What credence should we have
in the proposition H, that it will come up heads on the first flip?
Because the chance of heads corresponds to the bias of the chosen coin (what-
ever it is), and since (for all we know) the chosen coin could have any bias,
every possible chance hypothesis is left open by the evidence. In this setup,
for each P ∈ P , the credence assignment P(H) is given as the expected value
of a corresponding probability density function (pdf), fP, defined over the pos-
sible chance hypotheses: P(H) =
∫ 1
0 x · fP(x) dx. The information that, for any
α, there are as many coins of bias α as there are coins of bias (1− α) translates
into the requirement that for each a, b ∈ [0, 1] and for every fP,∫ b
a
fP(x) dx =
∫ 1−a
1−b
fP(x) dx. (1)
Any fP which satisfies this constraint will be symmetrical around the midpoint,
and will therefore have an expected value of 0.5. This means that P(H) = 0.5
7 Joyce (2010:288) writes that each element of the credal state is a probability function that the
agent takes to be compatible with her evidence. This formulation leaves it open whether com-
patibility is meant to be an objective or a subjective notion; we will return to this issue later.
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for each P ∈ P . Thus we have a case where all possible chance hypotheses are
left open by the evidence, but where we should still have a precise credence.8
Nevertheless, something in the spirit of the chance grounding thesis looks like
a natural way of unpacking the evidence grounding thesis. In Joyce’s exam-
ple, each possible chance hypothesis is indeed left open by the evidence, but
we do know that every pdf fP must satisfy constraint (1) for each a, b ∈ [0, 1].
So any fP which doesn’t satisfy this constraint will be incompatible with our
evidence. And similarly for any other constraints our evidence might impose
on fP. In the case of a known chance hypothesis, the only pdf compatible with
the evidence will be the one that assigns all weight to that known chance value.
Similarly, if the chance value is known to lie within some particular range, then
the only pdfs compatible with the evidence will be those that are equal to zero
everywhere outside of that range.
However, as Joyce’s example shows, these are not the only ways in which our
evidence can rule out pdfs. More generally, evidence can constrain the shape
of the compatible pdfs. In light of this, we can propose the following revision.
revised chance grounding thesis A rational agent’s credal state contains all
and only those credence functions that are given as the expected value of
some probability density function over chance hypotheses that satisfies
the constraints imposed by her evidence.
Just like White’s original chance grounding thesis, my revised formulation
posits an extremely tight connection between credence and chance. For any
given body of evidence, it leaves no freedom in the choice of which credence
functions to include in one’s credal state. Because of the way compatibility
is understood, there will always be a fact of the matter about which credence
functions are compatible with one’s evidence, and hence about which credence
functions ought to be included in one’s credal state.
The question, then, is whether we should settle on this formulation, or whether
we can change the requirements without thereby compromising the initial mo-
tivation for the imprecise model. In his discussion of the chance grounding
thesis, Joyce (2010:288) claims that even when the error in White’s formulation
has been taken care of, as I proposed to do with my revision, the resulting
principle is not essential to the imprecise proposal. Instead, he thinks it is
merely the most extreme view an imprecise Bayesian might adopt. Now, this
is certainly correct as a claim about imprecise Bayesianism in general. One can
8 It has been suggested to me that it might make a difference whether the coin that is to be
flipped has been chosen yet or not. If it has not yet been chosen, a precise credence of 0.5 seems
sensible in light of one’s knowledge of the setup. If instead it has already been chosen, then
it has a particular bias, and since the relevant symmetry considerations are no longer in play,
one’s credence should be maximally imprecise: [0, 1]. However, one might argue that rationally
assigning a precise credence of 0.5 when the coin has not yet been chosen does not constitute
a counterexample to the original chance grounding thesis, by arguing that the proposition ‘The
next coin to be flipped will come up heads’ has an objective chance of 0.5. My argument won’t
turn on this, so I’m happy to go along with Joyce and accept that we have a counterexample to
the chance grounding thesis.
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accept both imprecise probabilism and imprecise conditionalization without
accepting any claim about how knowledge of chance hypotheses, or any other
kind of evidence, should constrain which credence functions are to be included
in the credal state. However, on the evidentially motivated proposal that Joyce
advocates himself, it’s not clear whether any other way of specifying what it
means for a credence function to be compatible with one’s evidence could be
defended.
One worry you might have about the revised chance grounding thesis is that
in many cases our evidence seems to rule out certain credence assignments as
irrational, even though it’s difficult to see which chance hypotheses we might
appeal to in explaining why this is so. Take for instance the proposition that my
friend Jakob will have the extraordinarily spicy phaal curry for dinner tonight.
I know that he loves spicy food, and I’ve had phaal with him a few times
in the past year. In light of my evidence, some credence assignments seem
clearly irrational. A value of 0.001 certainly seems too low, and a value of 0.9
certainly seems too high. However, we don’t normally think of our credence
in propositions of this kind as being constrained by information about chances.
If this is correct, then the revised chance grounding thesis can at best provide
a partial account of what it takes for a body of evidence to rule out a credence
assignment as irrational. Of course, one could insist that we do have some
information about chances which allows us to rule out the relevant credence
assignments, but such an idea would have to be worked out in a lot more detail
before it could be made plausible. Alternatively, one could simply deny my
claim that these credence assignments would be irrational. However, as we’ll
soon discover, that response would merely strengthen my objection.9
Going forward, I will assume that the evidence grounding thesis holds, so
that a rational agent’s credal state should include all and only those credence
functions that are compatible with her total evidence. I will also assume that
this notion of compatibility is an objective one, so that there is always a fact
of the matter about which credence functions are compatible with a given
body of evidence. However, I will not assume any particular understanding of
compatibility, such as those provided by White’s chance grounding thesis or
my revised formulation. As we’ll see, these assumptions spell trouble for the
9 Another case where it’s not immediately clear how to apply the revised chance grounding thesis
is propositions about past events. On what I take to be the standard view, such propositions
have an objective chance of either 1 or 0, depending on whether they occurred or not (see for
instance Schaffer 2007). So for a proposition A about an event that is known to be in the past,
the only chance hypotheses left open by the evidence are (at most) 0 and 1. However, in certain
cases, this will be enough to give us maximal imprecision. If we have no knowledge of what
the chance of A was prior to the event’s occurring (or not occurring), then it seems that any
way of distributing credence across these two chance hypotheses will be compatible with our
evidence, and hence that the credal state will include a credence function P with P(A) = x for
each x ∈ [0, 1]. Indeed, if we accept Levi’s (1980, chapter 9) credal convexity requirement, then
whenever the credal state includes 0 and 1, it will also include everything in between. A further
worry, which I will set aside here, is whether we can have any non-trivial objective chances if
determinism is true.
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imprecise Bayesian. I will therefore revisit them in Section 6, to see whether
they can be given up.
2.4 local belief inertia
In certain cases, evidentially-motivated imprecise Bayesianism makes induc-
tive learning impossible. Joyce already recognizes this, but I will argue that
the implications are more wide-ranging and therefore more problematic than
has been appreciated so far.10 To illustrate the phenomenon, consider an ex-
ample adapted from Joyce (2010:290).
unknown bias A coin of unknown bias is about to be flipped. What is your
credence P(H1) that the outcome of the first flip will be heads? And
after having observed n flips, what is your credence that the coin will
come up heads on the (n + 1)th flip?
As in the Symmetrical Biases example discussed earlier, each P ∈ P is here
given as the expected value of a corresponding probability density function,
fP, over the possible chance hypotheses. We are not provided with any evi-
dence that bears on the question of whether the first outcome will be heads,
and hence our evidence cannot rule out any pdfs as incompatible. In turn,
this means that no value of P(H1) can be ruled out, and therefore that our
overall credal state with respect to this proposition will be maximally impre-
cise: P(H1) = (0, 1).11 However, this starting point renders inductive learning
impossible, in the following sense. Suppose that you observe the coin being
flipped a thousand times, and see 500 heads and 500 tails. This looks like
incredibly strong evidence that the coin is very, very close to fair, and would
seem to justify concentrating your credence on some fairly narrow interval
around 0.5. However, although each element of the credal state will indeed
move toward the midpoint, there will always remain elements on each extreme.
Indeed, for any finite sequence of outcomes and for any x ∈ (0, 1), there will
be a credence function P ∈ P which assigns a value of x to the proposition
that the next outcome will be heads, conditional on that sequence. Thus your
credence that the next outcome will be heads will remain maximally imprecise,
no matter how many observations you make.
Bradley (2015) calls this the problem of belief inertia. I will refer to it as local
belief inertia, as it pertains to a limited class of beliefs, namely those about
the outcomes of future coin flips. This is a troubling implication, but Joyce
(2010:291) is willing to accept it:
if you really know nothing about the [...] coin’s bias, then you also
really know nothing about how your opinions about [Hn+1] should
10 Joyce is of course not the first to recognize this. See for instance Walley’s (1991:93) classic
monograph for a discussion of how certain types of imprecise probability have difficulties with
inductive learning.
11 Joyce (2010:290) thinks we should understand maximal imprecision here to mean the open set
(0, 1) rather than the closed set [0, 1], but it’s not obvious on what basis we might rule out the
two extremal probability assignments. At any rate, my objection won’t turn on which of these
is correct, as we’ll see shortly.
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change in light of frequency data. [...] You cannot learn anything
in cases of pronounced ignorance simply because a prerequisite for
learning is to have prior views about how potential data should
alter your beliefs, but you have no determinate views on these mat-
ters at all.
Nevertheless, he suggests a potential way out for imprecise Bayesians who
don’t share his evidentialist commitments. The underlying idea is that we
should be allowed to rule out those probability density functions that are es-
pecially biased in certain ways. Some pdfs are equal to zero for entire subin-
tervals (a, b), which means that they could never learn that the true chance
of heads lies within (a, b). Perhaps we want to rule out all such pdfs, and
only consider those that assign a non-zero value to every subinterval (a, b).
Similarly, some pdfs will be extremely biased toward chance hypotheses that
are very close to one of the endpoints, with the result that the corresponding
credence functions will be virtually certain that the outcome will be heads, or
virtually certain that the outcome will be tails, all on the basis of no evidence
whatsoever. Again, perhaps we want to rule these out, and require that each
P ∈ P assigns a value to H1 within some interval (c−, c+), with c− > 0 and
c+ < 1.
With these two restrictions in place, the spread of our credence is meant to
shrink as we make more observations, so that after having seen 500 heads and
500 tails, it is centred rather narrowly around 0.5, thereby making inductive
learning possible again. While recognizing this as an available strategy, Joyce
does not endorse it himself, as it is contrary to the evidentialist underpinnings
of his view. In any case, the strategy doesn’t do the trick. Even if we could find
a satisfactory motivation, it would not deliver the result Joyce claims it does,
as the following theorem shows:
Theorem 1. Let the random variable X be the coin’s bias for heads, and let
the random variable Yn be number of heads in the first n flips. For a given
n, a given yn, a given interval (c−, c+) with c− > 0 and c+ < 1, and a given
c0 ∈ (c−, c+), there is a pdf, fX, such that
1. E[X] ∈ (c−, c+),
2. E[X | Yn = yn] = c0, and
3.
∫ b
a fX(x) dx > 0 for every a, b ∈ [0, 1] with a < b.
The first and third conditions are the two constraints that Joyce suggested we
impose. The first ensures that the pdf is not extremely biased toward chance
hypotheses that are very close to one of the endpoints, and the third ensures
that it is non-zero for every subinterval (a, b) of the unit interval. The second
condition corresponds to the claim that we still don’t have inductive learning,
in the sense that no matter what sequence of outcomes is observed, for ev-
ery c0 ∈ (c−, c+), there will be a pdf whose expectation conditional on that
sequence is c0.
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Proof. Consider the class of beta distributions. First, we will pick a distribution
from this class whose parameters α and β are such that the first two conditions
are satisfied. Now, the expectation and the conditional expectation of a beta
distribution are respectively given as
E[X] =
α
α+ β
, and E[X | Yn = yn] = α+ yn
α+ β+ n
.
The first two conditions now give us the following constraints on α and β:
c− <
α
α+ β
< c+, and
α+ yn
α+ β+ n
= c0.
The first of these constraints gives us that
c−
1− c− β < α <
c+
1− c+ β.
The second constraint allows us to express α as
α =
c0(β+ n)− yn
1− c0 .
Putting the two together, we get
β >
(1− c−)(yn − c0n)
c0 − c− and β >
(1− c+)(yn − c0n)
c0 − c+ .
As we can make β arbitrarily large, it is clear that for any given set of values
for n, yn, c−, c+ and c0, we can find a value for β such that the two inequalities
above hold. We have thus found a beta distribution that satisfies the first two
conditions. Finally, we show that the third condition is met. The pdf of a beta
distribution is given as
fX(x) =
1
B(α, β)
xα−1(1− x)β−1,
where the beta function B is a normalization constant. As is evident from this
expression, we will have fX(x) > 0 for each x ∈ (0, 1), which in turn implies
that
∫ b
a fX(x) dx > 0 for every a, b ∈ [0, 1] with a < b. Moreover, this holds
for any values of the parameters α and β. Therefore every beta distribution
satisfies the third condition, and our proof is done.
What this shows is that all the work is being done by the choice of the initial
interval. Although many credence functions will be able to move outside the
interval in response to evidence, for every value inside the interval, there will
always be a a credence function that takes that value no matter what sequence
of outcomes has been observed. Thus the set of prior credence values will be
a subset of the set of posterior credence values. The intuitive reason for this is
that we can always find an initial probability density function which is suffi-
ciently biased in some particular way to deliver the desired posterior credence
value.
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There are therefore two separate things going on in the unknown bias case,
both of which might be thought worrisome: the problem of maximal impreci-
sion, and the problem of belief inertia. As the result shows, Joyce’s proposed
fix addresses the former but not the latter, and our beliefs can therefore be
inert without being maximally imprecise.12 Granted, having a set of posterior
credence values that always includes the set of prior credence values as a sub-
set is a less severe form of belief inertia than having a set of posterior credence
values that is always identical to the set of prior credence values. However,
even this weaker form of belief inertia means that no matter how much evi-
dence the agent receives, she cannot converge on the correct answer with any
greater precision than is already given in her prior credal state.
Now, Theorem 1 only shows that one particular set of constraints is insuffi-
cient to make inductive learning possible in the unknown bias case. Thus
some other set of constraints could well be up to the job.
For example, consider the set of beta distributions with parameters α and β
such that β/m ≤ α ≤ mβ for some given number m. If we let the credal state
contain one credence function for each of these distributions, inductive learn-
ing will be possible.
It may be objected that we should regard belief inertia, made all the more press-
ing by Theorem 1, not as a problem for imprecise Bayesianism, but rather as a
problem for an extreme form of evidentialism. Suppose that a precise Bayesian
says that all credences that satisfy the first and third conditions are permissible
to adopt as one’s precise credences. Theorem 1 would then tell us that it is per-
missible to change your credence by an arbitrarily small amount in response to
any evidence. Although hardcore subjectivists would be happy to accept this
conclusion, most others would presumably want to say that this constitutes a
failure to respond appropriately to the evidence. Therefore, whatever it is that
a precise moderate subjectivist would say to rule out such credence functions
as irrational, the imprecise Bayesian could use the same account to explain
why those credence functions should not be included in the imprecise credal
state.
I agree that belief inertia is not an objection to imprecise Bayesianism as such:
it becomes an objection only when that framework is combined with Joyce’s
brand of evidentialism. Nevertheless, I do believe the problem is worse for
imprecise Bayesianism than it is for precise Bayesianism. On the imprecise evi-
dentialist view, you are epistemically required to include all credence functions
that are compatible with your evidence in your credal state. If we take Joyce’s
line and don’t impose any further conditions, this means that, in the unknown
bias case, you are epistemically required to adopt a credal state that is both
maximally imprecise and inert. If we instead are sympathetic to the two fur-
ther constraints, it means that you are epistemically required to adopt a credal
state that will always include the initial interval from which you started as a
12 In turn, this explains why it doesn’t matter whether we understand maximal imprecision to
mean (0, 1) or [0, 1]. Belief inertia will arise regardless of which of the two we choose.
2.5 global belief inertia 39
subset. By contrast, on the precise evidentialist view, you are merely epistem-
ically permitted to adopt one such credence function as your own. Of course,
we may well think it’s epistemically impermissible to adopt such credence
functions. But a view on which we are epistemically required to include them
in our credal state seems significantly more implausible.
A further difference is that any fixed beta distribution will eventually be pushed
toward the correct distribution. Thus any precise credence function will even-
tually give us the right answer, even though this convergence may be exceed-
ingly slow for some of them. By contrast, Theorem 1 shows that the initial
interval (c−, c+) will always remain a subset of the imprecise Bayesian’s pos-
terior credal state. Therefore, belief inertia would again seem to be more of a
problem for the imprecise view than for the precise view.
Finally, it’s not at all obvious what principle a precise Bayesian might appeal
to in explaining why the credence functions that intuitively strike us as insuf-
ficiently responsive to the evidence are indeed irrational. Existing principles
provide constraints that are either too weak (for instance the principal prin-
ciple or the reflection principle) or too strong (for instance the principle of
indifference). It may well be possible to formulate an adequate principle, but
to my knowledge this has not yet been done.
At any rate, Joyce is willing to accept local belief inertia in the unknown bias
case, and his reasons for doing so may strike one as quite plausible. When
one’s evidence is so extremely impoverished, it might make sense to say that
one doesn’t even know which hypotheses would be supported by subsequent
observations. This case is a fairly contrived toy example, and one might hope
that such cases are the exception and not the rule in our everyday epistemic
lives. So a natural next step is to ask how common these cases are. If it turns
out that they are exceedingly common—as I will argue that they in fact are—
then we ought to reject evidentially-motivated imprecise Bayesianism, even if
we were initially inclined to accept particular instances of belief inertia.
2.5 global belief inertia
I will argue that belief inertia is in fact very widespread. My strategy for es-
tablishing this conclusion will be to first argue that an imprecise Bayesian who
respects the evidence grounding thesis must have a particular prior credal
state, and second to show that any agent who starts out with this prior credal
state and updates by imprecise conditionalization will have inert beliefs for a
wide range of propositions.
As we saw in the previous chapter, in order for the Bayesian machinery—
whether precise or imprecise—to get going, we must first have priors in place.
In the precise case, priors are given by the credence function an agent adopts
before she receives any evidence whatsoever. Similarly, in the imprecise case,
priors are given by the set of credence functions an agent adopts as her credal
state before she receives any evidence whatsoever. The question of which con-
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straints to impose on prior credence functions is a familiar and long-standing
topic of dispute within precise Bayesianism. As we have seen, hardcore sub-
jectivists hold that any probabilistic prior credence function is permissible,
whereas objectivists wish to narrow down the number of permissible prior
credence functions to a single one. In between these two extremes, we find a
spectrum of moderate views. These more measured proposals suggest that we
add some constraints beyond probabilism, without thereby going all the way
to full-blown objectivism.
The same question may of course be asked of imprecise Bayesianism as well.
In this context, our concern is with which constraints to impose on the set of
prior credence functions. Hardcore subjectivists hold that any set of proba-
bilistic prior credence functions is permissible, whereas objectivists will wish
to narrow down the number of permissible sets of prior credence functions
to a single one. In between these two extremes, we again find a spectrum of
moderate views. For an imprecise Bayesian who is motivated by evidential
concerns, the answer to the question of priors should be straightforward. By
the evidence grounding thesis, our credal state at a given time should include
all and only those credence functions that are compatible with our evidence at
that time. In particular, this means that our prior credal state should include
all and only those credence functions that are compatible with the empty body
of evidence. Thus, in order to determine which prior credal states are permis-
sible, we must determine which credence functions are compatible with the
empty body of evidence. As you’ll recall, I assumed that the relevant notion of
compatibility is an objective one. This means that there will be a unique set of
all and only those credence functions that are compatible with the empty body
of evidence.13 Which credence functions are these?
In light of our earlier examples, we can rule out some credence functions from
the prior credal state. In particular, we can rule out those that don’t satisfy the
principal principle. If we were to learn only that the chance of A is x, then any
credence function that does not assign a value of x to A will be incompatible
with our evidence. And given that the credal state is updated by conditionaliz-
ing each of its elements on all of the evidence received, it follows that we must
have P(A|ch(A) = x) = x for each P in the prior credal state P0. Along these
lines, some may also wish to add other deference principles.
Now, one way of coming to know the objective chance of some event seems to
be via inference from observed physical symmetries.14 If that’s right, it would
appear to give us a further type of constraint on credence functions in the prior
credal state. More specifically, if some proposition Symm about physical sym-
metries entails that ch(A) = x, then all credence functions P in the prior credal
state should be such that P(ch(A) = x | Symm) = 1. Given that we’ve accepted
the principal principle, this means that we also get that P(A | Symm) = x. Now,
13 This objectivism may strike you as implausible or undesirable. In the next section, we will
consider whether an imprecise Bayesian can give it up without also giving up their evidentialist
commitment.
14 I’m grateful to Pablo Zendejas Medina for emphasizing this.
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what sort of things do we have to include in Symm in order for the inference to
be correct? In the case of a coin flip, we presumably have to include things like
the coin’s having homogenous density together with facts about the manner in
which it is flipped.15 But given that we are trying to give a priori constraints on
credence functions, it seems that this cannot be sufficient. We must also know
that, say, the size of the coin or the time of the day are irrelevant to the chance
of heads, and similarly for a wide range of other factors. Far-fetched as these
possibilities may be, it nevertheless seems that we cannot rule them out a priori.
I will return to a discussion of the role of physical symmetries shortly. For
the moment, it suffices to note that symmetry considerations, just like the
principal principle and other deference principles, can only constrain condi-
tional prior credence assignments, leaving the whole range of unconditional
prior credence assignments open. Are there any legitimate constraints on un-
conditional prior credence assignments? As we have seen, some endorse the
regularity principle, which requires credence functions to assign credence 0
only to propositions that are in some sense (usually doxastically) impossible.
So perhaps we should demand that all credence functions in the prior credal
state be regular.
So far, I’ve surveyed a few familiar constraints on credence functions. The
thought is that if we add enough of these, we may be able to avoid many in-
stances of belief inertia. However, this strategy faces a dilemma: on the one
hand, adding more constraints means that we are more likely to successfully
solve the problem. On the other, the more constraints we add, the more it
looks like we’re going beyond our evidence, in much the same way that the
principle of indifference would have us do. Given that Joyce endorsed impre-
cise Bayesianism for the very reason that it allowed us to avoid having to go
beyond the evidence in this manner, this would be especially problematic. Let
us therefore assume that the only constraints we can impose on the credence
functions in our prior credal state are the principal principle and other defer-
ence principles, constraints given by symmetry considerations, and possibly
also the regularity principle. This gives us the following result. The evidence
grounding thesis, together with an objective understanding of compatibility,
imply:
maximally imprecise priors For any contingent A, a rational agent’s prior
credence P0(A) in that proposition is maximally imprecise.16
Why does this follow? Take an arbitrary contingent proposition A. If we
accept the regularity principle, the extremal credence assignments 0 and 1 are
of course ruled out. The principal principle and other deference principles
only constrain conditional credence assignments. For example, the principal
principle requires each P in the prior credal state P0 to satisfy P(A | ch(A) =
x) = x, where ch(A) = x is the proposition that the objective chance of A is x.
Other deference principles have the same form, with ch(·) replaced by some
15 See Strevens (1998) for one account of how this works in more detail.
16 Where ‘maximally imprecise’ means either P0(A) = (0, 1) or P0(A) = [0, 1], depending on
whether or not we accept the regularity principle.
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other probability function one should defer to. By the law of total probability
for continuous variables, we have that
P(A) =
∫ 1
0
P(A | ch(A) = x) · fP(x) dx,
where fP(x) is the pdf over possible chance hypotheses that is associated with
P. By the principal principle, it follows for all values of x that P(A | ch(A) =
x) = x, which in turn means that
P(A) =
∫ ∞
−∞
x fP(x) dx.
This means that the value of P(A) is effectively determined by the pdf fP(x).
Therefore, if we are to use the principal principle to rule out some assignments
of unconditional credence in A, we have to do so by ruling out, a priori, some
pdfs over chance hypotheses. Given the constraints we have accepted on the
prior credal state, the only way of doing this17 would be via symmetry consid-
erations. However, in order to do so we would first have to rule out certain
credence assignments over the various possible symmetry propositions. As
we have no means of doing so, it follows that neither the principal principle
nor symmetry considerations allow us to rule out any values for P(A). Any
other deference principles will have the same formal structure as the principal
principle, and the corresponding conclusions therefore hold for them as well.
We thus get maximally imprecise priors.
Next, we will examine how an agent with maximally imprecise priors might re-
duce their imprecision. Before doing that, however, I’d like to address a worry
you might have about the inference to Maximally Imprecise Priors above. I
have been speaking of prior credal states as if they were just like posterior
credal states, the only difference being that they’re not based on any evidence.
But of course, the notion of a prior credal state is a fiction: there is no point
in time at which an actual agent adopts it as her state of belief. And given
that my formulation of the evidence grounding thesis makes it clear that it is
meant to govern credal states at particular points in time, we have no reason
to think that it also applies to prior credal states.
If the prior credal state is a fiction, what kind of a fiction is it? Titelbaum
(manuscript, p. 110) suggests that we think of priors as encoding an agent’s
ultimate evidential standards.18 Her ultimate evidential standards determine
how she interprets the information she receives. In the precise case, an agent
whose credence function at t1 is P1 will regard a piece of evidence Ei as favour-
ing a proposition A if and only if P1(A|Ei) > P1(A). So her credence function
P1 gives us her evidential standards at t1. Of course, her evidential standards
in this sense will change over time as she obtains more information. It may
be that in between t1 and t2 she receives a piece of evidence E2 such that
17 Other than the uninteresting case of the regularity principle ruling out discontinuous pdfs that
concentrate everything on the endpoints 0 and 1.
18 This kind of view of priors is of course not original to Titelbaum. See for example Lewis
(1980:288).
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P2(A|Ei) < P2(A). If she does, at t2 she will no longer regard Ei as favouring
A. In order to say something about how she is disposed to evaluate total bod-
ies of evidence, we must turn to her prior credence function, which encodes
her ultimate evidential standards. If an agent with prior credence function P0
has total evidence E, she will again regard that evidence as favouring A if and
only if P0(A|E) > P0(A). In the same way, we can think of a prior credal state
as encoding the ultimate evidential standards of an imprecise agent.19
Suppose that we have a sequence of credence functions P1, P2, P3, . . . , where
each element Pi is generated by conditionalizing the preceding element Pi−1
on all of the evidence obtained between ti−1 and ti. We will then be able
to find a prior credence function P0 such that, for each Pi in the sequence,
Pi(·) = P0(·|Ei), where Ei is the agent’s total evidence at ti. Because a credal
state is just a set of credence functions, we will also be able to find a prior
credal state P0 such that the preceding claim holds of each of its elements.20
This means that, in order to arrive at Joyce’s judgements about particular cases,
we must make assumptions about the prior credal state as well. Consider for
instance the third urn example, where we don’t even know what colours the
marbles might have. If we are to be able to say that it is irrational to have a
precise credence in B3 (the proposition that a marble drawn at random from
this urn will be black), we must also say that it is irrational to have a prior
credal state P0 such that there is an x such that P(B3|E) = x for each P ∈ P0,
where E is the (limited) evidence available to us (namely that the urn con-
tains one hundred marbles of unknown colours, and that one will be drawn at
random). Similarly, in the unknown bias case, we must rule out as irrational
any prior credal state which does not yield the verdict of maximal imprecision.
So although the prior credal state is in a certain sense fictitious, the evidence
grounding thesis must still apply to it, if it is to apply to posterior credal states
at all. Because of the intimate connection (via imprecise conditionalization on
the total evidence) between the prior credal state and posterior credal states,
any claims about the latter will imply claims about the former. Therefore, if the
evidence grounding thesis is to constrain an agent’s posterior credal states, it
must also constrain her ultimate evidential standards, namely her prior credal
state. Thus the argument for maximally imprecise priors still stands.
In order to determine how widespread belief inertia is, we must now consider
how an agent with maximally imprecise priors might reduce her imprecision
19 In this case, we will have to say a bit more about what it means for an agent to regard a piece
of evidence as favouring a proposition. Presumably a supervaluationist account, along the
lines of the one we sketched for unconditional comparative judgements, will do: an agent with
credal state P will regard a piece of evidence Ei as determinately favouring A if and only if
P(A|Ei) > P(A) for each P ∈ P .
20 Now, Pi and Ei will not determine a unique P0. There will be distinct P0 and P0‘ such that
Pi(·) = P0(· | Ei) and Pi(·) = P0‘(· | Ei). In the case of an imprecise Bayesian agent, this means
that we cannot infer her prior credal state from her current credal state together with her current
total body of evidence. However, given that we are for the moment assuming that the notion of
compatibility is an objective one, the prior credal state P0 should consist of all and only those
credence functions that satisfy the relevant set of constraints, and hence that P0 will be unique.
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with respect to some particular proposition. One obvious way for her to do so
is through learning the truth of that proposition. If she learns that A, then all
credence functions in her posterior credal state will agree that P(A) = 1. Given
that we required all credence functions in the prior credal state to satisfy the
principal principle, another way for the agent to reduce her imprecision with
respect to A is to learn something about the chance of A. If she learns that
ch(A) = x, then all credence functions in her posterior credal state will agree
that P(A) = x. Similarly, if she learns that the chance of A lies within some
interval [a, b], then all of them will assign a value to A that lies somewhere
in that interval.21 And if we take other deference principles on board as well,
those will yield analogous cases.
Although knowledge of objective chance is a staple of probability toy exam-
ples, how often do we come by such knowledge in real life? The question is
all the more pressing for the imprecise Bayesian. As the unknown bias case
illustrated, if an imprecise Bayesian starts out with no information about the
objective chance of some class of events, she cannot use observed outcomes
of events in this class to narrow down her credence. By contrast, precise
Bayesians can use such information to obtain a posterior credence that will
eventually be within an epsilon of the objective chance value.
As discussed earlier, we do have one other way of obtaining information about
objective chance, namely via inference from physical symmetries. Now, the
question is: how often are we in a position to conditionalize on propositions
about such symmetries? First, and most obviously, the principle will only
be able to constrain credences in propositions for which the relevant physical
symmetries are present. Thus even if we are happy to say that the proposition
that my friend Jakob will have phaal curry for dinner tonight, or the proposi-
tion that the next raven to be observed will be black have non-trivial objective
chances, there are presumably no physical symmetries to rely on here. Hence
the principle has limited applicability.
Second, in cases where the relevant physical symmetries do exist, we must also
know that other factors are irrelevant to the objective chance, as mentioned ear-
lier. From our everyday interactions with the world, as well as from physical
theory, we know that the size of a coin and the time of the day are irrelevant
to the chance of heads. But how might our imprecise Bayesian accommodate
this datum? We know from before that she will have a maximally imprecise
prior in any contingent proposition, and hence in any physical theory. So in
order to make use of these physical symmetries, she must first narrow down
the range of these credences, and assign higher credence to theories according
to which the irrelevant factors are indeed irrelevant.
21 I have not explained how the update works when an agent learns that the chance of A lies
within some interval [a, b]. One way of doing this is to set each pdf fP to equal zero everywhere
outside of that interval and then normalize it, so that
∫ b
a fP(x) dx = 1. Although I don’t believe
much of my argument turns on it, there are other ways of doing this as well.
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But this brings us back to the same problem: how can the imprecise Bayesian
reduce her imprecision with respect to these physical theories? Even if we
think it’s intelligible to think of physical theories as having objective chance
of being true, it seems clear that we’ll never be in a position to conditionalize
on propositions about their objective chance. Furthermore, given that physical
theories make claims that go beyond one’s evidence, we cannot directly con-
ditionalize a physical theory itself. Thus it would appear that, in practice, the
imprecise Bayesian cannot use symmetry considerations to reduce her impre-
cision. I take it as a given that we do have some way of rationally narrowing
down the range of possible objective chance values. We may not know their
exact values, but we can nevertheless do a lot better than forever remaining
maximally imprecise. The challenge for the evidentially-motivated imprecise
Bayesian is to explain how this is possible within their framework.
As you will recall, I suggested that we might want to take on board deference
principles other than the principal principle. So a further way of reducing
one’s imprecision with respect to some proposition would be to defer to a
relevant expert. To do so, we must say a bit more about who counts as an
expert. The first thing to note here is that if someone has arrived at a relatively
precise credence in A through reasoning that is not justified by the lights of
evidentially-motivated imprecise Bayesianism, she cannot plausibly count as
an expert with respect to A. If the precision of her credence goes beyond her
evidence in an unwarranted way, the same must hold of anyone who defers
to her credence as well. This greatly limits the applicability of the deference
principle. Therefore, we can only legitimately defer to experts in cases where
those experts have conditionalized on A directly.22 However, in order to do so
we must not only know what the expert’s credence in A is, but also that she
is indeed an expert. And again, we don’t seem to have a way of narrowing
down our initial, maximally imprecise credence that this person is an expert
with respect to A.
Given that the constraints we accepted on prior conditional credence assign-
ments have such limited practical applicability, we get the following result:
global belief inertia For any proposition A, a rational agent will have a
maximally imprecise credence in A unless her evidence logically entails
either A or its negation.
Even if we were willing to concede some instances of local belief inertia, such
as in the unknown bias case, this conclusion should strike us as unacceptable.
It invalidates a wide range of canonically rational comparative confidence judg-
ments. Propositions that are known to be true are assigned a credence of 1,
those that are known to be false are assigned a credence of 0, and all others
are assigned a maximally imprecise credence. Although some comparative
confidence judgments will remain intact—for instance, all credence functions
22 As well as in cases where the expert herself bases her credence on that of another expert, along
a sequence of deferrals that must eventually end with someone who conditionalized on A
directly.
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will regard four heads in a row as more likely than five heads in a row—many
others will not. Surely a theory of inductive inference should do better.23
2.6 responses
In a sense, global belief inertia is hardly a surprising result in light of my
strong assumptions. I assumed the evidence grounding thesis, which states
that the credal state must contain all and only those credence functions that
are compatible with the evidence. Moreover, I assumed that compatibility is an
objective notion, so that there is always an agent-independent fact of the matter
as to whether a particular credence function is compatible with a given body
of evidence. Finally, I noted that compatibility must be very permissive (in the
sense of typically counting a wide range of credence functions as compatible
with any particular body of evidence), because otherwise we risk making the
same mistake as the one we accused the principle of indifference of making.
With all of these assumptions on board, it’s almost a given that global belief in-
ertia follows. The question is whether we can motivate imprecise Bayesianism
on the grounds that precise credences are often epistemically reckless because
they force us to go beyond our evidence, without having the resulting view
fall prey to global belief inertia.
Some technical fixes may solve the problem. We saw that Joyce’s suggestion
for how to avoid belief inertia in the unknown bias case didn’t do the job, but
perhaps an approach along similar lines could be made to work.24 However,
as Joyce concedes, such a proposal could not be justified in light of his evi-
dentialist commitments. Similarly, we might try replacing imprecise condition-
alization with some other update rule that allows us to move from maximal
imprecision to some more precise credal state. One natural idea is to intro-
duce a threshold, so that credence functions which assigned a value below
that threshold to a proposition that we then go on to learn, get discarded from
the posterior credal state: P1 = {P(· | E1) : P ∈ P0 ∧ P(E1) > t}.25 The thresh-
old proposal comes with problems of its own: it violates the commutativity of
evidence (the order in which we learn two pieces of evidence can make a dif-
ference for which credal state we end up with), and it may lead to cases where
the credal state becomes the empty set. But again, the more fundamental prob-
lem is that it violates the evidentialist commitment. By discarding credence
functions that don’t meet the threshold, we go beyond the evidence.
In general, the dilemma for evidentially-motivated imprecise Bayesianism is
that in order to avoid widespread belief inertia, we must either place stronger
constraints on the uniquely rational prior credal state, or concede that there
is a range of different permissible prior credal states. However, these two
23 See Rinard (2013) for further discussion of the implications of maximal imprecision for compar-
ative confidence judgments.
24 I mentioned one such idea in the context of the unknown bias case: let all the credence functions
be based on beta distributions whose parameters are restricted in a particular way.
25 This threshold rule is mentioned by Bradley and Steele (2014). A related method is the maxi-
mum likelihood rule given by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993).
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strategies expose the view to the same criticism that we made of objective and
subjective precise Bayesianism: they allow agents to go beyond their evidence.
You might worry that the argument for global belief inertia relied on a tacit
assumption that the only way of spelling out the underlying evidentialism is
via some connection to objective chance (as done, for example, by the chance
grounding theses). Once we see that this leads to Global Belief Inertia, we
should give up that view, but that doesn’t mean we have to give up the ev-
identialism itself. Indeed, even in the absence of a detailed account of how
evidence constrains credal states, it seems quite obvious that our current evi-
dence does not support a precise credence in, say, the proposition that there
will be four millimeters of precipitation in Paris on 3 April 2237. So the case
for evidentially-motivated imprecision still stands.
The claim is not merely that there is no unique precise credence that is best sup-
ported by the evidence. If it were, precise Bayesians could simply respond by
saying that there are multiple precise credences, each of which one could ratio-
nally adopt in light of the evidence. Instead, the claim must be that, on its own,
any precise credence would be an unjustified response to the evidence. Hence
the evidence only supports imprecise credences. But does it support a unique
imprecise credence, or are there multiple permissible imprecise credences? On
the face of it, the claim that it supports a unique imprecise credence looks quite
implausible. At any rate, it is a claim that stands in need of further motiva-
tion. The revised chance grounding thesis gave us one possible explanation
of this uniqueness. By including credence functions in the credal state on the
basis of their consistency with what we know about objective chance, our cri-
terion gives a clear-cut answer in every case, and hence uniqueness follows.
But now that we’ve rejected the revised chance grounding thesis because of
the widespread belief inertia it gave rise to, we no longer have any reason to
suppose that the evidence will always support a unique credal state. In the
absence of a more detailed account of evidential support for credal states, we
should reject uniqueness.
Suppose therefore that we instead accept that our evidence supports multiple
imprecise credences. On what grounds can we then say that it doesn’t also
support some precise credences? The intuition behind the thought that no pre-
cise credence is supported by the evidence also suggests that, for sufficiently
small values of e, no imprecise credence of [x − e, x + e] is supported by the
evidence, so the relevant distinction cannot merely be between precise and im-
precise credences. What the intuition suggests is instead presumably that no
credence that is too precise is supported by the evidence, whether this be per-
fect precision or only something close to it. But again, to say what qualifies as
too precise, we need a more detailed account of evidential support for credal
states.
At this point, my interlocutor might simply reiterate their original point, cast in
a slightly new form. Yes, they will say, we don’t know exactly which credences
are too precise for our evidence. But even though we don’t have a detailed
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account, it is still quite clear that some credences are too precise whereas oth-
ers aren’t. So the case for evidentially-motivated imprecision still stands. To
give this idea a bit more flesh, consider an analogy with precise Bayesianism.
Unless they are thoroughly subjectivist, precise Bayesians hold that some prior
credence functions are rational and others aren’t. For example, stubborn priors
that are moved an arbitrarily small amount even by large bodies of evidence
may well be irrational. This cannot be explained by any evidence about ob-
jective chance, or indeed by any other kind of evidence, because by definition
priors aren’t based on any evidence. There are just facts about which of them
are rational and which aren’t. Furthermore, a credence function is supported
by a body of evidence just in case it is the result of conditionalizing a rational
prior on that body of evidence.26 Now, imprecise Bayesians can say the same
of their view. Some imprecise prior credal states are rational and others aren’t.
Again, this cannot be based on any evidence about objective chance, because
prior credal states aren’t based on any evidence. There are just facts about
which of them are rational and which aren’t. Furthermore, a credal state is
supported by a body of evidence just in case it is the result of conditionalizing
a rational prior credal state on that body of evidence.
I won’t attempt to resolve this large dispute here, so let me just say two things
in response. The first is simply that those who follow Joyce’s line of argument
is unlikely to be happy with this kind of position, given that it appears to
be vulnerable to the same criticisms as those he raised for precise objective
Bayesianism. Of course, imprecise Bayesians who don’t share these commit-
ments may well want to respond along these lines, which brings me to my
second point: even if they can’t give us an exact characterization of which im-
precise priors are permissible, they should at least be able to show that none
of the permissible priors give rise to widespread belief inertia. Before that has
been done, it seems premature to think that the problem has been solved.
Before concluding, let me briefly explore some other tentative suggestions
for where to go from here. If we wish to keep the formal framework as it
is (namely imprecise probabilism and imprecise conditionalization, together
with the supervaluationist understanding of credal states), then one option is
to scale back our ambitions. Instead of saying that imprecise credences are
rationally required in, say, the second and third urn cases, we only say that
they are among the permissible options.
This response constitutes a significant step in the direction of subjectivism. We
can still place some constraints on the credence functions in the prior credal
state (for example that they satisfy the principal principle). But instead of
requiring that the prior credal state includes all and only those credence func-
tions that satisfy the relevant constraints, we merely require that it includes
only (but not necessarily all) credence functions that satisfy them. On this
view, precise Bayesianism goes wrong not in that it forces us to go beyond our
evidence (any view that avoids belief inertia will have to!), but rather because
26 See Williamson (2000, chapter 10) for an example of a view of this kind, cast in terms of eviden-
tial probability.
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it forces us to go far beyond our evidence, when other more modest leaps are
also available. How firm conclusions we want to draw from limited evidence
is in part a matter of epistemic taste: some people will prefer to go out on a
limb and assign relatively precise credences, whereas others are more cautious,
and prefer to remain more non-committal. Both of these preferences are per-
missible, and we should therefore give agents some freedom in choosing their
level of precision.
Another option is to enrich the formal framework in a way that provides us
with novel resources for dealing with belief inertia. For example, we might
associate a weight with each credence function in the credal state and let the
weight represent the credence functions degree of support in the evidence.27
By letting the weights change in response to incoming evidence, inductive
learning becomes possible again, even in cases where the spread of values as-
signed to a proposition by elements of the credal state remains unchanged. In
a similar vein, Bradley (2017) suggests that we introduce a confidence relation
over the set of an agent’s probability judgements.28 For example, after having
observed 500 heads and 500 tails in the unknown bias case, we may be more
confident in the judgement that the probability of heads is in [0.48, 0.52] than
we are in the judgement that it is in [0.6, 1]. Needless to say, the details of these
proposals have to be worked out in much greater detail before we can assess
them. Nevertheless, they look like promising options for imprecise Bayesians
to explore in the future.
2.7 conclusion
I have argued that evidentially motivated imprecise Bayesianism entails that,
for any proposition, one’s credence in that proposition must be maximally
imprecise, unless one’s evidence logically entails either that proposition or
its negation. This means that the problem of belief inertia is not confined to
a particular class of cases, but is instead completely general. I claimed that
even if one is willing to accept certain instances of belief inertia, one should
nevertheless reject any view which has this implication. After briefly looking
at some responses, I tentatively suggested that the most promising options are
either (i) to give up objectivism and concede that the choice of a prior credal
state is largely subjective, or (ii) to enrich the formal framework with more
structure.
27 See Gärdenfors and Sahlin (1982) for an approach along these lines.
28 This approach is inspired by Hill (2013).
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M O R A L U N C E RTA I N T Y A N D A R G U M E N T S F O R
P R O B A B I L I S M
3.1 introduction
Our next variation concerns the objects of credence. Typically, Bayesians have
been concerned with uncertainty regarding descriptive states of affairs. But it
seems we may also be morally uncertain: that is, uncertain regarding the moral
states of affairs. For example, I may be uncertain whether abortion is morally
permissible, whether it’s better to order vegetarian, or whether modesty is a
virtue. And I may be uncertain about these things even if I am certain of all
relevant empirical facts, e.g. facts concerning the cognitive development of
the fetus, the conditions of factory-farmed animals, or how a modest person
behaves. If so, my uncertainty is fundamentally moral: I’m uncertain of what
moral reasons the descriptive facts known to me give rise to.
On the face of it, it seems plausible both that we are in fact sometimes morally
uncertain, and that it is sometimes rationally permissible to be morally un-
certain. To be sure, both of these claims can be resisted. But I take them to
be compelling enough to form a natural starting point for our investigations.
And once we allow for the notion of moral uncertainty, we can ask various
epistemological questions about it. The main focus of this chapter is one such
question: does probabilism hold for our degrees of belief in moral claims?
We shall approach this question by investigating whether the three types of
arguments that many take to establish probabilism with respect to ordinary,
descriptive uncertainty can also support this doctrine with respect to moral un-
certainty. Representation theorem arguments impose rationality constraints on
relational attitudes (either preferences or comparative confidence judgments)
and show that if the constraints in question are satisfied, the relation can be rep-
resented using a probability function. Dutch book arguments show that, given
certain assumptions about betting behaviour, agents with non-probabilistic cre-
dences are willing to accept a set of bets that together guarantee a sure loss for
them. And accuracy arguments show that, given certain assumptions about
how to measure distance from truth, probabilistic credences are guaranteed to
be closer to truth than non-probabilistic credences.
However, before we can evaluate these arguments, we must say a bit more
about the nature of moral uncertainty. In particular, we must get clear on what
the objects of credence are supposed to be in the case of moral uncertainty.
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The next section provides general background on moral uncertainty. In sec-
tion 3.3, I propose a way of representing moral claims formally so as to make
them suitable as objects of credence. Sections 3.4–3.6 examine the prospects
for representation theorem arguments, Dutch book arguments, and accuracy
arguments for probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty.
3.2 moral uncertainty
Existing discussions of moral uncertainty have tended to focus on its practical
dimension, i.e. on the question of how to make decisions in light of one’s
moral uncertainty. Although my concerns are primarily epistemological, the
two projects are not unrelated, and it will therefore be useful to first go through
some of the general issues to do with moral uncertainty.1
Consider the following example of decision-making under moral uncertainty.
You are deciding whether or not to have meat for dinner, and your credence
is divided between speciesism according to which animal welfare doesn’t mat-
ter, and non-speciesism, according to which animal welfare does matter. The
values assigned to the different options by the two theories are as follows:
Meat No meat
Speciesism 15 10
Non-Speciesism -100 10
Furthermore, suppose that your credence in speciesism is 0.9 and that your cre-
dence in non-speciesism is 0.1. What should you do in light of this uncertainty?
According to one natural line of thought, given that you have much greater con-
fidence in speciesism than in non-speciesism, you should act upon the former
and eat meat.2 However, this mode of reasoning is insensitive the fact that the
stakes are much higher for non-speciesism. One way of accommodating this
observation is to move to an expected value framework, where the expected
value of an option is given as the sum of the values assigned to that option
by the relevant theories, weighted by the agent’s credences in those theories.
In our example, the expected value of eating meat is 15 · 0.9− 100 · 0.1 = 3.5,
whereas the expected value of not eating meat is 10. So even though you are
much more confident in speciesism, expected value reasoning suggests that
you ought nevertheless to refrain from eating meat, because otherwise you
run the risk of doing something gravely morally wrong.3
1 See Hudson (1989), Gracely (1996), Lockhart (2000), Ross (2006), Sepielli (2009, 2010, 2013),
Guerrero (2007), Moller (2011), MacAskill (2014), and Bykvist (2017).
2 The idea that one should act in accordance with whatever theory one has highest credence in is
sometimes known as My Favourite Theory. See Gustafsson and Torpman (2014) for a defense.
3 Weatherson (2014) argues against this kind of moral hedging, and Harman (2015) argues against
the general view that moral uncertainty is relevant to what one ought to do.
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3.2.1 Problems for Moral Uncertainty
As illustrated by this example, the project of developing an account of decision-
making under moral uncertainty faces a number of obstacles. First, if non-
cognitivism about the moral domain is correct, it’s not obvious whether the
very idea of moral uncertainty is even intelligible. If moral claims are not
truth-apt, it’s not clear what it would mean to say that you are uncertain about
whether it’s permissible to eat meat. Thus the whole project may not even get
off the ground in the first place.4
Second, if we regard a theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty as
an account of what agents ought to do in light of this uncertainty, what no-
tion of ‘ought’ are we employing? In one sense, what we ought to do under
moral uncertainty is simply what the correct moral theory tells us to do. But
of course, this is not especially helpful or action-guiding for an agent who is
highly uncertain. So can we develop a suitable notion of ‘ought’ which is sen-
sitive to our moral uncertainty?5
Third, some accounts of decision-making under moral uncertainty require us
to make intertheoretic comparisons of value; comparisons between how valu-
able an action is according to one moral theory and how valuable it is accord-
ing to another moral theory. For example, in calculating expected value of
eating meat, I assumed that we can make intertheoretic comparisons between
speciesism and non-speciesism. But on the face of it, such comparisons seem
arbitrary. How can we compare the value of saving a life on a utilitarian theory
with the disvalue of telling a lie on a deontological theory? The problem ap-
pears to arise even in the case of theories that are overwhelmingly similar, such
as a utilitarian theory and a prioritarian theory. How does the utilitarian value
of increasing the well-being of someone well off by some amount compare to
the prioritarian value of increasing the well-being of someone badly off by the
same amount? The theories themselves do not seem to come equipped with
answers to such questions.6
Fourth, if we can be uncertain over first-order moral theories, we can presum-
ably be uncertain over second-order moral theories as well, i.e. over theories
of decision-making under first-order moral uncertainty. How should we act in
light of this second-order moral uncertainty? Well, to answer that we need a
third-order moral theory, and an infinite regress appears to arise.7
4 Smith (2002) and Bykvist and Olson (2009, 2012) argue that non-cognitivists have trouble ac-
counting for moral uncertainty, whereas Sepielli (2011) argues that they can rise to the chal-
lenge.
5 See Sepielli (2012) for one account.
6 For some proposals of how to make intertheoretic comparisons, see Lockhart (2000:84), Sepielli
(2009: 12), and MacAskill (2014, chapter 4). Gustafsson and Torpman argues for My Favourite
Theory largely on the basis of (what they take to be) the impossibility of intertheoretic compar-
isons. MacAskill (2016b) presents an account of decision-making under moral uncertainty that
draws on social choice theory rather than expected utility theory, thereby circumventing the
need for intertheoretic comparisons.
7 See Sepielli (2013) for discussion.
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Given that our concern is with the epistemic rather than practical aspect of
moral uncertainty, we can mostly set aside these questions. We are not pro-
viding a theory of decision-making under moral uncertainty, and hence the
question of which notion of “ought” we are appealing to will not arise.8 Al-
though the question of intertheoretic comparisons will for the most part not
concern us, it does play a central role in the discussion of decision-theoretic
representation theorem arguments, so we shall return to the matter in section
3.4.1. We shall not concern ourselves with the regress problem, but the ques-
tion of non-cognitivism clearly does have bearing on the epistemic aspect of
moral uncertainty, so let us consider it in a bit more detail.
3.2.2 Moral Uncertainty and Non-Cognitivism
According to moral non-cognitivism, moral claims are not truth-apt. When
people make moral statements, they are not expressing their beliefs but rather
expressing some non-cognitive attitude. If non-cognitivism is correct, it may
seem strange to speak of moral uncertainty. Being uncertain about some claim
is usually understood as being uncertain about its truth value. But if moral
claims lack truth value, what could it mean to be morally uncertain?
On the simplest expressivist analysis, agents who utter moral sentences do so
to express their approval or disapproval. For example, an agent who utters
the sentence “Stealing is wrong” thereby expresses their disapproval of steal-
ing. But Smith (2002) argues that no expressivist analysis can simultaneously
account for (i) the importance we take a moral judgment to have, (ii) how con-
fident we are in that judgment, and (iii) the stability with which we hold that
judgment over time. With regards to importance, I may judge that murder
and theft are both morally wrong but hold that murder is much worse than
theft. With regards to confidence, I may be much more confident that murder
is morally wrong than that abortion is, while believing that if they are both
morally wrong, then they are equally wrong. And finally, with regards to sta-
bility, I may be equally confident of two acts that they are morally wrong and
believe that if they are both morally wrong then they are equally wrong, and
yet the former judgment may be much more stable than the latter, in the sense
that incoming information is much more likely to make me revise the latter
judgment.
How would a cognitivist account for these features? First, the judgment that
murder and theft are both morally wrong, but that murder is much worse
than theft can be spelled out in terms of a moral theory (or perhaps a set of
moral theories) which gives this verdict. Smith’s second and third points are,
of course, very naturally captured in a Bayesian framework. The confidence
8 It is of course true that the theory we shall consider, i.e. probabilism with respect to moral
uncertainty, deals in oughts in the sense that it is a normative epistemological theory. However,
the ought in “Your degrees of belief in moral claims ought to be probabilistically consistent” is
presumably of the same sort as the ought in “Your degrees of belief in descriptive claims ought
to be probabilistically consistent,” and there is therefore no new notion in need of explanation
here.
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with which I make a moral judgment would then correspond to my probabilis-
tic credence in that judgment. And the stability with which I hold a moral
judgment could then be spelled out as follows: for some set {Ei} of proposi-
tions I might learn, my credence in A is more stable than my credence in B just
in case, for each Ei, | P(A)P(A | Ei) |<| P(B)P(B | Ei) | (cf. Leitgeb’s (2017)
stability theory of belief.)
For a simple expressivist, however, things are not so easy. To capture impor-
tance, we might say that I disapprove much more strongly of murder than of
theft. But how would we then capture confidence? We could try to say that
if I am more confident in one moral judgment than another, then I am more
likely to hold on to that judgment over time. But of course, that corresponds
more closely to stability than to confidence. The basic issue is that in order to
capture all three aspects that Smith identifies, we need there to be two grad-
able features of moral judgments, but the simple expressivist framework only
provides us with one.
Of course, this difficulty with moral uncertainty is not the only problem for
expressivism. One of its main challenges is explaining how it is that moral
sentences behave much like propositions in many ways. For example, one
moral sentence may entail another, two moral sentences may be inconsistent,
and we can conjoin moral sentences with descriptive propositions. This is
the so-called Frege-Geach problem. Let us consider a version of it involving
negation (Schroeder 2008):
1. I think that stealing is wrong.
2. I don’t think that stealing is wrong.
3. I think that stealing is not wrong.
4. I think that not stealing is wrong.
Here is how a simple expressivist would translate these:
E1. I disapprove of stealing.
E2. I don’t disapprove of stealing.
E3. ?
E4. I disapprove of not stealing.
The trouble is that there are three places in sentence (1) where one can insert
a negation, but only two places in (E1) where one can do so. As a result, the
simple expressivist lacks an analysis of sentence (3). However, more sophis-
ticated expressivists purport to provide adequate analyses. I do not have the
space here for an extended discussion of the various expressivist accounts, but
by way of illustration I will consider just one example.
Schroeder (2008) introduces the attitude of “being for” as the general conative
attitude to figure in expressivist analyses. A moral statement A expresses
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For(a), where a is an appropriate analysis of what A says that the speaker is
for. So ¬A expresses For(¬a), A ∧ B expresses For(a ∧ b), and so forth. We can
then translate (1)-(4) above as follows:
S1. I’m for blaming for stealing.
S2. I’m not for blaming for stealing.
S3. I’m for not blaming for stealing.
S4. I’m for blaming for not stealing.
We also need an account of how to combine moral claims with descriptive
claims. Schroeder proposes that descriptive claims can also be analysed in
terms of being for: belief in the descriptive claim A is analysed as “being for
proceeding as if A.” Of course, whether Schroeder’s analysis succeeds will de-
pend on whether every use of a moral statement A can plausibly be analysed
as expressing that the speaker is for some a. And it also depends on what
exactly being for amounts, and why it is inconsistent to both be for blaming
for stealing and be for not blaming for stealing. But suppose for the moment
that we these issues can be dealt with.
Sepielli (2011) claims that any expressivist theory adequate to handle the Frege-
Geach problem is adequate to handle moral uncertainty. However, few of
those who argue that expressivism and moral uncertainty are compatible then
go on to examine which form this uncertainty will take, and in particular
whether something like probabilism can be justified as a requirement of ratio-
nality given an expressivist understanding of moral uncertainty.
A recent exception is Staffel (forthcoming), who proposes the following two-
step procedure for including moral uncertainty in an expressivist framework.
First: find some feature of the framework that admits of degrees. Second: for-
mulate and defend rationality requirements for this feature. In Schroeder’s
case, Staffel proposes that we introduce the notion of degrees of being for. Sup-
pose that I have 0.5 credence that a coin will land heads and 0.5 credence that
it will land tails. On Schroeder’s account, this means that I’m for proceeding
as if the coin will land heads to degree 0.5, and I’m for proceeding as if it
will land tails to degree 0.5. Similarly, if I have 0.5 credence that stealing is
wrong, then on Schroeder’s account I am for blaming for stealing to degree
0.5. Clearly, more needs to be said about what it means for an agent to be for
something to degree x. But I shall not do so here.
The arguments for probabilism I will consider in this chapter make most intu-
itive sense on a cognitivist understanding of moral discourse, although it may
be possible to give them non-cognitivist readings. Although I shall sometimes
comment on the possibility of giving a non-cognitivist interpretation of some
notions that figure in the arguments, I will not provide a systematic account
of moral uncertainty for non-cognitivists. Any conclusions are therefore best
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read as holding conditional on cognitivism.9
This concludes our initial survey of moral uncertainty. Let me make one final
clarification. If we are prepared to take moral uncertainty seriously, we should
presumably also be prepared to take seriously many other forms of normative
uncertainty, such as decision-theoretic uncertainty (e.g. uncertainty whether
expected utility maximization is the correct norm of practical rationality), epis-
temological uncertainty (e.g. uncertainty whether Bayesianism is the correct
account of rational credence), perhaps even uncertainty over aesthetic value.10
While this is surely right, I will here ignore all other forms of normative uncer-
tainty and focus exclusively on moral uncertainty.11
We shall shortly consider whether the standard arguments for probabilism
with respect to descriptive uncertainty—representation theorem arguments,
Dutch book arguments, and accuracy arguments—can also justify this doc-
trine with respect to moral uncertainty. Before we can do that, however, we
first need to know how to represent moral claims formally. In particular, we
need to make sure that it is possible to form a σ-algebra of of moral claims so
that we can then define a probability function.
3.3 a formal semantics for moral language
On the face of it, we can be uncertain about a wide range of moral claims. I
may be uncertain about whether it’s impermissible for me to tell a particular
white lie, or about whether lying in general is impermissible. More generally
still, I may be uncertain about whether some specific form of utilitarianism is
the correct moral theory. Or I may be uncertain about whether modesty is a
virtue, or about whether pride is a sin. Ideally, we would like to have a single
framework to capture our uncertainty about all of these kinds of moral claims.
In many philosophical treatments of probabilism, the objects of credence are
taken to be propositions, and these are typically analysed in accordance with
the usual possible worlds semantics, which identifies each proposition with a
set of possible worlds, understood as the set of worlds in which the proposi-
tion is true.12 However, on some meta-ethical views, certain true moral claims
are necessarily true, and certain false normative claims are necessarily false.
For example, if utilitarianism is true, it’s natural to suppose that it’s necessar-
ily true, i.e. true in every metaphysically possible world. For one thing, moral
9 See Staffel (forthcoming) for an examination of whether there are sound expressivist Dutch
book and accuracy arguments for probabilism.
10 See for example MacAskill (2016a) for a discussion of decision-theoretic uncertainty.
11 For many of these domains, I believe it should be straightforward to extend the arguments for
probabilism. Of course, the case of epistemological uncertainty presents a special challenge: if
I’m uncertain between theories of reasoning under first-order uncertainty, it seems I may also
be uncertain between theories of reasoning under second-order uncertainty and so forth, poten-
tially leading to the same type of infinite regress we considered earlier. See Sepielli (2013) and
MacAskill (2016a) for discussion of the general issue in the context of other types of normative
uncertainty.
12 See Chalmers (2011) for discussion of related issues.
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theories should allow us to engage in counterfactual reasoning: they should
allow us to say that if the world were so and so, then this or that would be
the thing to do. For another, it is often assumed that the moral supervenes
on the natural, so that whenever there is a moral difference between two cases
there must also be a natural difference. But this means that every moral prop-
erty will be necessarily coextensive with some set of natural properties. As
a result, sets of possible worlds are poorly suited for the role as objects of
credence in the case of moral uncertainty, because they do not allow us to
model agents who have distinct credences in different necessary truths, and
distinct credences in different necessary falsehoods. All necessarily true moral
claims will correspond to the same set of possible worlds (namely the set of
all worlds), and all necessarily false moral claims will also correspond to the
same set (namely the empty set).
The same problem arises for attempts to model failures of logical omniscience.
In that context, some have proposed the use of impossible worlds to represent
agents who have distinct credences in different truths of logic (e.g. Hintikka
1975). Others have suggested that such cases can be dealt with by letting sen-
tences rather than propositions be the objects of credence (e.g. Hacking 1967
and Gaifman 2004).
Instead, however, we shall model moral claims as sets of moral theories, un-
derstood as the set of theories according to which the moral claim is true. This
allows us to capture all of the different kinds of normative claims that I men-
tioned at the beginning of this section: the claim that it’s impermissible for me
to tell a particular white lie will be the set of moral theories according to which
it is indeed impermissible for me to do so, the claim that lying in general is
impermissible will be the set of all theories that give that verdict, and the claim
that some specific form of utilitarianism is correct will be the singleton set con-
taining that theory. Similarly, the claim that modesty is a virtue will be the set
of moral theories according to which modesty is indeed a virtue. And so forth.
This kind of picture is implicit in a lot of writing on moral uncertainty. For
example, Lockhart (2000), Ross (2006b), Gustafsson and Torpman (2014), and
MacAskill (2014) all take the objects of credence to be moral theories. Sepielli
(2009:7–8) instead takes the objects of credence to be what he calls practical
comparatives, i.e. propositions of the form “the balance of reasons favors do-
ing action A rather than doing action B.” However, he goes on to note that “a
normative theory, on one conception at least, is just a very large practical com-
parative. It’s a comparative of the form Action A is better than action B, which is
better than action C, which is better than action D...”
I will argue that moral theories in fact have more structure than Sepielli allows
for. In particular, I will suggest that, in addition to telling us which actions are
better than which, moral theories also tell us why those actions are better than
others. This explanatory role is a crucial aspect of moral theories. To account
for it, I will borrow a framework developed by Dietrich and List (2017), which
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to my knowledge is the most sophisticated formal treatment of normative the-
ories available.13
3.3.1 The Dietrich-List Framework
We begin with a representation of the deontic content of the normative theo-
ries, i.e. their verdicts of permissibility and impermissibility. Let K be a set
of possible choice contexts that an agent may be faced with. Each K ∈ K is a
situation in which the agent has to choose among some options. For example,
it might be the situation of deciding whether to order steak or vegetarian for
dinner. We let [K] denote the set of options in context K. For each context
K, a moral theory tells us which of the available options are permissible and
which are not. We represent this with a rightness function D, which maps each
context K to a set D(K) ⊆ [K] of permissible options. The rightness function
D thus encodes the deontic content of the corresponding moral theory.
However, a moral theory is not exhausted by its deontic content. For one
thing, we usually expect a moral theory to tell us in virtue of what the permis-
sible actions are permissible. For another, many moral theories make more
fine-grained distinctions than simply classifying actions as either permissible
or impermissible. To take this into account, Dietrich and List enrich their for-
mal framework as follows. An option-context pair is a pair of the form 〈x, K〉,
where x is an option and K is a context. A property is a primitive object P that
picks out a set of option-context pairs, called the extension of P and denoted
[P]. Whenever a pair 〈x, K〉 is contained in [P], this means that option x has
property P in context K. Let P denote the set of those properties that may
be normatively relevant. For example, we might have welfare properties, the
property of being a lie, the property of being a rights-violation, and so forth.
Dietrich and List then define a reasons structure.
reasons structure A reasons structure is a pair R = 〈N,〉, consisting of (i)
a normative relevance function N, which assigns to each context K ∈ K a
set N(K) of normatively relevant properties, and (ii) a weighing relation 
over sets of properties, i.e. a binary relation over subsets of P .
For example, in the case of a simple utilitarian theory, N will assign each
context a set of utility properties, and  will rank sets of such properties in
accordance with the criterion that more utility is better than less.
For each option x and each context K, write P(x, K) to denote the set of all
properties of this option-context pair (among the properties in P). The norma-
tively relevant properties of option x in context K will be those that lie in the
intersection of P(x, K) and N(K). Let N(x, K) = P(x, K) ∩ N(K). We can now
derive a rightness function from a reasons structure by letting the permissible
13 There are some other accounts of normative theories in the literature on normative uncertainty.
See for example Gustafsson and Torpman (2014: 171) and MacAskill (2014: 12).
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options be the ones that are at least as choice-worthy as all other available
options according to that reasons structure:
D(K) = {x ∈ [K] : N(x, K)  N(y, K) for all y ∈ [K]}.
With this formal framework in place, Dietrich and List go on to provide a tax-
onomy of various types of moral theories. I will not go through all of their
distinctions, but let us consider a few just to get a better understanding of
the framework. Consider a very simple moral theory such as total hedonistic
utilitarianism. Intuitively, this theory says that there is only one normatively
relevant property—pleasure—and that more of this property is always better.
What kind of a property is pleasure? The amount of pleasure that a given ac-
tion would lead to does not depend on which other actions are available. That
is, pleasure is an option property: whether a given option-context pair has the
property depends only on the option and not the context. Dietrich and List say
that a moral theory is structurally consequentialist just in case it only ever deems
option properties to be normatively relevant. So total hedonistic utilitarianism
comes out as consequentialist in this sense.
Strictly speaking, total hedonistic utilitarianism recognizes not just one nor-
matively relevant property, but many: the property of leading to amount x of
pleasure, the property of leading to amount y of pleasure, etc. So we can write
that for every context K, N(K) is the set of all properties of the form Ppleasure=x.
Furthermore, the weighing relation linearly orders singleton sets of properties
of the form {Ppleasure=x}, so that {Ppleasure=x}  {Ppleasure=y} just in case x ≥ y
But we can say that these are all properties of the same type, namely pleasure
properties, and that total hedonistic utilitarianism recognizes only one type of
normatively relevant property.
Total hedonistic utilitarianism is also a monistic (as opposed to pluralistic theory
in that it assigns each option exactly one normatively relevant property in
every context. Dietrich and List say that a theory is teleological if the weighing
relation can be interpreted as a betterness relation. However, this betterness
relation need not be consequentialist in the sense just defined. Assuming that
a betterness relation is required to be transitive and reflexive, we can then say
that a moral theory is teleological just in case its weighing relation is transitive
and reflexive. Total hedonistic utilitarianism is clearly teleological in this sense.
3.3.2 A General Framework for Representing Moral Claims
With the account of moral theories in place, we can now give an account of
moral claims in general. The reasons structures will play the role of possible
worlds, so that each moral claim corresponds to a set of reasons structures.
More specifically, let R be a set of reasons structures and let F be a σ-algebra
over R. We can now state probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty as
follows:
probabilismM A rational agent’s quantitative beliefs in moral claims can be
represented as a probability space 〈R,F , P〉.
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For the most part, we shall be exclusively concerned with the agent’s credences
in moral claims. However, on a few occasions, particularly in section 4.2 where
we discuss the place of conditionalization in a probabilistic moral epistemol-
ogy we will have to consider the agent’s credences in both descriptive and
moral claims. In order to do so, we must appeal to a somewhat richer σ-
algebra. More specifically, we will let Ω = W ×R be the Cartesian product
of some background set W of possible worlds and some background set R of
reasons structures. Then we can let F be a σ-algebra on Ω, and finally let P
be a probability function on F . Each proposition in the algebra will now be
a set of pairs of possible worlds and reasons structures. However, we can still
distinguish between descriptive claims and moral claims. Intuitively, we can
understand a descriptive claim as a proposition whose moral content is the
(moral) tautology, and a moral claim as a proposition whose descriptive con-
tent is the (descriptive) tautology. All other claims we can call mixed. More
specifically, a proposition D ⊆ W ×R expresses a (purely) descriptive claim
just in case for every 〈W, R〉 ∈ W ×R, if 〈W, R〉 ∈ D, then for every R‘ ∈ R,
〈W, R‘〉 ∈ D. Similarly, a proposition M ⊆ W ×R expresses a (purely) moral
claim just in case for every 〈W, R〉 ∈ W ×R, if 〈W, R〉 ∈ M, then for every
W‘ ∈ W , 〈W‘, R〉 ∈ M. With this in place, the notion of the probability of a
moral claim conditional on a descriptive claim that we shall draw on later is
now well-defined.
This concludes our description of the formal framework. Now that we know
what probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty amounts to, it’s time to
consider the arguments for this claim. In evaluating these arguments, I will
assume the perspective of someone who is antecedently sympathetic to prob-
abilism with respect to descriptive uncertainty. That is, I shall not have much
to say about objections to probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty that
apply with equal force to probabilism with respect to descriptive uncertainty.
The more interesting question, I take it, is whether there are reasons to reject
probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty in particular. With that in mind,
let us begin with representation theorem arguments.
3.4 representation theorem arguments
A representation theorem shows that if an agent’s attitudes satisfy some set
of conditions, she can be represented as having a probabilistic credence distri-
bution. We can distinguish between decision-theoretic representation theorems,
which start from a preference relation, and epistemic representation theorems,
which start from a comparative probability relation (Briggs 2015).
In the decision-theoretic case, let  be a weak preference relation over some
set of prospects, so that A  B means that A is at least as preferred as B. A
decision-theoretic representation theorem shows that if  satisfies some partic-
ular set of constraints, then there exists a probability function P and a utility
function U which together represent  in the sense that, for any two prospects
A and B, A  B iff the expected value of A is at least as great as the expected
value of B, where the expected values are calculated relative to P and U. Typ-
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ically, the utility function will be unique up to positive linear transformation,
whereas the probability function will be fully unique.
In the epistemic case, let D be a weak comparative probability relation over
some set of prospects, so that AD B means that A is judged to be at least as
probable as B. An epistemic representation theorem shows that if D satisfies
some particular set of constraints, then there exists a probability function P
which represents D in the sense that, for any two prospects A and B, AD B iff
P(A) ≥ P(B).
Thus, a representation theorem argument posits that our preferences or our
comparative probability judgments are rationally required to satisfy the rele-
vant set of constraints and concludes via the representation theorem that we
are rationally required to have a probabilistic credence function. Much of the
philosophical work therefore consists in justifying the claim that the relevant
set of constraints are indeed requirements of rationality.
Representation theorems have played a central role in decision theory and for-
mal epistemology because the qualitative concepts embodied in the binary re-
lations are often thought to be in some sense prior to the quantitative concepts
(Bradley 2017:43). This is especially true of decision-theoretic representation
theorems. Preferences manifest themselves in choice behaviour, and as a result
they are more easily observable than are numerical degrees of belief and desire.
They form the empirical basis for the assignment of probabilities and utilities:
the qualitative attitudes provide evidence for the quantitative ones.
What, then, are preferences? According to the choice-theoretic account, claims
about preferences are simply claims about choice behaviour of some kind. In
the early days of revealed preference theory, preferences were identified with
actual choice behaviour (Samuelson 1938). On the one hand, this makes prefer-
ences perfectly amenable to empirical investigation: we simply have to observe
people’s choices. On the other, it means that we can only speak of an agent’s
preferring ice cream over torture if she has in fact encountered a situation
in which both options were available and chosen the former. More recently,
some have taken preferences to be identical to hypothetical choice behaviour
(Binmore 1994). This overcomes some of the difficulties of revealed preference
theory, but neither version is able to account for the apparent fact that pref-
erences can explain choice behaviour. My choosing pistachio ice cream over
strawberry ice cream is explained by my preference for the former. But if pref-
erences are identical to choice behaviour, then they cannot explain it.
According to the mentalist account, preferences are judgments or attitudes of
a certain sort. We might initially think that they are judgments of self-interest,
but further reflection reveals this to be implausible. The question of whther
people are fundamentally self-interested should not be settled by stipulative
fiat. As an example of a more sophisticated mentalist account, consider Haus-
man (2011) who proposes that preferences are total subjective comparative
evaluations. They are of course comparative in that they always compare two
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options (unlike, say, desire). They are subjective in that agents may have dif-
ferent preferences without any of them thereby being mistaken. And they are
total in that they concern everything that the agent takes to have bearing on
the question.
What about comparative confidence judgments? In this case, it would on the
face of it seem more difficult to give a choice-theoretic account. When it comes
to preference, even a mentalist agrees that there is some link or other between
preferring A to B and choosing A over B, even if she denies that this link is
definitional. By contrast, knowing that an agent judges A to be more likely
than B does not tell us anything about how she is likely to choose, at least not
in the absence of further assumptions about her preferences. But if we make
the innocuous assumption that she prefers receiving £10 to not receiving £10,
then we can formulate comparative confidence judgments in choice-theoretic
terms by offering her to choose between a prize that pays £10 if A and nothing
otherwise, and a prize that pays £10 if B and nothing otherwise.
Although I will assume that preferences and comparative confidence judg-
ments are connected both to our choice behaviour and to various psychological
states, I will not settle on a particular account. Instead, we shall now examine
the prospects for formulating decision-theoretic and epistemic representation
theorem arguments for the case of moral uncertainty.
3.4.1 Decision-Theoretic Representation Theorems
As we have seen, a decision-theoretic representation theorem takes as its start-
ing point a binary preference relation on some set of prospects and shows that
if the preference relation satisfies certain conditions, it can be represented as
expected utility maximisation relative to a unique probability function and a
unique (up to positive linear transformation) utility function.14
For our purposes, one immediate difficulty with using decision-theoretic rep-
resentation theorems to establish probabilism is that preferences are a poor
starting point for moral uncertainty. We cannot infer from my preference for
spending £20 on dinner over donating that same £20 to charity that I believe
the former to be morally better than the latter, or that I take it to have a higher
expected choice-worthiness, or any other such claim. I may simply not care
about morality, in which case my preferences will never reflect my moral judg-
ments. Or perhaps I do care, but not to the point of letting morality be the
sole determinant of my preferences. In neither case can my moral views be
straightforwardly read off from my preferences. And this is so regardless of
whether we opt for a choice-theoretic or a mentalist approach to preferences.
Hence any decision-theoretic representation theorem for moral uncertainty
would have to start from some other notion than preference. And this is indeed
the strategy chosen by Riedener (2015), who provides what is to my knowledge
14 See von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944/2007), Savage (1954), Jeffrey (1965), Bolker (1966),
and Joyce (1999).
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the only existing discussion of representation theorems in the context of moral
uncertainty. More specifically, he is concerned with axiological uncertainty, i.e.
uncertainty about moral value—about which options are morally better than
which. He introduces the notion of uncertainty-relative value judgments, or
u-value judgments for short. These are the betterness judgments the agent
makes while taking her axiological uncertainty into account.
You might worry that u-value judgments, or whatever alternative relation we
settle for, are less amenable to empirical investigation than preferences are,
given that they cannot be straightforwardly read off from choice behaviour. In
order to obtain an agent’s u-value judgments, we have to invoke hypothetical
situations: assuming you only cared about axiological considerations, or as-
suming that only axiological considerations were at stake, which alternative
would you judge to be better? But of course, once we abandon the strictest ver-
sion of the choice-theoretic account, the same is true of ordinary preferences.
In order to make sense of an agent’s having preferences over options she has
never encountered we have to invoke her disposition to choose or the hypo-
thetical judgments she would form, or some other such notion. Hence u-value
judgments do not appear to be significantly worse off in this regard.
The standard decision-theoretic representation theorem arguments purport to
establish that it is a requirement of rationality to maximise expected utility.
On a natural understanding of this claim, it encompasses both theoretical and
practical rationality: theoretical rationality requires us to have probabilistic
degrees of belief, and practical rationality requires us to maximise expected
utility relative to those probabilistic degrees of belief.
A straightforward translation of decision-theoretic representation theorem ar-
guments from empirical uncertainty would then seem to yield the analogous
conclusion that it is a requirement of rationality to maximise expected choice-
worthiness (MEC), where the expected choice-worthiness of an option is the
probability-weighted average of the choice-worthiness, or moral value, assigned
to that option by each of the moral theories in which we have non-zero cre-
dence. This would give us the desired result that theoretical rationality re-
quires degrees of belief in moral claims to be probabilistic, but it would also
give us the additional result that practical rationality requires us to maximise
expected choice-worthiness.
Riedener on Axiological Uncertainty
For the sake of illustration, let us briefly consider Riedener’s representation
theorems for axiological uncertainty. He uses the framework of state-dependent
utility theory, which is usefully contrasted with Savage’s (1954) framework. In
Savage’s framework, there is a set of states of nature and a set of outcomes. An
act is a mapping from states to outcomes: it maps each state to the outcome
which would result if the act were performed when that state is the actual state
of nature. The agent is uncertain about which state is actual, and thereby un-
certain about the outcomes of her acts. Savage’s representation theorem begins
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from a preference relation over acts and constructs a utility function defined
over outcomes and a probability distribution over states. By contrast, in state-
dependent utility theory, the utility function is defined over state-outcome
pairs rather than over outcomes alone (Drèze and Rustichini, 2004). Riedener
proposes state-dependent utility theory as a natural framework for axiological
uncertainty. In this application, the states of nature are axiologies, and utility
corresponds to u-value. Since different axiologies assign different values to
empirical outcomes, the u-value of an outcome will depend on which state it
occurs in. And this makes state-dependent utility theory a natural framework.
Riedener provides two representation theorems for axiological uncertainty. These
theorems show under what conditions the u-value relation can be represented
as maximising expected axiological value. The first theorem assumes that a
probability distribution over axiologies is given exogenously. Hence it clearly
cannot be used to underwrite an argument for probabilism with respect to
axiological uncertainty. But it will nevertheless be useful to briefly describe it
before we move on to the second theorem. This second theorem does not as-
sume that a probability distribution over axiologies is given exogenously and
is therefore more promising as an argument for probabilism.
To begin, an axiology is a binary relation over some set O of options. These
options are probability distributions (lotteries) over (descriptive) states of the
world. It is assumed that all axiologies under consideration satisfy the von
Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. That is, for any A, B, C ∈ O:
1. transitivity If A  B and B  C, then A  C.
2. completeness A  B or B  A.
3. independence If A  B then pA + (1− p)C  pB + (1− p)C for any C
and any p ∈ (0, 1].
4. continuity If A  B and B  C, then there exist p, q ∈ (0, 1) such that
pA + (1− p)C  B and B  qA + (1− q)C.
For his first result, which draws on Karni and Schmeidler (2016), the u-value
relation is defined over a somewhat more complex set of options Q than are
the axiologies themselves. More specifically, the options are probability distri-
butions over pairs of states of the world and axiologies. This means that we are
taking into account both descriptive and axiological uncertainty.
Here is the result: the u-value relation U over Q can be represented as max-
imising expected axiological value just in case it satisfies the von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms with respect to Q (Riedener 2015, p. 47). As I already
mentioned, this result cannot be used to support an argument for probabilism.
Let us therefore move on to the second result.
Although this result does not assume that we have a probability distribution
over axiologies, it does assume that we have one over (descriptive) outcomes.
More specifically, an option is set of pairs of, on the one hand, an axiology,
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and on the other, a probability distribution over outcomes. An option contains
one such pair for each axiology under consideration. We can interpret these
pairs as saying: “if axiology Ti is true, then the probability distribution over
outcomes is such and such.” Of course, under normal circumstances the prob-
ability distribution over outcomes will be independent of which axiology is
true. But the construction gives us a way of incorporating axiologies into the
options without having to specify a probability distribution over them. So for
the second result, the u-value relation is defined over a set K of options of this
sort.
Again, it is assumed that the axiologies under consideration satisfy the von
Neumann-Morgenstern axioms with respect toO, and that the u-value relation
satisfies them with respect to K. However, since we are no longer assuming a
probability distribution over axiologies, these conditions are not sufficient for
a representation theorem. In order to get around this, Riedener supposes that
the u-value relation is defined not just over K, but also over the set Q that was
used in the previous result. This way, the agent can form conditional u-value
judgments of the form: “if the probability distribution over axiologies were P,
I would judge that A is u-better than B.” Roughly, the idea is now as follows:
by considering the agent’s conditional u-value judgments, we hold the proba-
bility distribution fixed, and can therefore determine her utility function in the
same way we did with the previous theorem. Having determined her utility
function, we can then use her unconditional u-value judgments (“actually, I
judge that A is u-better than B”) to determine her probability distribution over
axiologies. Hence with this assumption in place, Riedener is able to provide a
representation theorem.
Of course, by considering the agent’s conditional judgments, we still had to
take some notion of probability as a given. So, in what sense could this result
underwrite an argument for probabilism with respect to axiologies? Riedener
takes himself to be engaged in the project of giving an explication of the notion
of subjective credence in axiologies. But nothing has been said so far about how
the probability distributions that the agent is considering in her conditional
judgments should be interpreted. If we interpret them as the agent’s own
subjective probabilities, you might suspect that the explication of subjective
credence in axiologies becomes circular. But if we interpret them as objective
probabilities, there is no risk of circularity. Of course, the notion of an axiology
having an objective probability sounds rather outlandish. But Riedener asks
us to imagine a scenario in which God used a randomising device to deter-
mine the true axiology. In order for the construction to work, we don’t have to
find such a scenario plausible. We only have to believe that it is conceptually
coherent. If it is, then these probability distributions over axiologies can play
their intended role in conditional u-value judgments, and the theorem is able
to underwrite an argument for probabilism with respect to axiological uncer-
tainty. Clearly, much more can be said here.
Can Riedener’s representation theorem provide us with an argument for prob-
abilism with respect to moral uncertainty? As it turns out, his result is limited
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in a number of ways.15 The first thing to note is that the result only pertains to
axiological uncertainty (i.e. uncertainty over which states of affairs are morally
better than others), and therefore says nothing about how other types of moral
uncertainty, such as deontic uncertainty (i.e. uncertainty over which acts are
permissible), should be represented. So even if the argument is otherwise
successful, it can only establish probabilism with respect to a specific type of
moral uncertainty. Secondly, the assumption that all axiologies under consid-
eration satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms arguably rule out some
plausible axiologies, or at any rate axiologies that agents may reasonably as-
sign non-zero credence. For example, by requiring that axiologies be complete,
we rule out axiologies that posit incommensurable values. Furthermore, the
continuity condition rules out axiologies that assign infinite value to some out-
come and finite value to others, as well as ones according to which some kinds
of values lexically dominate others. So even if we find Riedener’s argument
persuasive, it only establishes probabilism with respect to a particular class of
axiologies.
Intertheoretic Comparisons of Value
From my perspective, one potential further downside of decision-theoretic rep-
resentation theorem arguments in general is that they may prove too much.
As we saw earlier, these arguments purport to establish both that theoretical
rationality requires us to have probabilistic credences and that practical ratio-
nality requires us to maximise expected choice-worthiness (MEC). Given that
my focus here is on whether probabilism holds for moral uncertainty, it would
be preferable if we could answer that question without also having to take a
stance on the question of how to make decisions, or how to evaluate options,
in light of such uncertainty. Additionally, the claim that practical rationality
requires us to maximise expected choice-worthiness is much more controver-
sial than the claim that theoretical rationality requires us to have probabilistic
credences. There are several accounts of decision-making under moral uncer-
tainty which assume that agents have probabilistic credences in moral claims
and yet recommend a different procedure than that of maximising expected
choice-worthiness, such as acting in accordance with the moral theory in which
one has highest credence (Gracely 1996, Gustafsson and Torpman 2014). Fur-
thermore, in order for the injunction to maximise expected choice-worthiness
to even be well-defined, we must assume that so-called intertheoretic compar-
isons of value are possible, because the choice-worthiness function tells us how
an option’s value according to one moral theory compares to its value accord-
ing to another. But it’s not at all clear what could ground these comparisons,
and indeed, scepticism about intertheoretic value comparisons is one common
motivation for those who propose an alternative account of decision-making
under moral uncertainty. Intertheoretic comparisons of value are comparisons
of the form:
intertheoretic comparisons The difference in choice-worthiness between A
and B according to moral theory T1 is greater than the difference in
choice-worthiness between C and D according to moral theory T2.
15 I should note that Riedener himself is keenly aware of the limitations of the result.
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Their name highlights the analogy with interpersonal comparisons of well-
being. And just as with interpersonal comparisons of well-being, the intelligi-
bility of intertheoretic comparisons of value has been rather controversial.
In order for MEC to be a well-defined decision rule, such comparisons must
meaningful. To see why, consider the following simple case. Say that your
credence is split between two theories, T1 and T2, and that the two available
options are A and B. Let U1 and U2 be the choice-worthiness functions of T1
and T2 respectively. The expected choice-worthiness of these two options is
given as:
EC(A) = 0.5U1(A) + 0.5U2(A)
EC(B) = 0.5U1(B) + 0.5U2(B)
MEC now tells us to pick whichever option has the highest expected choice-
worthiness. But in order for these expressions to be well-defined, intertheoretic
comparisons must be possible. We must be able to put the two theories in a
common scale, so to speak, so that if U1(A) > U2(A), this means that A is more
choice-worthy according to T1 than according to T2. Following Gustafsson and
Torpman (2014), let us distinguish between the following views:
non-comparativism Intertheoretic comparisons are never possible (Gustafs-
son and Torpman 2014).
weak comparativism Intertheoretic comparisons are sometimes possible (Ross
2006, MacAskill 2014).
strong comparativism Intertheoretic comparisons are always possible (Lock-
hart 2000, Sepielli 2010).
Why be sceptical of intertheoretic comparisons of value? I will first give two
reasons to think that there are at least some classes of moral theories for which
intertheoretic comparisons are not possible. If this is correct, we should reject
strong comparativism. Then I will consider some reasons for thinking that they
are never possible. If this is correct, we should reject even weak comparativism.
The first reason for thinking that intertheoretic comparisons are not always pos-
sible has to do with the structure of moral theories. Let O = {O1, O2, . . . , On}
be some set of options. The job of a moral theory is to tell us how good, or
choice-worthy, these options are. One way for it to do so is to provide a rank-
ing of those options, say O1  O2  · · ·  On. If this is all the information a
moral theory provides us with, we will say that it is merely ordinal. A merely
ordinal moral theory does not allow us to say anything about the magnitude of
differences in choice-worthiness: it does not allow us to say, for example, that
the difference in choice-worthiness between O1 and O2 is twice as large as that
between O3 and O4. If a moral theory is merely ordinal, then any numerical
utility function U such that, for all Oi and Oj ∈ O, U(Oi) > U(Oj) just in case
Oi  Oj will be just as good a representation as any other.
A moral theory is measurable on an interval scale if it is meaningful to say that
the difference in choice-worthiness between O1 and O2 is twice as large as that
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between O3 and O4. If the theory is measurable on an interval scale and U1
is a numerical representation of it, then so is any U2 such that for all O ∈ O,
U2(O) = kU1(O) + m, for k > 0.
In order for intertheoretic comparisons of value to be possible, all of the rele-
vant moral theories must be measurable on an interval scale. If a moral theory
is merely ordinal, it does not make sense to speak of how large the difference
in choice-worthiness is between two options. But it is precisely claims of this
form that we need for intertheoretic comparisons.
Some moral theories are naturally thought of as being measurable on an inter-
val scale. For example, it is natural to think of utilitarianism as saying that (all
else equal) the difference in choice-worthiness between saving two lives and
saving no lives is twice as large as that between saving one life and saving
no lives. If necessary, the relevant interval scale can be obtained by paying
attention to how the moral theory orders prospects that involve empirical un-
certainty: for example, utilitarianism will say that the option of saving one life
with certainty is just as good as the option with one-half probability of saving
no lives and one-half probability of saving two lives.
But not all moral theories are amenable to such a treatment. For example,
many deontological theories are arguably best thought of as being merely or-
dinal. On Kant’s view, murder is worse than lying, which in turn is worse than
not helping a stranger in need. But it does not seem to make much sense to ask
Kant whether the difference between murder and lying is smaller or greater
than that between lying and not helping a stranger in need (MacAskill 2014:55).
Relatedly, according to absolutist moral theories, some acts are always wrong,
no matter what the consequences. Such theories are also naturally thought of
as having a merely ordinal structure. Hence there seems to be many influential
moral theories that lack the structure necessary for intertheoretic comparisons
of value to be possible. Since a decision-theoretic representation theorem for
moral uncertainty will imply that all theories under consideration are interthe-
oretically comparable, such a representation theorem cannot be given for an
agent for whom merely ordinal theories are a live option. Therefore, it cannot
be used to establish probabilism with respect to merely ordinal theories.
The second reason for thinking that intertheoretic comparisons of value are
not always possible also has to do with the structure of moral theories. Some
moral theories posit incommensurable values. For example, a theory might say
that although pleasure and beauty are both valuable, they cannot be compared:
we cannot say whether an outcome with some given amount of pleasure is bet-
ter or worse than an outcome with some other given amount of beauty. This
incommensurability can be either weak or strong. If it is weak, then there are
at least some amounts for which the two are incomparable. If it is strong, then
they are never comparable. Both weak and strong incommensurability spell
trouble for intertheoretic comparisons of value, because such comparisons re-
quire that moral theories tell us, for any pair of options, how large the dif-
ference in choice-worthiness is between them. Therefore, a decision-theoretic
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representation theorem cannot be given for an agent for whom moral theories
that posit incommensurable values are a live option.
We have now seen two types of moral theories for which intertheoretic compar-
isons are not always possible. Moreover, it’s not as though these are obscure
moral theories: they include some of the most prominent ones. I therefore take
it that we have good reason to reject strong comparativism.
But suppose now that an agent is only considering theories that are measurable
on an interval scale. Do we still have any reason to think that intertheoretic
comparisons of value are impossible?
Some argue for the claim that intertheoretic comparisons are sometimes pos-
sible by pointing to particular cases in which we would intuitively judge that
such comparisons are meaningful. For example, MacAskill and Ord (forth-
coming) present two such cases. The first class of cases are ones where the
two theories under consideration are very similar. As an example, MacAskill
and Ord consider the view that Singer (1972) presents in “Famine, Affluence,
and Morality.” There, he proposes a modification of common-sense ethics ac-
cording to which those of us who are wealthy have stronger obligations to the
global poor than we may have otherwise thought. Consider now the claim “It’s
more important to give to Oxfam on Singer’s view than it is on the common-
sense view.” This claim clearly seems true. Moreover, it is a claim about
intertheoretic comparisons. The second class of cases are ones where the two
theories under consideration only differ with respect to the extension of bear-
ers of value. As an example, they consider utilitarianism, which says that the
value of an outcome is given by the sum of well-being across all people, and
utilitarianism*, which says that the value of an outcome is given by the sum
of well-being across all people except Richard Nixon. Again, some value com-
parisons between these two theories clearly seem to be true: for example, the
claim that the two theories agree on the value of each person except Richard
Nixon.
Suppose we agree that the intertheoretic comparisons in these two cases are
intelligible. How far does that get us? In both cases, it seems as though one
moral theory is defined in terms of its relation to another moral theory: Singer’s
view is just like the common-sense view, except that it assigns greater impor-
tance to help the global poor, and utilitarianism∗ is just like utilitarianism,
except that it doesn’t count the well-being of Richard Nixon. It is almost as
if these theories are defined by stipulating that certain intertheoretic compar-
isons hold. This need not in itself be problematic, but when one considers the
moral theories that have been influential, it seems quite rare for one of them
to be defined in terms of another in this manner. So the worry is that these
intuitive comparisons will only be possible in somewhat artificial cases.
Another view, advocated by Riedener, is that intertheoretic comparisons get
their meaning via the relevant representation theorem. However, he thinks
that probabilistic credences also get their meaning via the relevant representa-
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tion theorem. But if the conditions of the representation theorem will only be
satisfied by agents who are only considering moral theories of a specific type
(i.e. axiologies that satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms), then it
seems we cannot meaningfully speak of agents having probabilistic credences
in moral theories that are not of that type.
Upshot
We have found good reason to reject strong comparativism, while leaving some
room for weak comparativism. In light of this, what are the prospects for a
decision-theoretic representation theorem argument for probabilism with re-
spect to moral uncertainty? If non-comparativism is correct, then clearly no
such argument can get off the ground. If a decision-theoretic representation
theorem is to underpin a fully general argument for probabilism with respect
to moral uncertainty, it is not sufficient to assume weak comparativism. Strong
comparativism is required. According to weak comparativism, intertheoretic
comparisons are possible for some moral theories but impossible for others.
Suppose now that an agent has preferences, or u-value judgments, over moral
theories of both kinds. What are the rationality constraints on these u-value
judgments? If we go for the ones that that figure in a decision-theoretic repre-
sentation theorem, we will of course end up with a representation of the agent
as an expected utility maximiser. But such a representation implies that all
theories are intertheoretically comparable. Hence it cannot be that our u-value
judgments must satisfy the axioms of the representation theorem for every
moral theory. In particular, they must violate at least some of them whenever
the judgment concerns two incomparable theories.
In response, we might settle for a more modest conclusion: if an agent is only
considering intertheoretically comparable theories, then her degrees of belief in
those theories are rationally required to be probabilistic. For example, suppose
that we are concerned with axiological uncertainty, and that the agent in ques-
tion is only considering axiologies that satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern
axioms. We can then argue that the u-value relation should also satisfy these
axioms and then derive probabilism via Riedener’s second result. If on the
other the agent is also considering some incomparable theories, then we don’t
make any claims about what rationality requires of her degrees of belief.
However, although the argument for this more modest conclusion may be
sound, it is not an especially satisfying conclusion. As we have seen, the class
of incomparable theories includes several prominent moral theories. By exclud-
ing these from consideration, we seem to be giving up the game. We might
hope that some other argument can underwrite probabilism with respect to
credences in incomparable theories as well. But any argument that does so is
likely to lend just as much support to probabilism with respect to credences
in comparable theories (as we shall see when we examine Dutch book argu-
ments and accuracy arguments later on). Hence by appealing to a separate
argument to address the special case of incomparable theories, we undermine
the decision-theoretic representation theorem argument’s standing as an inde-
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pendent argument for probabilism.
So, the upshot is that decision-theoretic representation theorems cannot under-
write an argument for probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty in general.
Therefore, insofar as you accept probabilism with respect to descriptive uncer-
tainty on the basis of a decision-theoretic representation theorem argument,
you have less reason to accept it with respect to moral uncertainty.
3.4.2 Epistemic Representation Theorems
As you will recall, epistemic RTAs take as their starting point a notion of
comparative confidence, rather than preferences (like the standard decision-
theoretic RTAs) or u-value judgments (like Riedener’s repurposing of standard
decision-theoretic RTAs). Again, we begin with some set Ω and a σ-algebra F
on Ω. The comparative confidence relation D is a binary relation on F . We
will gloss AD B as “A is as least as likely as B.” The general strategy of the
argument is the same as for decision-theoretic RTAs. We impose some pur-
ported rationality constraints on the relevant binary relation, and then show
that it can be given a certain type of numerical representation just in case it
satisfies those rationality constraints. In the case of decision-theoretic RTAs,
the numerical representation is an expected utility representation with respect
to relevantly unique probability and utility functions. But in the case of epis-
temic RTAs, the numerical representation is just the probability function alone.
In dispensing with the utility function, epistemic RTAs avoid what I took to be
perhaps the main pitfall for decision-theoretic RTAs, namely that a fully gen-
eral decision-theoretic RTA for probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty
would necessarily commit us to strong comparativism, i.e. it would force us
to say that intertheoretic comparisons of differences in choice-worthiness are
always possible. Unlike the preference relation, the comparative confidence
relation is fully epistemic, and therefore has no need for value comparisons.
The Comparative Confidence Relation
What does it mean to judge that A is at least as likely as B? And how can
we find out whether an agent makes this judgment or not? We know how
to determine whether she prefers A to B: that she would (in suitable circum-
stances) choose one over the other. Although their link to choice is not defini-
tional, preferences do nevertheless manifest themselves in the corresponding
choice behaviour with sufficient regularity. This makes preferences amenable
to empirical investigation. Because the link between comparative confidence
judgments and choice behaviour must necessarily be weaker, they may seem
to be proportionally less amenable to empirical investigation.
Consider the most natural idea for a test. In order to determine whether or
not an agent judges that A is more likely than B, we offer them a desirable
prize and ask them to choose between either receiving this prize if A is true
or receiving that same prize is B is true. If they choose the former, we can
conclude that they judge A to be more likely than B. I think this is a fine test.
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But notice that it does require us to make some assumptions about the agent’s
preferences. In particular, we have to assume that the agent prefers receiving
the prize to not receiving it, and that this preference remains the same no mat-
ter which one (if any) of A and B turns out to be true. So a natural version of
the simple choice-theoretic account would identify an agent’s comparative con-
fidence judgments with her choice behaviour in situations of this kind. And
more nuanced choice-theoretic accounts would appeal to her dispositions to
choose in such situations, or her hypothetical choice behaviour.
So on the face of it, epistemic representation theorems for probabilism with
respect to moral uncertainty would seem to have more going for them than
the decision-theoretic ones. They avoid having to make intertheoretic compar-
isons. And comparative confidence judgments appear to be just as amenable
to empirical investigation, at least provided some innocent assumptions about
how they can be revealed in choice behaviour. However, given that compara-
tive confidence is a cognitive attitude (unlike preference which is an evaluative
attitude), you might wonder whether we have to assume cognitivism in order
to make sense of an agent’s making comparative confidence judgments about
moral claims. Let us see how the expressivist framework we have looked at
deals with this. As you will recall, Schroeder introduces the notion of being for.
To capture moral uncertainty, we introduce the notion of degrees of being for.
So we would then read AD B as saying that the agent is more for a than she
is for b, where a and b are suitable analyses of what A and B respectively say
that the speaker is for. Therefore, if you are happy to allow that expressivists
can account for moral uncertainty more broadly, the comparative confidence
relation should not pose any special problems.
The Axioms of Qualitative Probability
In the first half of the 20th century, several probabilists were studying the
comparative confidence relation. Many took it to be in some sense more fun-
damental than quantitative probability (Koopman 1940a, 1940b; Good 1950; de
Finetti 1951, Savage 1954). In particular, they thought that comparative confi-
dence judgments could play an important part in explicating the concept of
degrees of belief.16 What conditions should a rational comparative confidence
relation satisfy? De Finetti (1931) proposed the following axioms on D.
qualitative probability The comparative confidence relation D on F is said
to be a qualitative probability relation if for any A, B, C ∈ F :
A1. transitivity If AD B and BD C, then AD C.
A2. completeness Either AD B or BD A.
A3. qualitative additivity If A ∩ C = B ∩ C = ∅, then AD B iff A ∪
CD B ∪ C.
A4. normality ΩD AD∅.
16 For an overview of the mathematical work on comparative confidence, see Fine (1973) and
Fishburn (1986).
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De Finetti (1951) conjectured that these conditions were necessary and suf-
ficient for probabilistic representability. However, Kraft et al (1959) showed
this to be false: it is possible to construct a comparative confidence relation
which satisfies A1-A4 and yet does not admit of a probabilistic representation.
But although the conditions are not sufficient, they are necessary. We should
therefore examine how plausible they are as rationality requirements on com-
parative confidence judgments. And in particular, we should examine whether
they become any more or any less plausible when the domain of the compar-
ative confidence judgments changes from descriptive states of the world to
moral claims and moral theories. Most of these are quite straightforward. I
shall have most to say about completeness, and will therefore save it for last.
After having evaluated these axioms, we will look at two epistemic represen-
tation theorems, due to Scott (1964) and Villegas (1964) respectively. We shall
also consider a related result for imprecise probabilism (Bradley 2017).
Transitivity
It seems clear that any rational comparative probability relation should be tran-
sitive. Moreover, the shift from descriptive uncertainty to empirical uncertainty
does not seem to have any bearing on its status as a requirement of rational-
ity.17
Qualitative Additivity
This axiom says that if two propositions A and B are both logically inconsistent
with C, then A is more credible than B just in case the disjunction of A and C is
more credible than the disjunction of B and C. This should not be controversial.
Normality
Normality simply says that no proposition is strictly more probable than the
tautology, and that every proposition is at least as probable as the contradic-
tion. Again, this should not be controversial as a requirement of rationality.
Completeness
Completeness demands that agents be fully opinionated: for any pair of propo-
sitions, they must either judge one to be more probable than the other, or judge
them both to be equally probable. Many see completeness as mainly a struc-
tural assumption rather than a rationality condition in its own right. Roughly
speaking, it is needed in order to ensure that her comparative confidence judg-
ments are sufficiently rich for probabilistic representability.
Of the four axioms, A2 is the only one that makes an existential requirement:
it demands that the agent form an opinion on everything. By contrast, A1 and
A2 are both conditional requirements: they say that if the comparative con-
fidence relation satisfies certain conditions, it must also satisfy certain other
conditions. Similarly, A4 says that if the agent forms a judgment about A, then
she must judge it to be more probable than the contradiction and less probable
17 Some of the reasons people give for abandoning completeness are also reasons to weaken tran-
sitivity somewhat (Bradley 2017:234). I will not go into detail, but the relevant weakening is
known as Suzumura consistency (Bossert and Suzumura 2010).
3.4 representation theorem arguments 74
than the tautology.
An agent who does not feel compelled to make up her mind does not seem to
be guilty of a failure of rationality. On these grounds, many have argued that
incomplete comparative confidence judgments are rationally permissible. But
others have made the stronger claim that incomplete comparative confidence
judgments are sometimes rationally required. Typically, this argument appeals
to the same evidentialist considerations that were used to motivate imprecise
Bayesianism in the previous chapter, i.e. the idea that in cases where we only
have limited, partial, or ambiguous evidence, completeness would require us
to go beyond the information available to us in an epistemically irresponsible
way (Joyce 2010). If one finds these considerations convincing in the case of
descriptive uncertainty, one should presumably say the same in the case of
moral uncertainty. Moreover, one may think that if anything, the evidentialist
case against completeness is stronger in the case of moral uncertainty. I take
it that, regardless of one’s views in moral epistemology, it is at least prima fa-
cie plausible to think that the evidence we have for or against various moral
claims is in some sense sparser than the evidence we have for or against vari-
ous moral claims. This notion of sparseness can be spelt out in different ways.
I will just consider one example. In physics, the empirical evidence available
to us lets us determine the value of Planck’s constant to at least ten significant
figures. But if say a pluralist moral theory is true, according to which both
utility and equality are of value, it is unlikely that we will ever be able to es-
tablish the correct conversion rate between these two goods with comparable
precision. Hence if one thinks that unnecessary precision is rationally imper-
missible, one will find rational violations of completeness to be more frequent
in the moral case.
This shows why it matters whether completeness is merely a structural as-
sumption or not. If it is merely a structural assumption, then we can say that
although completeness is not rationally required, it is rationally permissible,
and an agent should therefore at least in principle be able to become fully
opinionated. But if she does become fully opinionated, then the rationality
assumptions entail that her comparative confidence judgments can be repre-
sented by a probability function.
The consistency concepts that we introduced in section 1.2.1 will be useful here.
As a reminder, recall that a belief set B is
strictly inconsistent iff there is some A ∈ F such that A,¬A ∈ B.
logically non-omniscient iff there is some A ∈ Cn(B) such that A /∈ B.
implicitly inconsistent iff there is some A such that A,¬A ∈ Cn(B).
coherently extendable iff B has some strictly consistent completion C.18
18 Recall that a completion C of B is a maximal subset of F such that if A ∈ B then A ∈ C, and that
a subset S of F is maximal just in case for every A ∈ F , either A ∈ S or ¬A ∈ S (or both).
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Let us now apply this to the comparative confidence relation. Her state of
belief will now be represented as the set BD of all comparative confidence
judgments she endorses, i.e. all claims of the form AD B. The relevant con-
sequence operator will now be qualitative probability consequence. That is,
consequence with respect to A1-A4. So Cn(BD) will be the closure of her be-
lief state under qualitative probability consequence. This lets us define all the
same consistency concepts as before. The rationality requirement on compar-
ative confidence judgments is now this: that they be coherently extendable.
That is, for any A, B ∈ F , she should be able to add either AD B or BD A
to her set of comparative confidence judgments without becoming strictly in-
consistent. Given that, standardly, a belief state BD is coherently extendable
just in case it is implicitly consistent, it follows that, whether or not it is com-
plete, any rational set of comparative confidence judgments BD must satisfy
the other qualitative probability axioms. So on this view, coherent extendabil-
ity is the normative core of probabilism.19
If we instead think that incomplete comparative confidence judgments are
sometimes rationally required, then matters are not quite so straightforward.
Why care about whether an agent’s comparative confidence judgments are
coherently extendable if the coherent extension in the form of a precise prob-
ability function is not even a rationally permissible doxastic state? However,
most of those who think that incomplete comparative confidence judgments
are sometimes rationally required also think that complete comparative confi-
dence judgments are sometimes rationally required. That is, they think that
there is some body of evidence E such that some precise credence function P
is rationally required with respect to that evidence. For example, we can imag-
ine that the agent’s body of evidence consists only of chance propositions and
that there are enough chance propositions to determine, via the correct chance-
credence principle, a unique probability function. Plausibly, she should then
apply this chance-credence principle. Assuming all of the chances are precise
probabilities, her credence function will be a precise probability function.
With this in mind, we can appeal to a principle that is similar to coherent
extendability. First, we assume that any rational agent should in principle be
able to acquire some body of evidence E such that it is rationally permissible
to be fully opinionated in light of that body of evidence. We say that a set
of comparative confidence judgments BD is evidentially extendable just in case
it has some strictly consistent completion C such that C would be rationally
permissible relative to some body of evidence E that an agent with comparative
confidence judgments BD could in principle learn. We can now run through a
similar argument:
19 We can also give coherent extendability an expressivist reading. For Schroeder, it says that an
agent should in principle be able to come to be more for a than she is for b, for any A, B ∈
F (where a and b, recall, are suitable analyses of whatever it is that A and B say that the
speaker is for) without thereby becoming strictly inconsistent, where strict inconsistency is now
understood as a property of the set of contents of the agent’s For attitudes. This seems like a
plausible requirement of rationality.
3.4 representation theorem arguments 76
1. The set of comparative confidence judgments BD is rationally required
to be evidentially extendable.
2. Typically, BD is evidentially extendable just in case it is implicitly consis-
tent.
3. Therefore, whether BD is complete or not, it should satisfy the other
axioms on qualitative probability.
In the previous chapter I argued that on at least one natural way of spelling
out the evidentialist argument against completeness, it has the unacceptable
implication that the agent’s imprecise credences with respect to a very large
class of propositions will barely change at all no matter how much (finite) ev-
idence she receives. But there are other ways of capturing at least part of this
evidentialist line of thought which do not lead to global belief inertia. In par-
ticular, we could say that, in cases where multiple probability assignments to
A are all compatible with the evidence, then imprecision is rationally permissi-
ble but not rationally required. Therefore, we can reject completeness without
being forced to say that global belief inertia is rationally required.
Let us now turn to the two representation theorems.
Scott’s Theorem
One well-known epistemic representation theorem is due to Scott (1964). To
prove this theorem, we need one further condition beyond the qualitative prob-
ability axioms. Let Ai be the indicator function of any set A, i.e. Ai(ω) = 1 if
ω ∈ A and Ai(ω) = 0 otherwise. Scott’s condition may now be stated as
follows.
scott’s condition For all A0, . . . , An, B0, . . . , Bn ∈ F , if Ai D Bi for 0 ≤ i < n,
and for all ω ∈ Ω,
Ai0(ω) + · · · = Ain(ω) = Bi0(ω) + · · ·+ Bin(ω),
then Bn D An.
This condition is not especially intuitive, so let’s try to unpack it. First, we
have two sequences A0, . . . , An and B0, . . . , Bn of the same number of proposi-
tions. The first part of the antecedent requires that the ith element of the first
sequence is more probable than the ith element for every i 6= n. If Ai(ω) = 1
then the proposition A is true at ω, and if Ai(ω) = 0, then A is false at ω. For
a given ω, the central equality states that the same number of A propositions
and B propositions are true at ω. The antecedent requires this to hold for all
ω ∈ Ω. This means that, no matter which world is actual, it is guaranteed that
the same number of A propositions and B propositions will be true. Finally,
Scott’s condition says that for any two sequences of propositions in the algebra
that satisfy these conditions, it must be the case that the final element of the
second sequence is more probable than the final element of the first sequence.
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Scott’s condition implies both A1 and A3. Let us see how it implies transitivity.
For any A, B, C ∈ F , and for every ω ∈ Ω, we have that
Ai(ω) + Bi(ω) + Ci(ω) = Bi(ω) + Ci(ω) +Ai(ω).
Suppose now that AD B and BD C. This means that the antecedent of Scott’s
Condition is satisfied, and therefore it follows that AD C.
Theorem 2. (Scott 1964) Let Ω be a finite set and let F be a σ-algebra on Ω.
If the comparative confidence relation D on F satisfies A2, A4, and SC, then
there is a probability function P such that for all A, B ∈ F , P(A) ≥ P(B) iff
AD B.
Scott’s theorem does not guarantee that the probability function in question is
unique. This should not be surprising. Given that Ω was assumed to be finite,
there will only be a finite number of possible qualitative probability relations
D on F . Therefore, each qualitative probability relation will be represented by
some set of probability functions rather than a unique one.
Scott’s theorem gives us necessary and sufficient conditions for when a com-
parative confidence relation can be given a probabilistic representation in the
finite case. However, the axiom he appeals to is not especially intuitive, and
few have therefore undertaken to defend it as a rationality constraints. There
are other results using more intelligible axioms that give us only sufficient con-
ditions (e.g. Suppes 1969). But we shall now consider the infinite case instead.
Villegas’s Theorem
For our next result, we will require both the event space Ω and the σ-algebra
F to be uncountably infinite. As before, we let D be a qualitative probability
relation in de Finetti’s sense (i.e. a binary relation satisfying A1-A4). An atom
of a σ-algebra F is a proposition A ∈ F such that A 6= ∅ and for every B ∈ F ,
if B ⊆ A, then B = A. All finite σ-algebras have atoms. An algebra is atomless
iff it has no atoms. We say that σ-algebra F is complete iff every S ⊆ F has a
lower and upper bound with respect to set inclusion, i.e. elements B∗, B∗ ∈ S
such that for all A ∈ S , B∗ ⊆ A and A ⊆ B∗.
Villegas’s theorem requires the algebra to be both complete and atomless. It
also requires one further condition on the comparative confidence relation D,
namely that it be continuous, in the following sense. Let A = {A1, A2, . . . }
be a countable set such that A1 ⊇ A2 ⊇ · · · . Suppose that BD Ai and Ai D C
for all i. The comparative confidence relation D is continuous if for every such
A ∈ F , BD⋃A and ⋃AD C.
Theorem 3. (Villegas 1964) Let F be a complete, atomless σ-algebra on Ω. Let
D be a continuous qualitative probability relation on F . Then there exists a
unique (countably additive) probability function P on F such that AD B just
in case P(A) ≥ P(B).
The additional conditions for Villegas are essentially richness conditions that
are necessary to ensure that the probabilistic representation is unique. There-
fore, armed with the notion of coherent extendability, we can take Villegas’s
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theorem to underwrite an argument for imprecise probabilism. More specifi-
cally, consider the following condition on D:
weak axiom of consistency The relationD has a minimal coherent extension
on F that is a continuous qualitative probability relation.
We can now obtain the following:
Theorem 4. (Bradley 2017:236) Let D be a non-trivial comparative confidence
relation on F that satisfies the weak axiom of consistency; then there exists a
maximal set of probability functions P = {P1, P2, . . . } that rationalises D in the
sense that for all A, B ∈ F ,
AD B⇔ ∀P ∈ P , P(A) ≥ P(B).
However, in order for these arguments to underwrite an argument for impre-
cise probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty in particular, we must first
verify that the richness conditions make sense in this domain. That is, can we
ensure that a σ-algebra F of sets of reasons structures is both atomless and
complete? Begin with the former. First we need to ensure that the background
set Ω of reasons structure over which F is defined is countably infinite. The
most natural way to do this, I take it, is to let the number of choice contexts
over which the reasons structures are defined be countably infinite. This guar-
antees that the background set Ω of reasons structures is countably infinite,
and therefore that we can form an uncountably infinite σ-algebra F over Ω.
We now wish to impose the constraint that F contain no atoms. That is, we
wish to impose the requirement that for every A ∈ F there is a B ∈ F such
that B ⊂ A. This means that no singleton set of an individual reasons structure
R can be an element of F ; that is, the agent is never allowed to believe a fully
specified moral theory. Is this a problem? Arguably not, given the countably
infinite number of choice contexts. Moreover, for a given set of choice contexts
of interest, we can always make a moral claim as precise as we want with
respect to those ones. So the assumption that the algebra be atomless seems
okay. At the very least, it seems that it should be rationally permissible for an
agent to have their probability function be defined over an atomless algebra.
In conclusion, epistemic representation theorem arguments provide a strong
case for thinking that precise probabilistic credences in moral claims are ratio-
nally permissible, and that imprecise probabilistic credences in moral claims
are rationally required.
3.5 dutch book arguments
Suppose that you are in the business of placing bets, and suppose further that
your credences match your betting prices: your credence in A is x just in case
you take £x to be the value of a bet that pays £1 if A and nothing otherwise.
Your goal in placing bets is, naturally, to make money. As such, one thing you
certainly wish to avoid is accepting a set of bets that jointly entail a sure loss.
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Such a combination of bets is called a Dutch book, and anyone who accepts a
Dutch book is guaranteed to lose money no matter what the actual state of
the world turns out to be. Therefore, the cunning bettor who offers a Dutch
book does not have to rely on any superior knowledge or information to turn
a profit: she is simply exploiting the internal structure of your betting prices.
What can you do to avoid Dutch books? According to the Dutch book theorem,
if your betting prices violate the probability calculus, you are vulnerable to a
Dutch book. And according to the converse Dutch book theorem, if your betting
prices satisfy the probability calculus, you are not vulnerable to a Dutch book.
These two theorems form the mathematical centrepiece of the Dutch book argu-
ment that seeks to establish probabilism on the basis of the irrationality of sure
losses. Here is a sketch of the argument.20
1. Your credences match your betting prices.
2. A Dutch book can be made against you just in case your betting prices
violate the probability calculus.
3. If a Dutch book can be made against you, then you are susceptible to
sure losses.
4. If you are susceptible to sure losses, then you are irrational.
5. Therefore, if your credences violate the probability calculus, then you are
irrational.
Of course, this argument may be resisted in a number of ways. The second
premise is simply a piece of sound mathematics, but objections have been
raised for all other premises. I will not attempt an exhaustive survey, but sim-
ply sketch the main ones so that we can examine whether they apply with
equal force when the Dutch book argument is intended to establish probabil-
ism for moral rather than descriptive uncertainty.
The first premise assumes that you value money linearly. This is clearly not
realistic. If you are £2 short of a tube ticket, the value you assign to £1 will be
much smaller than half the value you assign to £2. We might attempt to fix this
by replacing money with utility, as it is much more plausible to think that we
value utility linearly. However, utility is usually defined via representation the-
orems, and as we saw in the previous section, those representation theorems
already provide us with probabilism on their own. Hence in replacing money
with utility, the Dutch book argument may lose its force as an independent
argument for probabilism.
The third premise assumes the package principle that the value you assign to
a combination of bets is the sum of the values you assign to the individual
bets. One way for this principle to fail is if you don’t value money linearly:
if you are £2 short of a tube ticket, then the value you assign to two bets that
20 See Vineberg (2016) and Hájek (2008) for introductions to Dutch book arguments.
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each pay out £1 will be much greater than the sum of the values you assign
to them considered separately. Another way for it to fail is if you believe that
your placing one bet gives you evidence about the outcome of another bet in
the package. For then the act of placing the first bet will change your credence
in, and thereby your fair price for, the second bet.
The fourth premise stands in need of clarification: what does it mean for a loss
to be sure? Suppose that in the early 19th century you were offered to bet on
the proposition that water is not H2O. If you accept, you are guaranteed to lose
as a matter of metaphysical necessity. You may be ignorant of chemistry, but
you are certainly not irrational in the sense intended by the Dutch book argu-
ment. The Dutch book argument was meant to show that you can be exploited
monetarily if your credences are internally inconsistent in a certain way. But
you can have perfectly coherent probabilistic credences and yet be less than
certain that water is H2O. Hence it is not the case that just any susceptibility
to sure losses makes you irrational.
3.5.1 Dutch Book Arguments and Moral Uncertainty
How does the Dutch book argument fare when we turn to moral uncertainty?
On the face of it, the prospects may not seem so good. First, it’s strange to
imagine a situation in which an agent is offered to bet on the truth of a moral
proposition. How could such a bet be settled? The situation is strange in an-
other respect too: for on some meta-ethical views, certain general moral truths
are necessarily true. But if so, there’s a risk that the Dutch book argument for
probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty proves too much by establish-
ing that our credence in any necessary moral truth should be 1, just like the
ordinary Dutch book argument establishes that our credence in any tautology
should be 1. Second, the linearity assumption looks to be much more problem-
atic in the case of moral uncertainty, because the value of a given amount of
money may depend on which moral theory is correct.
However, I will argue that all of these challenges can be met. More specifi-
cally, I will argue that if you believe that a particular depragmatized account
of Dutch book arguments gives us a sound case for probabilism with respect
to descriptive uncertainty, then that same account also gives us probabilism
for moral uncertainty.
Begin with the betting scenario. We might reject the setup on the grounds
that it’s hard to see how a bet on the truth of a moral proposition could be
decisively settled. But of course, this is true of many bets on descriptive propo-
sitions as well. Consider for instance the proposition that the rate at which the
universe expands at some particular point in the future when all intelligent
life has perished will be thus and so. Naturally, a bet on such a proposition
could never be settled. So if the Dutch book argument requires us to be able to
decisively settle any bet, this is just as much of a problem for the descriptive
case as it is for the moral case.
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It might be objected that there is a difference between bets that could in prin-
ciple be settled and ones that could not, with the proposition about the uni-
verse’s rate of expansion falling into the former category and moral proposi-
tions falling into the latter. For the former category, at least we know which
circumstances would verify the claim and which would falsify it, whereas we
seem to lack even this in the latter case. However, we can imagine a situation
in which you are offered to bet on some moral claim before God informs you
of its truth value. Then even this bet can be decisively settled. If you find the
example too outlandish, it suffices to imagine a situation in which someone
merely believes that God or some similarly reliable being will inform them of
the truth value of the relevant moral claim.
Linearity
The linearity assumption in the first premise of the Dutch book argument looks
especially problematic in the case of moral uncertainty, because the value of
a given amount of money may depend on which moral theory is correct. For
example, perhaps a given amount of money is more valuable on a purely util-
itarian theory than it is on a purely egalitarian theory. Of course, in order for
this to be intelligible, we must assume that intertheoretic comparisons of value
are at least sometimes possible. But ideally, probabilism with respect to moral
uncertainty should we compatible with any position on intertheoretic com-
parisons. In discussing decision-theoretic representation theorem arguments,
we wanted to avoid making the case for probabilism rest on the assumption
of strong comparativism. Similarly, in discussing Dutch book arguments, we
want to avoid making the case rest on non-comparativism. And if we don’t
assume non-comparativism, then intertheoretic comparisons may sometimes
be possible, and it therefore follows that the value of a given amount of money
may depend on which moral theory is correct.
Moreover, the response of formulating the argument in terms of utility rather
than in terms of money is if anything even less compelling in the case of moral
uncertainty. We saw that the standard objection to this response is that util-
ity is typically defined via a decision-theoretic representation theorem. But a
decision-theoretic representation theorem also gives us a probability function,
and in replacing money with utility, the Dutch Book argument therefore loses
its status as an independent argument for probabilism. The same point applies
to moral uncertainty, but here the situation is even worse because as we have
seen, the decision-theoretic representation theorem argument for probabilism
with respect to moral uncertainty is unsound as it requires us to assume that
non-comparable theories are in fact comparable.
However, in the case of Dutch book arguments for probabilism with respect
to descriptive uncertainty, some have argued that a so-called depragmatized un-
derstanding of the argument can help us avoid many of the objections. I will
argue that the same can be done for moral uncertainty. Christensen (2004)
begins by considering what he calls simple agents Simple agents value money
linearly, and do not value anything else. Clearly, such agents are possible, and
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their values rationally permissible. Christensen suggests the following princi-
ples for simple agents:
sanctioning A simple agent’s degrees of belief sanction as fair monetary bets
at odds matching his degrees of belief.
bet defectiveness For a simple agent, a set of bets that is logically guaranteed
to leave him monetarily worse off is rationally defective.
belief defectiveness If a simple agent’s beliefs sanction as fair each of a set
of bets, and that set of bets is rationally defective, then the agent’s beliefs
are rationally defective.
According to the first principle, an agent’s degrees of beliefs may sanction
bets as fair without her thereby being disposed to bet or evaluate bets in the
sanctioned manner. Christensen intends for the connection to be purely nor-
mative. This means that if the agent’s if the agent’s degrees of belief are non-
probabilistic, she is not necessarily at risk of suffering financial consequences.
The second principle essentially says that it would be rationally defective of a
simple agent to accept a set of bets that is logically guaranteed to give her less
of what she wants. Finally, the third principle forges a link between rationally
defective bets and rationally defective beliefs. Together with the Dutch Book
Theorem, these principles give us the following conclusion:
simple agent probabilism If a simple agent’s degrees of belief violate the
probability axioms, they are rationally defective.
But what bearing does this have on agents who are not simple? The point of
the Dutch book argument is not dependent on the particular preferences of a
simple agent. As Christensen puts it, “there is no way the world could turn
out that would make the set of bets work out well—or even neutrally—for the
agent.” And the assumption that the agent values money linearly plays no
essential role in establishing this conclusion. This also allows Christensen to
address the charge that Dutch book arguments fail to establish probabilism as
a distinctively epistemic claim: the fact that an agent who bets in accordance
with her beliefs is logically guaranteed to lose money reveals that those beliefs
are themselves rationally defective.
Much more can be said about Christensen’s argument, but I will not undertake
a detailed evaluation.21 Instead, let us see what all of this implies for moral
uncertainty. Christensen’s framework can help us address the worry that the
value of a given amount of money may depend on which moral theory is cor-
rect. Again, we restrict our attention to simple agents, i.e. agents who value
money linearly and who do not value anything else. Again, we are concerned
with their betting behaviour. But of course now the bets concern moral claims
rather than descriptive claims. Now it could well be that the (moral) value of
a given amount of money depends on which moral theory is correct. But by
21 See Maher (1997) for criticism.
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hypothesis, a simple agent is indifferent to such concerns, and they will there-
fore have no effect on her betting behaviour.
We are therefore, in a sense, making the opposite assumption of one we made
in the context of decision-theoretic representation theorem arguments. There
we assumed that the relevant attitudes—comparative u-value judgments—only
took moral considerations into account. Here we are instead assuming that the
betting behaviour is entirely insensitive to moral considerations. Therefore, in-
sofar as we find Christensen’s principles for simple agents compelling in the
descriptive case, we should also find them compelling in the moral case. Con-
sequently, we get the conclusion of simple agent probabilism with respect to
moral uncertainty. And again, the Dutch book argument is not dependent on
the particular preferences of a simple agent.
It may be objected that it is irrational for an agent to bet in a way that is con-
trary to her moral convictions.22 Suppose that this is right. How then should
an agent bet in light of her moral uncertainty? Suppose first that the agent has
full credence in some moral theory T which values money non-linearly. Given
that she has full credence in T, she will presumably accept any bet on the truth
of T (assuming at least that T values money positively and in a monotonically
increasing way, that there is no moral prohibition on gambling, etc.). There-
fore, in such a case we can read off her credences from her betting behaviour
even though she has positive credence in a moral theory that values money
non-linearly.
Suppose next that the agent has 0.5 credence in a linear theory T1 and 0.5 cre-
dence in a non-linear theory T2. The agent now wishes to let these credences
affect her betting behaviour. How should she do so? She is no longer in a po-
sition to be guided by a moral theory (unless she is first willing to make what
would by her own lights be an entirely arbitrary choice between T1 and T2).
Plausibly, then, her betting behaviour should somehow be sensitive to both of
these theories. But how exactly?
Assume for now that she regards her own betting behaviour as evidentially
irrelevant with respect to T1 and T2. If both T1 and T2 evaluate a bet as
favourable, then clearly so should the agent herself. And similarly if both T1
and T2 evaluate it as unfavourable. But what if one evaluates it as favourable
and the other as unfavourable? We could say that it is permissible (but not
obligatory) to bet in such situations. If we don’t think that intertheoretic com-
parisons are possible, we would presumably have to say something like this.
On the other hand, if we do think that intertheoretic comparisons are possi-
ble, we could attempt a more nuanced Maximise Expected Choice-Worthiness
solution. In the former case, we would not be able to pin down the agent’s cre-
dences by observing her betting behaviour. In the latter case, the utility func-
tion in question would presumably come from a decision-theoretic represen-
22 For example, see Nissan-Rozen (2015) and Bradley and Stefánsson (2016) for discussion of a
moral analogoue of the principal principle that would rule out such behaviour as irrational.
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tation theorem for moral uncertainty, in which case the Dutch book argument
loses its standing as an independent argument for probabilism. Moreover, as I
argued in section 3.4.1, this means that we can’t get a fully general argument
for probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty, because not all moral theo-
ries are comparable.
I therefore take it that a more promising line is to say that an agent may well
have moral beliefs and be morally uncertain even if they believe that when
it comes to deciding what one has all-things-considered most reason to do,
prudence always trumps morality. Moreover, this combination of attitudes is
rationally permissible, at least in the sense of rationality that Bayesians tend
to be concerned with. This allows us to establish probabilism with respect to
moral uncertainty for simple agents. As before, if we can then show that the
assumption of linearity played no essential role in the argument, then we can
take ourselves to have established for agents in general, and not just those who
value money linearly.
Package Principle
The package principle does not seem to pose any further problems in the moral
case. We have stipulated that simple agents value money linearly (and do not
value anything else), and hence the package principle cannot fail for reasons
of non-linearity. And we can further stipulate that in all relevant cases, simple
agents do not regard their own betting behaviour as having any evidential
bearing. And as before, this assumption is not essential for establishing the
conclusion.
Sure Loss?
The question of what it means for a loss to be sure becomes especially pertinent
when the propositions on which we are betting are moral ones. According to a
common strand of thinking in meta-ethics, any true moral claim is necessarily
true, at least if we consider moral claims of a sufficiently general nature (refer-
ences). For example, it is generally believed that if utilitarianism is true, then
it is necessarily true, i.e. true in all (ordinary) possible worlds. But we clearly
don’t wish to conclude that anyone who assigns utilitarianism a credence of
less than one is thereby irrational.
Mahtani (2015) proposes an account of what it is for a loss to be sure that is
well-suited to our purposes. She begins by observing that in the case of out-
right belief, an agent’s belief state is coherent if and only if the set of all claims
she believes is logically consistent. In turn, a set of claims is logically consistent
if and only if there is an interpretation under which those claims are all true.
An interpretation assigns meanings to all the non-logical terms in the language.
For example, consider the claim “All triangles are asparaguses,” which we can
render in first-order logic as ∀xT(x) → A(x). Here the non-logical terms are
T(x) and A(x). On one interpretation, T(x) means “x is a hippopotamus” and
A(x) means “x is a mammal.” Consider now the set containing only the claim
“All triangles are asparaguses.” According to our interpretation, this claim
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means that all hippopotami are mammals, which is true. Since this is the only
claim in the set, our interpretation renders true all claims in the set, and that
set is therefore logically consistent. By contrast, consider the set containing the
claims “All triangles are asparaguses” and “It is not the case that all triangles
are asparaguses.” In this case, there is no interpretation under which all claims
in the set are true, and that set is therefore logically inconsistent.
Mahtani then extends this idea to degrees of belief, as follows. Take some set
of bets that the agent regards as fair or better, and vary the interpretation of
the claims involved. We can now say that the agent faces a sure loss just in
case she makes a loss under every interpretation. So, just like an agent’s out-
right beliefs are inconsistent just in case there is no interpretation according to
which they are all true, so too her degrees of belief are incoherent just in case
betting in accordance with those degrees of belief would lead her to make a
loss under every interpretation.
This account allows us to address the issue that arose from the possibility that
some moral claims may be true as a matter of metaphysical necessity. Suppose
for the sake of illustration that utilitarianism is necessarily true. And suppose
we gloss utilitarianism as saying that one option is better than another just in
case it leads to greater happiness: ∀x∀yB(x, y) ↔ GH(x, y). An agent who
regards £0.50 as the fair price for a bet that pays £1 if utilitarianism is false
and £0 if it is true is not thereby incoherent, because it is not the case that she
would make a loss under every interpretation.
In conclusion, the upshot seems to be that, despite initial concerns, Dutch book
arguments work more or less just as well in the moral case. Therefore, insofar
as you accept probabilism for descriptive uncertainty on the basis of a Dutch
book argument, you should also accept it for moral uncertainty. However, this
assumes that agents may rationally evaluate bets in a way that is contrary to
her moral convictions. If you reject this assumption, you will find the Dutch
book argument less compelling.
3.6 accuracy arguments
As many have noted, representation theorem arguments (at least those of the
decision-theoretic variety) and Dutch Book arguments (at least before given a
depragmatized reading) both have a practical flavour. Decision-theoretic rep-
resentation theorem arguments appeal to rational constraints on preference (or
on evaluative judgments), and Dutch Book arguments appeal to undesirable
financial consequences. Yet the conclusion both arguments seek to establish—
probabilism—is an epistemic one, and it would therefore be desirable to derive
it on epistemic grounds alone. Accuracy arguments for probabilism promise
to do just this. They proceed from the assumption that the goal of our be-
liefs is to be accurate, and show that, in a certain specific sense, credences
that satisfy probabilism are guaranteed to be more accurate than credences
that violate probabilism, no matter what state of the world is actual. That
is, if your credence function violates probabilism, there will always be some
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specific credence function which satisfies probabilism that will be more accu-
rate no matter what. Therefore, concludes the argument, you are rationally
required to have probabilistic credences.23
There are two main components. The first is the claim that the goal of belief
is accuracy, i.e. that accuracy is the only fundamental epistemic value. Call
this claim credal veritism. The second is the claim that this notion of accuracy
should be measured in a particular way. In the case of full belief it is quite
clear what accuracy amounts to: a belief is accurate if it is true and inaccurate
if it is false. But for degrees of belief it’s not quite so straightforward. However,
a natural starting point is the thought that accuracy somehow measures close-
ness to truth. A credence is more accurate the closer to the truth it is. Hence if
A is true, then a higher credence in A should receive a higher accuracy score
than a lower one. Conversely, if A is false, then a lower credence in A should
receive a higher accuracy score than a lower one. Any acceptable way of mea-
suring accuracy should have this property.24 A credence function is a function
C : F 7→ R. Let us assume that credences take values in the unit interval, so
that a credence of 0 in A corresponds to being certain that A is false, and a
credence of 1 corresponds to being certain that it is true. This means that if A
is false then 0 is the most accurate credence, and if A is true then 1 is the most
accurate credence. Hence for a given world ω, the most accurate credence
function is the one that assigns 0 to every claim that is false at ω and assigns 1
to every claim that is true at ω. Let us call this the credence function Vω that
is vindicated at ω. In order to measure the accuracy of some given credence
function at world ω, we measure how close it is to Vω.
Suppose we wish to compare two credence functions C1 and C2 (assumed to
be numerical, but not assumed to be probabilistic) and determine which one
is more accurate. To do so, we need to know which world is actual. If it will in
fact rain tomorrow, then a higher credence in this claim will be more accurate
than a lower one. But if it won’t, then the lower credence will be more accurate.
Hence accuracy can only be measured relative to a world. However, suppose
we discover that C1 is more accurate than C2 relative to every world. That
is, no matter what the actual facts are, C1 is guaranteed to be more accurate
than C2. Clearly, C1 is superior: an agent with credence function C2 would be
sure to become more accurate if she adopted C1, and she could realise this a
priori. If C1 is at least as accurate as C2 in every world, we say that it weakly
dominates C2. If C1 is strictly more accurate than C2 in every world, we say that
C1 strongly dominates C2.
Let us also introduce the notion of expected accuracy. The expected accuracy of
a credence function is calculated not relative to a world, but relative to another
credence function. That is, I can determine how accurate I expect someone
else’s credences to be, in light of my own credences. This way, I can compare
23 See Rosenkrantz (1981), Joyce (1998) and Pettigrew (2016a).
24 Goldman (2002: 58) proposes that “the highest degree of belief in a true proposition counts as
the highest degree of ’veritistic value‘ [...] In general, a higher degree of belief in a truth counts
as more veritistically valuable than a lower degree of belief in that truth.”
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other people’s credences in terms of how accurate I expect them to be. But the
notion of expected accuracy also allows me to determine how accurate I expect
my own credences to be. And we can then ask whether I expect myself to be
more accurate than other people. Suppose I discover that I expect another
credence function to be more accurate than my own. This creates a certain
instability in my beliefs: by my own lights, I would do better by adopting
this other credence function instead. But credences, at least if they are to
be rational, should not undermine themselves in this way; they should, so
to speak, be self-recommending. Therefore, any acceptable accuracy measure
should be such that all rational credence functions expect themselves to be
more accurate, according to that accuracy measure, than every other credence
function. Accuracy measures that meet this condition are said to be strictly
proper. For example, a commonly used strictly proper accuracy measure is the
Brier score (Brier 1950):
B(C,ω) = 1− ∑
A∈F
| Vω(A)− C(A) |2
However, there are many other strictly proper accuracy measures. Why should
we pick the Brier score rather than another? Luckily we don’t have to because
we can appeal to the following result. According to any strictly proper accuracy
measure, (1) every non-probabilistic credence function is strongly dominated
by some probabilistic credence function, and (2) no probabilistic credence func-
tion is weakly dominated by any other credence function (Predd et al 2009).
That is, for every non-probabilistic credence function there is a probabilistic
one which is guaranteed to be strictly better, in terms of its accuracy, in every
possible world. But if the credence function is probabilistic, there is no other
credence function (probabilistic or not) which is even just as good, in terms
of its accuracy, as the probabilistic credence function. Therefore, insofar as we
agree that the goal of belief is accuracy, and that accuracy should be measured
by a strictly proper accuracy measure, we should conclude that credences are
rationally required to be probabilistic.
3.6.1 Objections
Objections to accuracy arguments come in two forms: we might take issue ei-
ther with the claim that accuracy is the only goal of belief, or with the claim
that only strictly proper accuracy measures are acceptable. We shall focus here
on the first.
Why think that only accuracy matters? After all, epistemologists have been
concerned with various other aspects of our beliefs as well, such as whether
they hang together in a coherent way (BonJour, 1985), or whether they are pro-
portioned to the evidence (Conee and Feldman, 2004). But if these other things
are epistemically valuable, then an argument which assumes that only accu-
racy is of epistemic value cannot establish probabilism, because for all that has
been said we cannot rule out the possibility that these other epistemic values
mandate in favour of non-probabilistic credences. The standard response on
behalf of the accuracy theorist is to argue that insofar as these other things are
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indeed of epistemic value, their value is not intrinsic, but can in fact be derived
from accuracy considerations. In the first case, Pettigrew (2016c) notes that if
the sort of coherence the coherentist has in mind amounts to probabilistic co-
herence, then the accuracy argument for probabilism vindicates coherence as
well.25 In the second case, he suggests that a set of accuracy arguments for
epistemic principles beyond probabilism can underwrite the idea that rational
agents proportion their credences to their evidence. In particular, there are
accuracy arguments for conditionalization (Greaves and Wallace 2005), for the
principal principle (Pettigrew 2013), and for the principle of indifference (Pet-
tigrew 2016b). Together, these principles seem to support the idea of propor-
tioning one’s credences to the evidence. However, as we saw in the previous
chapter, some believe that this evidentialism entails that, for at least certain
bodies of evidence, imprecise credences are rationally required, or at the very
least rationally permissible. And some have argued that no reasonable accu-
racy measure can vindicate the rationality of imprecise credences.26 I take it to
be an open question to what extent accuracy-based epistemology is compatible
with imprecise credences.
3.6.2 Accuracy Arguments and Moral Uncertainty
One immediate difficulty for adapting accuracy arguments to the case of moral
uncertainty is the following. If we define dominance in terms of greater accu-
racy in every (ordinary) possible world, and if we take the correct moral theory
to be necessarily correct, then it follows that the credence function which as-
signs 1 to the correct moral theory and 0 to every other moral theory will
be more accurate than every other credence function (whether probabilistic or
not) in every possible world. Hence this credence function accuracy-dominates
every other credence function. Therefore, it seems as though an accuracy argu-
ment for probabilism would yield the much stronger (and undesirable) conclu-
sion that we always ought to adopt this unique maximally accurate credence
function. But a natural response to this is to say that even if these other moral
theories are not metaphysically possible, they are nevertheless epistemically
possible, and this should be enough to get an accuracy argument going. After
all, accuracy arguments probabilism do not seek to establish that we should
have credence one in all metaphysical necessities, whether those metaphysical
necessities are ethical or belong to some other domain. We can adapt Mahtani’s
account of sure losses to give an account of what it is for one credence func-
tion to accuracy-dominate another: for two credence functions defined over
the same domain, we say that one accuracy-dominates another just in case it
is more accurate than the other under every interpretation of the claims in the
domain. This means that all of the notions that the accuracy argument appeals
to are well-defined, and hence that we can formulate an accuracy argument
for probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty. Let us now again consider
the two types of objections to accuracy arguments, this time in the context of
25 Of course, there are other ways of measuring the coherence of a credence function, not all of
which allow for coherence to be justified on accuracy grounds. See Olsson (2005).
26 See e.g. Seidenfeld et al (2012) and Schoenfield (2017a).
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moral uncertainty.
First, do we have any particular reason to think that credal veritism fails when
the beliefs in question concern moral claims? On the face of it, it seems that
we don’t. In order for credal veritism to fail, there would have to be properties
of belief states that are epistemically laudable in the case of moral belief but
not in the case of descriptive belief. If the credal veritist can give a plausible
account of coherence and evidential proportionalism in the descriptive case,
she can presumably also do so in the moral case. So in order to show that
credal veritism fails, we would not only have to show that there are in fact
these additional properties in the moral case, but also that —unlike coherence
and evidential proportionalism—those properties cannot be accounted for in
veritist terms. This strikes me as unlikely. Of course, it could also be that
credal veritism fails in the descriptive case and ipso facto in the moral case. If
so, the accuracy argument for probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty
would fail, but not for reasons that are particular to morality.
Second, do we have any particular reason to think that the conditions on a
reasonable accuracy measure are any different in the moral case than in the de-
scriptive case? It seems not: whatever it is that make a credence function over
a descriptive algebra accurate should also be what makes a credence function
over a moral algebra accurate. Therefore, it seems that if you find accuracy ar-
guments for probabilism persuasive in the descriptive case, you should do so
in the moral case as well. Of course, I have not said anything here about how
accuracy arguments for probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty fares
on an expressivist understanding of moral language (see Staffel forthcoming),
so it may well turn out that the very cognitive-sounding language of accuracy
cannot be given a plausible expressivist reading, or that if it can, then the
resulting expressivist notion of accuracy cannot underwrite an argument for
probabilism. I leave these important questions for future investigation.
3.7 conclusion
We have surveyed four types of argument for probabilism: decision-theoretic
and epistemic representation theorem arguments, Dutch book arguments, and
accuracy arguments. Of the four, the decision-theoretic representation theo-
rem arguments was found most clearly wanting. Such arguments give us a
utility function as well as a probability function, thereby forcing us to accept
strong comparativism (i.e. the view that intertheoretic comparisons of value
are always possible), at least if we are to obtain a fully general argument for
probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty. Moreover, if we reject strong
comparativism (i.e. we believe that there is at least some pair of incomparable
theories), then we cannot appeal to coherent extendability here.
By starting from an epistemic rather than an evaluative notion, epistemic rep-
resentation theorem arguments were able to sidestep the main issue with
decision-theoretic representation theorem arguments. However, I conjectured
that rational failures of completeness may be more frequent in the moral case
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than in the descriptive case. If so, the kind of probabilism that the epistemic
representation theorem arguments gives rise to will be more imprecise in the
former than in the latter.
I argued that a depragmatized understanding of Dutch book arguments can al-
low them to vindicate probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty. However,
this argument rests on the assumption that agents may rationally evaluate bets
in a way that is contrary to their moral convictions.
Finally, I argued that if you think the accuracy argument for probabilism is
sound in the case of descriptive uncertainty, you should also think it is sound
in the case of moral uncertainty.
Where does this leave us?
The first thing to note is that we have not explored the possibility of giving
these arguments a non-cognitivist reading in any detail. Therefore, any con-
clusions only hold conditional on congitivism.
Second, what conclusions you draw based on my examination will depend on
how you think the arguments fare in the case of descriptive uncertainty. For ex-
ample, Christensen (2004:124) writes that “If DBAs are the best-known ways of
supporting probabilism, Representation Theorem Arguments (RTAs) are per-
haps taken most seriously by committed probabilists.” What Christensen has
in mind are decision-theoretic representation theorem arguments in particular.
It is therefore interesting to note that these are the ones that seem to fare worst
in the case of moral uncertainty. Consequently, someone who believes that, of
the ones considered, the decision-theoretic representation theorem argument
is the only sound argument for probabilism with respect to descriptive uncer-
tainty may reasonably reject probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty.
There may be other interactions between the arguments as well. For example,
some have claimed that accuracy arguments are incompatible with imprecise
credences (Schoenfield 2017). If I am right that epistemic representation the-
orem arguments more plausibly support imprecise probabilism than precise
probabilism, it would seem to follow that we cannot accept both arguments:
one makes imprecision rationally permissible whereas the other does not. But
perhaps such an inference would be too quick, for there are some proposed
accuracy measures that do vindicate imprecise credences (Mayo-Wilson and
Wheeler 2016, Konek forthcoming).
At the very least, I take this chapter to have shown that probabilism with
respect to moral uncertainty is sufficiently plausible to merit further investiga-
tion.
4
B AY E S I A N M O R A L E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E F L E C T I V E
E Q U I L I B R I U M
4.1 introduction
In the previous chapter, we examined various arguments for probabilism with
respect to moral uncertainty and tentatively concluded that they succeed, with
two caveats. First, we did not sufficiently explore the possibility of giving these
arguments an expressivist reading, and consequently any tentative conclusions
only hold conditional on cognitivism. Second, I suggested that failures of com-
pleteness may be more common in the case of moral uncertainty. Strictly speak-
ing then, we have at best established imprecise probabilism. However, going
forward I will mostly only consider agents with precise credences. Although
precision is not rationally required, it is often rationally permitted, and it is
therefore instructive to study the rationality constraints on agents with precise
credences.
Once we have established something like probabilism, a natural next step is
to ask whether we can also establish conditionalization. We would then have
obtained both of the two core norms of traditional Bayesianism for moral un-
certainty. And many arguments for conditionalization mirror those for proba-
bilism. For example, there are both accuracy arguments (Greaves and Wallace
2005, Briggs and Pettigrew forthcoming) and Dutch book arguments (Teller
1973) for conditionalization.1 Therefore, insofar as we accepted probabilism
on the basis of such arguments, it seems we have reason to accept condition-
alization as well. This means that all of the conceptual tools of Bayesianism
become available for us to use. We can ask whether there are any constraints
(beyond the probability axioms) on how we may assign prior probability to
moral claims. We can ask whether any reasonable prior probability function
is such that it satisfies the conditions of merging of opinion results. We can
ask whether there are cases where Jeffrey conditionalization is more appropri-
ate than standard conditionalization. We can ask how our degrees of belief in
moral claims relate to our full beliefs in moral claims. And we can ask whether
one can plug the probabilistic credences into a theory of decision-making un-
der moral uncertainty.
However, even if the arguments for conditionalization succeed, it is still possi-
ble that we end up with a moral epistemology that looks rather different from
1 Although see Mahtani (2012) and Schoenfield (2017b).
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traditional Bayesian epistemology. This is because the rule of conditionaliza-
tion only tells agents to conditionalize if they have learned some proposition
with certainty. It doesn’t say anything about how agents should behave if their
learning experience does not take this form. Therefore, if learning experiences
that cannot be captured using conditionalization (or Jeffrey conditionalization)
are more widespread in the moral case than in the descriptive case, the result-
ing epistemological picture will be different. In fact, I will argue that some-
thing like this is the case. I will argue that in order to model certain aspects of
moral epistemology, we need to avail ourselves to the possibility of awareness
growth. When an agent’s awareness grows, she becomes aware of possibili-
ties she had not previously entertained, and therefore not previously assigned
any probability (or taken any other doxastic attitude towards). Traditional
Bayesianism cannot capture this, because it assumes that the σ-algebra F over
which the agent’s probability function is defined remains fixed over time.
Although the phenomenon of awareness growth is familiar from the descrip-
tive domain, I will suggest that it may play an epistemologically more central
role in the moral domain. In particular, I will argue that if we wish to make
our Bayesian moral epistemology compatible with the method of reflective
equilibrium, we must make room for awareness growth. Since I take it that re-
flective equilibrium, in one form or another, has the status of standard method
in moral epistemology, it would count against Bayesian moral epistemology if
the two turned out to be incompatible. But happily, this turns out not to be
the case. Or so I will argue.
This is our third variation then: what do the dynamics of credence look like
when the learning experience does not take the form of probabilities shifting
across some partition, but instead consists in the agent becoming cognizant
of new possibilities? First, however, we will briefly look at some cases in
which conditionalization does seem to get moral epistemology right (section
4.2). After that, I discuss some cases of moral learning where neither condi-
tionalization nor Jeffrey conditionalization seem applicable, and argue that in
order to account for such cases, we must make room for awareness growth
(section 4.3). I then introduce the method of reflective equilibrium, and argue
that this method also calls for awareness growth (section 4.4). Finally, I present
a formal account of reflective equilibrium (sections 4.5-4.6).
4.2 bayesian moral epistemology
As you will recall, this is how we formulated the rule of conditionalization:
conditionalization If a rational agent with probability function P(·) learns
proposition E with certainty and nothing else, her new probability func-
tion is given as PE(·) = P(· | E)
As the formulation makes clear, the rule only applies when there is some
proposition that the agent learns with certainty. You might wonder how of-
ten this condition is met when it comes to our moral beliefs. In the ordinary
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empirical case we can make observations and conditionalize on those observa-
tions. Although it’s certainly not unproblematic to say that we should become
certain of our empirical observations, if anything the moral case looks even
more dubious. What observations can confirm or disconfirm moral theories?
One possibility is that they are the same kind of empirical observations as those
that confirm or disconfirm scientific theories. If an agent believes that some
observation is more likely on one moral theory than on another, then making
that observation confirms the former and disconfirms the latter. And if we are
happy to conditionalize on ordinary empirical observations in a scientific con-
text, we should be equally happy to do so in a moral context. So in principle
there is no problem here. But we might still wonder which empirical observa-
tions may reasonably be taken to count in favour of some given moral theory.
Here, I survey a few possibilities. My discussions will be brief, and I certainly
don’t take them to establish that conditionalization is absolutely the right way
to model all of these cases. However, I do take them to at the very least make
plausible the idea that there is some interesting role for conditionalization to
play in a probabilistic moral epistemology.
Testimony
A paradigmatic example is moral testimony. At least on occasion, it seems
reasonable to treat the moral views of other people as evidence, especially if
you judge them to be trustworthy, reflective, and wise (or to possess whatever
set of abilities you take to be conducive to having accurate moral beliefs).2 In
a case of testimony, the proposition that is learnt with certainty takes the gen-
eral form “Person A reports that N” but the type of moral claim being reported
may vary. For example, they might report that some option is impermissible,
or that one option is better than another, or that some aspect of an option is
a morally relevant consideration, or that some general moral theory is correct,
and so on. For any such type, they may either assert the claim itself, or assert
that they have some particular credence in it.3
Given that some proposition is learnt with certainty, standard conditionaliza-
tion seems appropriate. If the agent takes the person to be reliable, the result of
conditionalizing will be to increase her credence in the claim being reported.
Furthermore, she will also increase her credence in other moral claims that
entail the reported claim, and decrease her credence in claims that entail its
negation. For example, if they report that it’s impermissible to switch in a trol-
ley case, she will increase her credence in Kantian deontology and decrease her
credence in utilitarianism. If they report that equality of outcome is a morally
2 Many philosophers have argued that there is something epistemically defective about relying
on testimony when the subject matter is morality. The same philosophers are typically happy to
allow that reliance on testimony can be perfectly acceptable in other domains, and hence they
argue that there is something distinctive about morality which makes testimony inappropriate
as a basis of belief. However, most discussions of moral testimony assume that belief is an
all-or-nothing matter, as opposed to the graded picture we are working with here. See Hills
(2013) for an overview of existing work on moral testimony.
3 Of course, they may also report having other types of doxastic attitudes towards the claim, such
as being fairly confident, or being agnostic, etc. But for simplicity I will restrict attention to
assertions and credence reports.
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relevant consideration, she will increase her credence in ex post egalitarianism
and decrease her credence in Nozickian libertarianism. And so forth.4
In the case where the person also reports their credence in the moral claim, we
might consider a moral deference principle, analogous to other expert princi-
ples such as the principal principle or the reflection principle. To treat someone
like a moral expert in this sense is to satisfy something like the following con-
dition: P(N | PA(N) = x) = x, where PA(N) is person A’s credence in N.
Formally speaking, the fact that the domain of inquiry concerns moral matters
does not pose any distinctive problems for the formulation of expert principles.
Nevertheless, you might wonder how one could be justified in treating some-
one as a moral expert in this sense. When deciding to treat, say, a meteorologist
as a weather expert, one is able to consult their track record and justify one’s
decision on that basis. But when the purported expertise concerns morality, it
seems that no such track record is available (or if it does exist, it will be much
smaller). Of course, and as we have seen, you might regard a person’s testi-
mony as evidence without treating them as an expert in the relevant sense. In
the case where someone simply asserts a moral claim, you treat that assertion
as positive evidence just in case P(N | A asserts N) > P(N). So even if you
think that one should never (or only very rarely) treat someone as a moral ex-
pert in the sense of deferring to their credences, it is clear that moral testimony
can still play a role.
Emotions as Evidence
Another possible source of morally relevant empirical observations is the agent’s
own reactions. For example, if she takes feelings of guilt to reliably indicate
wrongness, then whenever she comes to feel guilty about something she’s
done, she should increase her credence that what she did was impermissible.
Of course, it is crucial here that she actually does believe that feelings of guilt
track wrongness. If she instead believes a debunking explanation according
to which feelings of guilt simply serve to make one an obedient member of
society (and further believes that this has nothing to do with morality), then
she should not treat feelings of guilt as evidence in this manner.
For agents who do take feelings of guilt to be relevant, it seems appropriate
to model such cases using conditionalization. The agent notices that she is
feeling guilty about something she’s done, and conditionalizes on this fact. As
a result, she will increase her credence in moral claims according to which she
did something impermissible and decrease her credence in those according
to which she did not. All of this is of course assuming that she was at least
somewhat surprised by her feelings of guilt: if she knew that she would feel
guilty but carried on anyway, then those feelings do not provide any new
information. Of course, guilt is just one salient example here: there may be
other feelings that agents take to carry some moral information, and these can
be treated in the same way.
4 Enoch (2014) argues that deferring to experts is sometimes the only morally acceptable way of
responding to moral uncertainty.
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Track Record
In the sciences, theories gain support in part by their track record. All else
equal, a scientific theory that makes more accurate predictions deserves higher
credence than one which makes fewer. Might the same idea apply in the moral
case? One obvious difference is that in the scientific case, there is much wider
interpersonal agreement on what the data points are, and therefore on which
predictions were accurate and which were not. By contrast, there is very little
agreement on what the data points are in the moral case. But even if there is
little agreement, there might still be some, and that is all we need to get the
idea going.
Consider for example an early utilitarian like Bentham. On the basis of his
utilitarianism, he argued in favour of freedom of expression, equal rights for
women, the decriminalising of homosexual acts, and animal rights; and against
the death penalty and physical punishment. In many instances, these views
flew in the face of the prevailing wisdom of his time. Nonetheless, there is
today widespread agreement that he got these things essentially right. Of
course, the agreement is still far from unanimous, and we should be wary of
treating contemporary opinion as a perfect guide to truth. But it is still striking
how much Bentham seems to have gotten right. Contrast this with Kant, who
opposed homosexuality, claimed that husbands possess their wives in much
the same way that they possess material objects, argued that masturbation is
a grave sin, and held that it’s permissible to kill children born out of wed-
lock.5 In these cases, there is today widespread agreement that Kant got these
things wrong. Again, that agreement is far from unanimous, and certainly
not as clear-cut as the agreement on what the data points are in the scientific
case. Nevertheless, to the extent that we do take these to be data points, we
can regard them as counting in favour of utilitarianism and counting against
Kant’s moral philosophy. Many of Bentham’s ‘predictions’ have been borne
out, whereas many of Kant’s have not.
Of course, the above example is merely intended to illustrate the possibility in
principle of testing moral theories in a way analogous to the testing of scien-
tific theories. It would take a lot more careful examination to justify the par-
ticular inference that the historical track record supports utilitarianism over
Kantian ethics. Perhaps the difference between Bentham and Kant does not
tell us anything about their moral philosophies, but merely something about
their temperaments, with Bentham more disposed to think through the impli-
cations of his view in a detached manner, and Kant more sensitive to the spirit
of his time. Furthermore, a complete assessment would need to look at their
entire bodies of work, to make sure that we’re not cherry-picking our exam-
ples. In particular, utilitarianism does of course have many other implications
that sound unpalatable to contemporary ears.
In conclusion, I hope to have made plausible the claim that conditionalization
has a role to play in moral learning. We sometimes revise our moral credences
5 Schwitzgebel (2010).
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by updating on the testimony of someone else. If we take guilt and other moral
feelings to indicate wrongness, then such feelings will also lead us to revise
our moral credences. And if we think there are fairly uncontroversial ‘data
points’ that any theory should account for, we can use those to assess theories.
However, many types of moral learning are left out of this picture. Some might
be dealt with by generalizing conditionalization to Jeffrey conditionalization
to allow for uncertain learning. Conflicting testimony or mixed emotions are
perhaps naturally modelled as cases of Jeffrey conditionalization. But I will
argue that many types of moral learning are left out even by this more general
picture. Some such cases are better thought of as cases of awareness growth.
4.3 awareness growth
Suppose that you come across the following hypothetical scenario for the first
time:
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in
bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist.
He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society
of Music Lovers canvassed all the available medical records and
found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have
therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory
system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to
extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of
the hospital now tells you, “Look, we’re sorry the Society of Music
Lovers did this to you—we would never have permitted it if we had
known. But still, they did it, and the violinist now is plugged into
you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it’s only
for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment,
and can safely be unplugged from you.” Is it morally incumbent
on you to accede to this situation? (Thomson 1971:49)
Given that you had never come across the scenario before, it seems as though
it would be inaccurate to say that you assigned some particular credence to the
claim that it would be morally required for you to accept the situation. But the
trouble is not with precision: imprecise credences would not provide a more
plausible model, and neither would suspension of judgment. It seems more
natural to say that, prior to encountering the scenario, you took no doxastic
attitude whatsoever towards the relevant claim, because you were unable to
entertain it in the first place.
A fundamental feature of the traditional Bayesian picture is that the σ-algebra
F over which the probability function is defined remains fixed throughout
the agent’s epistemic life. She goes about her day revising her credences (via
conditionalization or Jeffrey conditionalization) in light of the information she
receives, perhaps also making some decisions along the way. But her funda-
mental conception of the space of possibilities never changes: all that ever hap-
pens, epistemically speaking, is that her probability assignment shifts around
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between the various propositions in F . When an agent undergoes awareness
growth, she becomes able to conceive of possibilities she was previously un-
able to entertain. For example, suppose that the agent has never before come
across the idea that we might one day be able to create artificial intelligence
that vastly outperforms humans on a wide range of tasks. Given that she
was previously unable to entertain this proposition, it was not an element of
her σ-algebra F , and therefore she did not previously assign it any probability.
Clearly, this sort of thing happens to us all the time. We don’t have a maximally
fine-grained understanding of the entire space of possibilities; instead that
understanding is constantly evolving as new possibilities become salient to
us. So if a normative Bayesian theory is to apply to agents like ourselves, it
must allow for the possibility of awareness growth. Let us therefore see what
a Bayesian account of awareness growth might look like.6
4.3.1 Formal Account of Awareness Growth
There are two salient ways in which an agent’s awareness may grow. In cases
of expansion, new possibilities are added to the sample space Ω. In cases of
refinement, the sample space remains the same, but the propositions in F are
individuated more finely.7 The distinction is perhaps best appreciated by way
of example.
example 1 You are thinking about tomorrow’s weather. At first you take the
possibilities to be a clear or rainy sky, and a warm or cold temperature.
But then you realise that if it’s a clear, warm day, it could be either windy
or calm, and similarly for the other possibilities.
example 2 You are again thinking about tomorrow’s weather, and your initial
conception of the relevant possibilities is the same as before. But then
you realise that, in addition to clear and rainy, the sky could also be
snowy.
Clear Rainy
Warm WC WR
Cold CC CR
Table 3: Initial Awareness Context
In both cases, your initial awareness context is given by table 1. In example 1,
you refine it to arrive at table 2. In example 2, you expand it to arrive at table 3.
Formally, what happens is that the belief state changes from 〈Ω,F , P〉 to
〈Ω+,F+, P+〉, with Ω ⊆ Ω+ and F ⊂ F+. In the case of refinement, Ω+ = Ω
and F ⊂ F+. In the case of expansion, Ω+ = Ω ∪ X, and X ∈ F+.
6 The phenomenon of awareness growth is closely related to the problem of new theories for
Bayesian confirmation theory (Glymour 1980).
7 I take the terminology of refinements and expansions from Bradley (2017: 258).
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Clear Rainy
Warm & Windy WWC WWR
Warm & Calm WCC WCR
Cold & Windy CWC CWR
Cold & Calm CCC CCR
Clear Rainy Snowy
Warm WC WR WS
Cold CC CR CS
Table 4: Refinement Table 5: Expansion
You might think that all instances of awareness growth can be captured as
refinements by requiring that the agent’s awareness context F always include
a “catch-all” proposition (Shimony 1970). Intuitively, the catch-all proposition
says something like “none of the above.” We can then model example 2 as a
case of refining the catch-all proposition into a new proposition, Snowy, and
a new catch-all proposition. And more generally, we can represent the initial
awareness context as in table 6.
Clear Rainy ??
Warm WC WR W??
Cold CC CR C??
? ?C ?R ???
Table 6: Using a “Catch-All” Proposition
Here we have two catch-all propositions: ? is the event that the temperature
is neither warm nor cold, and ?? is the event that the sky is neither clear nor
rainy. How should the agent assign credence among these propositions? In
particular, how should she assign credence to propositions involving either of
the two catch-alls? Some object to the approach of using a catch-all precisely
on the grounds that it requires agents to assign probability to a proposition
that they do not understand.8 Although we often do recognise, and perhaps
often should recognise, that there may be more possibilities than we have con-
ceived of, this does not straightforwardly translate into a requirement to assign
a precise numerical probability to these unimagined possibilities.
We have been discussing awareness growth in probabilistic terms, but given
that the basic definitions formulated in terms of conditions on σ-algebras, they
are just as readily applicable to categorical and relational belief. In the categor-
ical case the belief state changes from 〈Ω,F ,B〉 to 〈Ω+,F+,B+〉, and in the
relational case it changes from 〈Ω,F ,D〉 to 〈Ω+,F+,D+〉. In the following,
however, we shall mostly be concerned with awareness growth for agents with
probabilistic beliefs.9
4.3.2 Rationality Constraints on Awareness Growth
After an agent has undergone awareness growth, she must adopt a new prob-
ability function P+ that assigns credence to the propositions in her new σ-
8 For example, Stefánsson and Steele (manuscript) voice this concern.
9 See Schipper (2014) for an overview of work on awareness growth.
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algebra F+. How should she do this? Traditional Bayesianism is silent on the
matter, because it assumes that the σ-algebra is fixed. Some have proposed
ways of extending the Bayesian framework. A common theme among such
proposals is that belief change in the face of awareness growth should be con-
servative in a way that is similar to ordinary updating. Roughly speaking,
Bayesian updating is conservative in the sense that it tells agents to make the
most minimal change in their beliefs necessary to bring those beliefs in line
with what has been learnt. For example, Karni and Vierø (2013) propose the
following constraint, which they dub reverse Bayesianism:
reverse bayesianism For any A, B ∈ F ∩F+:
P(A)
P(B)
=
P+(A)
P+(B)
.
Reverse Bayesianism is conservative in the sense that it whenever an agent’s
awareness grows, she should preserve the probability ratios between all propo-
sitions that she entertained prior to the growth in awareness. In example 1, this
means that
P(Warm)
P(Cold)
=
P+(Warm & Windy) + P+(Warm & Calm)
P+(Cold & Windy) + P+(Cold & Calm)
That is, learning that it can be either windy or calm should not affect the rela-
tive probability you assign to warm and cold. In example 2, reverse Bayesian-
ism implies that learning that it could be snowy should not affect the relative
probability you assign to clear and rainy:
P(Clear)
P(Rainy)
=
P+(Clear)
P+(Rainy)
However, reverse Bayesianism does not provide any constraints on what cre-
dence you may assign to Snowy. Nor does it constrain how you divide your
credence between Warm & Windy and Warm & Calm in example 1. But reverse
Bayesianism is arguably still too strong. Consider the following case (Stefáns-
son and Steele, manuscript):
Suppose you happen to see your partner enter your best friend’s
house on an evening when your partner had told you she would
have to work late. At that point, you become convinced that your
partner and best friend are having an affair. You discuss your suspi-
cion with another friend of yours, who points out that perhaps they
were meeting to plan a surprise party to celebrate your upcoming
birthday—a possibility that you had not even entertained. Becom-
ing aware of this possible explanation for your partner’s behaviour
makes you doubt that she is having an affair.
Stefánsson and Steele suggest that it would be perfectly rational if, as a result
of becoming aware of this new possibility, your credence that your partner is
having an affair decreases proportionally more than your credence that she
is overworked. But if so, reverse Bayesianism is violated. Bradley (2017:258)
proposes a similar constraint, also based on the idea that agents should make
the most minimal change necessary:
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awareness rigidity For any A ∈ F ∩ F+, P+(A | Ω) = P(A).
Reverse Bayesianism implies Awareness Rigidity, but not the other way around.10
Awareness Rigidity and Reverse Bayesianism will give the same result in cases
of refinement, but not in cases of expansions.11 Given that the counterexam-
ple to Reverse Bayesianism was a case of expansion, Awareness Rigidity is not
subject to the same counterexample, because it does not constrain credences
as strongly.
This concludes our survey of rationality constraints on awareness growth. We
now turn to the main area of application: reflective equilibrium.
4.4 reflective equilibrium
4.4.1 Background
If there is anything like a standard method in moral epistemology, it is ar-
guably some form or other of the method of reflective equilibrium.12 Rawls
originally introduced the term in the context of his theory of justice as fairness,
but the general framework has been applied much more broadly.13 In what
follows, I will therefore assume that all talk of reflective equilibrium concerns
our moral beliefs in general, not just those that concern justice.
First, we imagine that there is some agent engaged in moral deliberation. We
make certain requirements of this agent: she “is presumed to have the ability,
the opportunity, and the desire to reach a correct decision (or at least, not the
desire not to)” (Rawls 1999:42) Second, we assume that there are two types of
moral claims: particular judgments and theoretical principles.
The particular judgments are in some sense specific. For example, they may
concern particular acts, such as the judgment that it was morally wrong for
David Cameron to call the Brexit referendum. Furthermore, they don’t cite
the reasons for their verdicts, e.g. the particular judgment does not explain
why it was wrong to call the referendum. The theoretical principles, on the
other hand, are general: they are applicable in a wide range of circumstances.
Moreover, they are explanatory: they are able to cite reasons for their verdicts.
In particular, they are able to explain the various particular judgments that the
agent holds.
The agent engaged in moral deliberation is not a blank state: she begins deliber-
ation having already made some moral judgments. We may impose constraints
on which sets of moral judgments count as legitimate starting points. Rawls
10 To see the implication, simply replace all probabilities in the statement of reverse Bayesianism
with probabilities conditional on Ω, and note that P(A | Ω) = P(A) and P(B | Ω) = P(B).
11 Note that in cases of refinement, P+(A | Ω) = P+(A), whereas in cases of expansion this will
not generally be the case.
12 See Rawls (1971/1999), Scanlon (2003), Daniels (2018), and Cath (2016).
13 Rawls himself attributes this idea to Nelson Goodman’s (1955) work on the justification of
deductive and inductive rules of inference.
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(1951) thought that the initial moral judgments all had to be particular; no the-
oretical principles allowed. Moreover, the particular judgments in question all
had to concern actual (as opposed to hypothetical) cases. Rawls (1971:41) sug-
gested that they were particular judgments “with their supporting reasons.”
And Rawls (1975) held that the agent’s initial belief set was allowed to contain
moral claims of any level of generality.
Throughout, Rawls emphasised that not just any set of moral judgments will
do as a starting point. Those judgments also need to have a certain epistemic
pedigree. In A Theory of Justice, he held that we can discard (i) judgments
made with hesitation, (ii) judgments in which we have little confidence, (iii)
judgments made when we are upset or frightened, and (iv) judgments made
when we stand to gain one way or another. He refers to the judgments that
remain after these have been discarded as the agent’s considered judgments.
In the simplest case, we can think of the search for reflective equilibrium as
follows. The agent starts out with only particular judgments. In trying to
systematise and account for these particular judgments, she considers various
theoretical principles, perhaps finding some of them quite plausible. However,
it is unlikely that there will initially be a perfect fit between her particular
judgments and her theoretical principles. She may have to give up some of
her initial particular judgments and come to accept new ones. And she may
also have to replace some of her theoretical principles with others. Eventually
though, working her way back and forth between revisions to her particular
judgments and revisions to her theoretical principles, the hope is that she will
reach reflective equilibrium. When she has reached reflective equilibrium, her
beliefs are consistent, and her theoretical principles account for her particular
judgments in a satisfactory manner:
It is an equilibrium because at last our principles and judgments
coincide; and it is reflective since we know to what principles our
judgments conform and the premises of their derivation (Rawls
1999:18).
Of course, the reason we are interested in reflective equilibrium is that we
think that the beliefs held in reflective equilibrium are epistemically laudable
in some way: that they are justified, or that they are more likely to be correct
than beliefs acquired through some other method, or something else along
these lines. But some have worried that, in giving comparatively large weight
to the agent’s initial judgments, reflective equilibrium is an inherently conser-
vative method, in the sense that any equilibrium the agent reaches is unlikely
to deviate too far from her starting assumptions. But if so, it seems we may
have reason to think that the method of reflective equilibrium may not be so
trusthworthy after all. For if the result never deviates to far from the starting
assumptions, we will not be able to resolve disagreement between agents with
different starting assumptions.
Partly in response to this, Rawls (1975) distinguished between narrow and wide
reflective equilibrium. One may reach reflective equilibrium in this narrow
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sense rather easily, perhaps just by making a few minor adjustments to one’s
moral beliefs. But the philosophically more interesting notion of reflective
equilibrium—wide reflective equilibrium—requires more than this. It requires
that one’s moral beliefs have withstood various kinds of scrutiny. This can be
specified in various ways, and in principle there are no restrictions. It might
require that one has given all other comprehensive moral theories on offer a
serious consideration. It might require that the agent inform herself of various
empirical facts (such as those of the social sciences) that may be relevant. Or
it might require that the agent considers some other facts that have bearing on
whether or not the beliefs held in reflective equilibrium are justified. Rawls
(1975:8) says that wide reflective equilibrium is found after we have
had an opportunity to consider other plausible conceptions and
assess their supporting grounds. Taking this process to the limit,
one seeks the conception, or plurality of conceptions, that would
survive the rational consideration of all feasible conceptions and
all reasonable arguments for them.
4.4.2 Towards a Formal Theory
Now that we have a rough idea of what reflective equilibrium looks like, we
can start thinking about how to formalise it in a way that makes it amenable
to a Bayesian treatment. Before we do so, let me make a couple of clarifi-
cations about the notion of reflective equilibrium I shall be proposing. First,
we will not concern ourselves with how some initial judgments are discarded
due to lack of epistemic merit. The initial judgments are given exogenously.
Second, the notion of reflective equilibrium we shall formulate corresponds
more closely to narrow than to wide. We will not be modelling the process
by which agents consider all reasonable arguments for all feasible principles.
On the other hand, if the critics are right that narrow reflective equilibrium is
conservative in the sense that the results are heavily biased towards the initial
judgments, then our notion of reflective equilibrium is not a narrow one either,
because it may turn out that in reflective equilibrium an agent rejects all of her
initial judgments. With those clarifications in mind, let us now examine what
a formal account of reflective equilibrium might look like.
Consider the following highly stylised example. Suppose an agent initially
judges that ordering steak for lunch yesterday was impermissible, and that
saving the child drowning in the pond would be obligatory. She then reflects
on what these two judgments have in common. Perhaps she realises that, of the
available options, saving the child would maximise total happiness, whereas
ordering steak would not. Insofar as she finds this a plausible explanation of
her initial judgments, she may come to believe the theoretical principle which
says that an option is permissible if and only if it maximises total happiness. If
she does, she has reached reflective equilibrium: she has endorsed a theoretical
principle that accounts for her particular judgments in a satisfactory manner.
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The example is formulated in terms of categorical belief, even though it is re-
flective equilibrium for probabilistic belief that we are ultimately concerned
with. However, much of what I will have to say applies equally well to each of
the three models of belief we have considered (i.e. categorical, relational, and
quantitative). In particular, the formal accounts I give of particular judgments
and theoretical principles can be used in all of these models. And the same is
true of the account of the process of reflective equilibrium I give in terms of
awareness growth. Given that categorical belief is in many ways simpler than
probabilistic belief, we shall initially formulate things in terms of categorical
belief, only later moving on to consider Bayesian reflective equilibrium.
With that in mind, what lessons can we draw from the example? Let’s begin
with particular judgments. First, these judgments concern specific situations:
the agent’s lunch decision yesterday, and Singer’s hypothetical scenario. They
don’t say anything about situations other than these. In particular, the judg-
ment that ordering steak was impermissible does not imply anything at all
about whether saving the child is obligatory or not. Second, particular judg-
ments don’t say anything about why these verdicts hold. This means that in
principle, various different theoretical principles could account for the same
set of particular judgments.
Next, theoretical principles. In contrast with particular judgments, theoretical
principles are general: they concern a wide range of cases. Second, theoretical
principles can both entail and explain particular judgments.
In the example, the agent initially only has beliefs about particular actions:
she believes that ordering steak was impermissible and that saving the child
would be obligatory, but she neither believes nor disbelieves that an option is
permissible if and only if it maximises total happiness. You might think this
means that she suspends judgment with respect to this theoretical principle,
but that doesn’t seem to get things right either. Suspension of judgment im-
plies that she has considered the principle and is unable to make up her mind,
but this does not appear to be a faithful characterisation of her state of mind.
Instead, it seems to me that a more natural description of what’s going on is
that she has not even considered the possibility. Therefore, we need to allow
for awareness growth. The agent starts out initially only aware of particular
judgments, and then she formulates theoretical principles through awareness
growth.
Perhaps this is the right thing to say about this toy example, but what about
more sophisticated reasoners like ourselves? When we engage in reflective
equilibrium reasoning, it’s not as though we begin from a state of complete
ignorance about general moral principles. We are familiar with various such
principles, and don’t have to formulate them all from scratch. But while this
is surely right, it also does happen, at least on occasion, that we come across
new principles that we hadn’t considered before. Moreover, for all of the fa-
miliar moral theories, there are various ways of making them more precise.
Even a comparatively simple moral theory such as hedonistic utilitarianism
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can be made more precise in various ways. What exactly counts as pleasure?
How should it be measured? Answering these questions and others gives us
different versions of the theory. And therefore, we will still need to appeal to
awareness growth when giving an account of reflective equilibrium for more
sophisticated reasoners. However, to keep things simple, I will first focus on
agents who are initially only aware of particular judgments and have to formu-
late all theoretical principles through awareness growth.
Moreover, there is a further role for awareness growth in the process of reach-
ing reflective equilibrium. Just like we may become aware of new theoretical
principles, we may also become aware of new particular judgments. Some-
times we are confronted with entirely new situations, whether in real life or
in a hypothetical scenario presented to us, and we may then form new partic-
ular judgments about theses cases. If we discover that these new judgments
are inconsistent with the theoretical principle we have tentatively settled on,
we shall have to revise that theoretical principle. Indeed, this can be a way of
testing a proposed theoretical principle.
In our toy example, the theoretical principle was said to account for the par-
ticular judgments. How shall we unpack this notion? A natural suggestion is
that a theoretical principle accounts for a set of particular judgments in virtue
of both entailing and explaining those judgments. This also gives us a natural
way of saying what it takes for an agent to reach reflective equilibrium: she
has reached reflective equilibrium just in case her belief set consists of some
particular judgments together with a theoretical principle that entails and ex-
plains all of those judgments.
If, in equilibrium, a theoretical principle is required to entail all of an agent’s
particular judgments, it follows that an agent in equilibrium cannot simulta-
neously endorse multiple theoretical principles. You might think that this fits
poorly with how theoretical principles are usually conceived of in the reflec-
tive equilibrium framework. For example, an agent may without inconsistency
endorse both a principle of utility, according to which greater utility is better
(all else equal), and a principle of equality, according to which greater equality
is better (all else equal). In part, I take it that this is a merely verbal question:
the agent who endorses both the principle of utility and the principle of equal-
ity can just as well be construed as believing a single principle, the principle
of utility and equality, defined as the intersection of the other two principles.
Whenever there is only utility at stake, the joint principle says that the greater
utility option is best, and whenever there is only equality at stake, it says that
the greater equality option is best. In cases where the two considerations pull
in different directions, the principle is silent on which option is best.
The more substantive issue is whether a theoretical principle has to entail all
of the particular judgments the agent endorses in equilibrium. The principle
of utility and equality is silent on which option is best whenever the two con-
siderations pull in different directions. But in some such cases the agent might
still hold the particular judgment that the higher utility option is best, or that
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the higher equality option is best. Perhaps she hasn’t made up her mind about
exactly how utility and equality should be traded off against one another.
But even if she hasn’t settled on a precise conversion rate, the fact that she is
able to make a judgment in some cases suggests that she could at least for-
mulate a somewhat more precise principle that yields these verdicts as well.
This more precise principle would better account for her judgments than the
initial one. On the other hand, if there is some case in which she is genuinely
unable to make up her mind as to which consideration should win out, then
her theoretical principle should also remain silent. Any theoretical principle
that gave a determinate verdict in such cases would misrepresent the beliefs
she in fact holds.
Granted, it is rather demanding to require that, in equilibrium, an agent must
endorse a theoretical principle that logically entails all of her particular judg-
ments. But the fact that it is so demanding makes it a natural place to start.
Clearly, mere consistency cannot be enough for reflective equilibrium: far too
many far too strange theoretical principles will be consistent with a given set
of particular judgments. So we should at least require that a theoretical prin-
ciple must entail some of her particular judgments. But once we’ve conceded
that it must entail some of them, the most natural place to stop is to say that it
must entail all of them. On the face of it, any other stopping point would seem
arbitrary. And even if it could be chosen in a non-arbitrary way, the resulting
proposal would be a lot more complicated. So in the spirit of first getting a
simple theory on the table, saving modifications for later, we should stick with
the demanding requirement for now.
Another consideration in favour of the present proposal is that in some sense
it represents an epistemic ideal. An agent who has formulated a theoretical
principle that entails all of her particular judgments is in a better epistemic
position than an agent who has formulated a theoretical principle that only
entails some of them. The former principle explains everything, whereas the
latter leaves some things unexplained. Again, we should therefore begin with
the more idealised notion, saving possible modifications for later.
You might worry that the requirement that a theoretical principle entail all of
the particular judgments introduces a risk of overfitting. The charge would
be justified if her particular judgments were forever set in stone. But the re-
quirement only comes into play provided that the agent has in fact reached
reflective equilibrium. Initially, her particular judgments may be subject to all
sorts of biases. But if she still holds on to them after having gone through
multiple revisions in search of reflective equilibrium, it no longer makes sense
to think of them as potential sources of noise. Instead, they are data points
that an adequate theoretical principle should account for.
We can make some general observations about what this means in the particu-
lar formal framework that we shall be using. Given that we will be modelling
both types of moral claims as sets of reasons structures, it follows that what it
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is for a theoretical principle to entail a particular judgment is for the principle
to be a subset of the judgment. Moreover, the notion of explanation should
somehow be cashed out in terms of normatively relevant properties: what it
is for a theoretical principle to explain a particular judgment is for it to say
something about the normatively relevant properties in virtue of which that
judgment holds. We will return to this in more detail later.
A closely related point is that theoretical principles are general: they apply in
a wide range of cases. In our example, the principle applied both in the case
of ordering steak and in the case of the drowning child. And as we have just
seen, an adequate theoretical principle should be general enough to account
for all of the particular judgments the agent holds in equilibrium. However, it
should be still more general: it should be applicable even in cases the agent
has not considered explicitly.
For example, the agent who formulates and endorses the theoretical principle
according to which an option is permissible if and only if it maximises total
happiness may then come to see that this principle has implications for cases
beyond those she had initially considered. Perhaps she comes across Philippa
Foot’s case of the surgeon who cuts up a healthy person in order to distribute
their organs and save the lives of five other people. When she does, she may
form the particular judgment that it would be impermissible for the surgeon
to do so. If so, she will have to give up her theoretical principle.
This points to another feature of theoretical principles that we should be able
to capture in our framework: the agent may not realise all their implications
and when she does, she may feel compelled to give up the principles in light
of their implications.
How shall we think about this? One option is to see it as a failure of logical
omniscience: the agent simply doesn’t realise that her theoretical principle is
implicitly inconsistent with her particular judgment about the case of the sur-
geon. But while this certainly happens from time to time, it doesn’t seem like
an accurate description of all cases. In order for this to be a case of implicit in-
consistency, the agent must already have formed a particular judgment about
the surgeon case. But if the agent has never considered the case before, she will
not have formed a particular judgment about it. And just like it was implau-
sible to say that the agent initially suspended judgment about the theoretical
principle, so too it would be implausible to say that she initially suspended
judgment about the surgeon case. Again, awareness growth provides a more
natural framework for thinking about what’s going on here.
Of course, the restriction to particular judgments and theoretical principles is
somewhat artificial: there is no reason to think that all of our moral judgments
can be neatly divided into these two categories. Ultimately, our concern is
to give an account of reflective equilibrium for agents whose objects of belief
are arbitrary sets of reasons structures. Nevertheless, by initially considering
considering only these two categories of moral claims, we are able to focus our
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attention on an important aspect of the methodology, namely the fact in order
for an agent to be in reflective equilibrium, it is not enough that her beliefs be
logically consistent: her beliefs about particular cases also need to be explained
by a general principle.
Let us summarise these lessons.
1. First, some general lessons about particular judgments and theoretical
principles. Particular judgments concern specific situations, and do not
explain their verdicts. Theoretical principles, on the other hand, are gen-
eral: they concern a wide range of situations. Moreover, they can both
entail and explain particular judgments. Furthermore, a theoretical prin-
ciple can have implications for cases beyond those the agent has explicitly
considered.
2. Second, some observations on initial conditions. We will require that the
agent is initially only aware of particular judgments.
3. Third, some lessons about the process of reaching reflective equilibrium.
The agent must be able to formulate theoretical principles through aware-
ness growth. She must also be able to formulate new particular judg-
ments (that concern new situations) through awareness growth.
4. Fourth and finally, some observations on the state of reflective equilib-
rium. In the case of categorical belief, we require that once she has
reached reflective equilibrium, the agent’s belief set consists of some
number of particular judgments together with a theoretical principle that
entails and explains all of those particular judgments.
4.5 judgments and principles
I shall present two accounts of particular judgments and theoretical principles.
The first account represents an ideal in the sense that it is suitable only to
agents who are capable of making maximally fine-grained moral judgments.
Although you and I are not such agents, it is nevertheless instructive to study
the proposal, because it will allow us to formulate a very straightforward no-
tion of reflective equilibrium that can be applied to all three models of belief.
The second account is suitable to agents with finite powers of discrimination.
4.5.1 The Fine-Grained Account
Let’s begin with particular judgments. A natural way of capturing the way in
which they are particular is to say that they concern specific choice contexts.
Your decision to order steak took place in a specific choice context, and it is this
context alone that the judgment is concerned with. Let us call a claim about
the moral status of an option which does not say why the option has this status
an evaluative moral claim. And let us call a moral claim which does say why
the option has this status an explanatory moral claim. With this terminology in
place, we can now state our first account as follows: a particular judgment is a
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context-specific evaluative claim.
Let us now see how this account deals with the various examples of particular
judgments given above. Recall that a moral claim is a set of reasons structures,
where a reasons structure is a pair R = 〈N,〉 consisting of a normative rele-
vance function and a weighing relation. The normative relevance function tells
us, for every context K in some background set K of contexts which properties
are normatively relevant in that context, and the weighing relation ranks the
available options by ranking their properties. Let K be the context in which
you told a white lie (so that [K] is the set of options available in K), and let
w be the option of telling a white lie. The claim that telling a white lie was
permissible will then be defined as follows:
PW = {R ∈ R : ∀x ∈ [K] : NR(w, K) R NR(x, K)},
where NR and R are the normative relevance function and weighing relation
of reasons structure R. That is, the claim that telling a white lie was permissi-
ble corresponds to the set of all and only those reasons structures according to
which no option is ranked as strictly better than the option of telling a white lie.
Second, theoretical principles. A natural way of capturing the way in which
they are general is to say that they correspond to (singleton sets of) individual
reasons structures. After all, a theoretical principle is more or less the same
thing as a moral theory, and the whole point of the reasons structure frame-
work was to give us a way of formalising moral theories. This gives us:
fine-grained account Particular judgments are context-specific evaluative
claims and theoretical principles are singleton sets of reasons structures.
On this account, the particular judgments are certainly specific, and by con-
struction they do not cite reasons for their verdicts. It captures the particular
character of the judgment by letting it concern just one choice context. And
it captures the evaluative (as opposed to explanatory) nature of the judgment
by including all reasons structures that entail the verdict in question. The vari-
ous reasons structures in PW will identify different properties as normatively
relevant. By not ruling out any of those reasons structures, we don’t commit
ourselves to any claims about which properties are normatively relevant and
which ones are not.
It is straightforward to see how this account generalises to the other examples
of particular judgments. The claim that it was impermissible to order steak
for lunch will be the set of all and only those reasons structures according to
which some other option is ranked strictly above the option of ordering steak
in the relevant context. The claim that it would be obligatory to save the child
drowning in the pond will be the set of reasons structures according to which
this option is ranked strictly above every other option available in the context.
And the claim that donating to the Against Malaria Foundation was better than
donating to Oxfam will be the set of reasons structures that rank the former
option strictly above the latter. And so forth.
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The theoretical principles are certainly general, and clearly able to entail and
explain particular judgments. They are general because they tell us, for any
choice context, which properties are normatively relevant in that context, and
they explain particular judgments by citing the normatively relevant properties
in virtue of which those judgments hold. And they can also have implications
for cases the agent has not explicitly considered. Furthermore, it is clear that
an agent who begins with only particular judgments can formulate theoretical
principles conceived of as single reasons structures via awareness growth.
The account also captures the state of reflective equilibrium nicely. In equilib-
rium, the agent’s belief set will contain some number of particular judgments
as well as a theoretical principle that entails and explains all of those judg-
ments.
Problems for The Fine-Grained Account
However, the trouble with this account is that it makes both particular judg-
ments and theoretical principles much too fine-grained.
Consider first particular judgments. According to the present proposal, par-
ticular judgments concern specific choice contexts. But choice contexts are
extremely fine-grained. A context can be specified as a collection of sets of
properties, with each set of properties representing an option available in the
context. This means that whenever there is some discernible difference be-
tween two situations, they will correspond to different contexts. For example,
if one situation takes place on a Tuesday and another on a Wednesday, they
will correspond to different contexts, even if they are exactly alike in all other
respects. In the former, all options (or to be more exact, all option-context
pairs) will have the property of taking place on a Tuesday, whereas in the lat-
ter they will have the property of taking place on a Wednesday.
Given that contexts are so extremely fine-grained, how is it that an agent’s
particular judgment manages to latch on to one specific context rather than
another? If the judgment in question concerns an actual situation the agent
has encountered, we might be able to tell a causal story. When you judge that
it was impermissible to order steak yesterday, this judgment was caused by
the situation in question, and this situation corresponds to a single context. So
here we might say that your judgment manages to latch on to a specific context
in virtue of being causally related to an actual situation that instantiates that
context. But whatever we may think of this response, it is unavailable if the
particular judgment in question concerns a hypothetical situation rather than
an actual one. If an agent forms a particular judgment about Singer’s hypo-
thetical scenario of the child drowning in a pond, there is no actual situation
with which her judgment is causally connected. And moreover, the hypotheti-
cal scenario is underdescribed in various ways. This means that any individual
context will contain a lot more detail than is present in the description of the
case, and it would therefore be arbitrary to single out one context rather than
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another.
Now, we could try to solve the problem as follows. Two contexts are distinct
just in case there is some difference in terms of their properties. But we could
reduce the number of different contexts by saying that the only difference-
making properties are those that are possibly normatively relevant. For exam-
ple, the day of the week is clearly not a normatively relevant property, so any
two contexts that differ only in this respect will count as the same context. On
this proposal then, two contexts are distinct just in case there is some differ-
ence in terms of their possibly normatively relevant properties.
Of course, this response lets the notion of a possibly normatively relevant
property do a lot of work. The more properties we rule out as not possibly
normatively relevant, the more plausible it becomes to say that particular judg-
ments concern specific contexts. At the same time, the more properties we rule
out, the more restrictions we impose on what a moral theory could look like.
And given that our concern is ultimately to model agents who are morally un-
certain, we should like to get by with as few such restrictions as possible.
Consider now theoretical principles on this account. Individual reasons struc-
tures are similarly much too fine-grained to play the role of theoretical princi-
ples. As you will recall, a reasons structure consists of a normative relevance
function and a weighing relation. The normative relevance function tells us,
for any possible context, what the normatively relevant properties are in that
context, and the weighing relation tells us how to rank all bundles of proper-
ties. So in believing in a single reasons structure, an agent commits herself
to definite beliefs about what would be normatively relevant in every possible
context, and about how to rank options in every possible context.
According to this picture, what happens in the search for reflective equilibrium
is that the agent begins with some particular judgments and then in formulat-
ing a theoretical principle she refines her algebra so that it now includes a
maximally specific singleton set of a reasons structure. On what basis can
we say that it is this reasons structure she believes in, rather than one of the
countless other reasons structures that account equally well for her particular
judgments and differ only on cases she is unaware of?
If the theoretical principle she believes in is of a very simple kind, such as
total hedonistic utilitarianism, it is perhaps easier to answer this question con-
vincingly. Here we can tell the following story: in reflecting on her particular
judgments, the agent comes to realise that many or most of them track facts
about total happiness: she tends to judge that one option is better than an-
other if it leads greater happiness overall. The correlation need not be perfect,
of course: in some cases she may intuitively think that an act is wrong even
though it would lead to greater happiness overall. But through deliberation
and philosophical reflection she gradually gives up these anti-utilitarian judg-
ments and endorses total hedonistic utilitarianism. The fact that the theory is
comparatively simple makes it less implausible to think that the agent believes
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(in some sense of the word) its implications even for cases she has not consid-
ered at all.
Of course, even a comparatively simple theory such as this one has several
free parameters. Do wanting and liking both count as pleasures? How do we
measure pleasure? Which risk attitude is correct? And so forth. Presumably
an agent can count as believing total hedonistic utilitarianism without having
settled all such questions. But if so, we should not construe her as believing in
a single reasons structure.
In summary, although this account is not suitable to agents like ourselves,
it is nevertheless instructive to study it, because in a sense it represents an
ideal. A logically omniscient agent with unlimited powers of discrimination
would be able form particular judgments that concern specific choice context,
and believe maximally specific theoretical principles construed as individual
reasons structure. But for the rest of us, this is not always feasible.
4.5.2 The Coarse-Grained Account
Particular Judgments
According to our second account, particular judgments concern not specific
contexts, but rather types of contexts, where a context type is given as a set of
contexts. If an agent forms the judgment that some option is permissible in a
given context type, she believes that it is permissible in all contexts of this type.
To illustrate, consider the standard trolley case. A runaway trolley is heading
down a track towards five people. If you don’t do anything, the trolley will
hit and kill those five people. If you pull a lever, the trolley will be switched
onto a different track, where it will hit and kill one person. Suppose an agent
considers this case and forms the judgment that pulling the lever is obligatory.
On the present proposal, this judgment concerns some set of contexts. In all of
these contexts, the two available options are pulling the lever and not pulling
the lever. How can we determine which contexts belong in this set and which
ones don’t? Put differently, how can we determine which contexts count as
instances of the standard trolley case and which ones do not?
For some properties, it is determinate whether the options in the standard trol-
ley case have them or not. For example, it is determinate that the option of
pulling the lever has the property of leading to exactly one death. This means
that any context in which the option of pulling the lever has the property of
leading to any other number of deaths cannot be an instance of the standard
trolley case. So any such context will not be an element of the set of contexts
that represents the case.
For other properties, it is indeterminate whether the options in the standard
trolley case have them or not. For example, it is indeterminate what tempera-
ture it is. So a context in which it is 20°C and a context in which it is 22°C may
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both be instances of the case.
For yet other properties, it is determinate whether the options have them or
not, even though they are not explicitly mentioned in the description of the
case. For example, we can assume that pulling the lever does not, in addition
to the one death, also lead to one person suffering a headache. And in general,
whenever we describe a hypothetical scenario, it is assumed that all possibly
relevant information is mentioned explicitly.
For now, I will simply assume that a particular judgment concerns some set
of contexts, without specifying what determines which contexts belong in that
set and which ones do not.
Recall the two main features of particular judgments that we identified at the
outset: that they are specific rather than general, and that they are evaluative
rather than explanatory. The second account captures both of these aspects.
Granted, given that particular judgments now concern sets of contexts rather
than individual contexts, they will be less specific than they were on the first
account. But of course, the whole reason for going beyond the first account
was that it made particular judgments too specific for realistic application. On
the present proposal, those judgments are still specific in the sense that mat-
ters. An agent who judges that pulling the lever is obligatory in the standard
trolley case does not thereby commit herself to any verdict about the bridge
variant of the trolley case.
The present proposal also captures the way in which particular judgments are
evaluative rather than explanatory. However, the distinction is somewhat less
clear cut than it was for the first account, for the following reason. In a con-
text type, as we have seen, some properties are determinately present, some
are determinately absent, and for others it is indeterminate whether they are
present or absent. So when an agent forms a particular judgment about a given
context type, she implicitly commits herself to thinking that the indeterminate
properties do not make a difference for the particular judgment. This is so
because the agent forms the judgment in question regardless of whether these
properties are present or not.
To illustrate, consider the following case. Let the context type be given as
K = {K1, K2}. There are two options, O1 and O2. In both K1 and K2, O1 has
property P1 and O2 has property P2. In K2, option O2 additionally has property
P3. So in context type K, it is determinate that O1 has P1 and that O2 has P2
but indeterminate whether O2 has P3. Suppose now that an agent forms the
particular judgment that O1 is better than O2 in K. This doesn’t mean that the
agent implicitly judges that P3 is normatively irrelevant. Consider a reasons
structure according to which N(K1) = {P1, P2} and N(K2) = {P1, P2, P3}. If it
has a weighing relation according to which {P1} > {P2} and {P1} > {P2, P3},
it will still accurately represent the agent’s particular judgment. Hence what
is ruled out is not that P3 is normatively relevant, but only that its presence or
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absence is not sufficient to change the way in which the two options are ranked.
Hence in making a particular judgment, the agent does not commit herself
to any claim about which of the determinately present properties are norma-
tively relevant. Nor does she commit herself to believing that the indetermi-
nate properties are irrelevant, although she is forced to think that they are in
a sense inert. But all of this means that a wide range of explanations, in terms
of normatively relevant properties, can be provided for any given particular
judgment. Therefore, particular judgments are still evaluative rather than ex-
planatory.
On this account, the claim that telling a white lie was permissible will then be
given as follows, where K is the set of contexts that belong to the context type
in question:
PW = {R ∈ Ω : ∀K ∈ K ∀y ∈ [K] : NR(w, K) R NR(y, K)}.
Theoretical Principles
According to the coarse-grained account of theoretical principles, they are sets
of reasons structures that could, in reflective equilibrium, entail and explain
all of the agent’s particular judgments. Which set? Consider again the case
of total hedonistic utilitarianism. As we saw, this theory is underdetermined
in some ways. The fact that the phrase “total hedonistic utilitarianism” does
not determine a unique reasons structure suggests a slightly different account
from the first. We can think of the questions about whether both wanting and
liking count as pleasure, and so forth as different ways of making the meaning
of “total hedonistic utilitarianism” more precise. And then we can think of an
agent who believes in total hedonistic utilitarianism without having settled on
any particular way of making it maximally precise as believing in something
more coarse-grained than a single reasons structure, namely the set of all ad-
missible precisifications of total hedonistic utilitarianism.
This account captures the way in which theoretical principles are explanatory,
although the notion of explanation is perhaps somewhat less straightforward
than on the first account. A single reasons structure will tell us, for any given
context, which properties are normatively relevant in that context. It is there-
fore able to explain particular judgments in terms of those normatively rele-
vant properties. More specifically, if the agent judges that option O is obliga-
tory in context type K, a reasons structure is able to explain this judgment by
(i) telling us what the normatively relevant properties of the various options
available in this context are, and (ii) telling us that the bundle of properties
that corresponds to option O is ranked strictly higher than every other avail-
able option by the weighing relation.
By contrast, given that we are now construing theoretical principles as sets
of reasons structures rather than individual ones, it may happen that those
reasons structures offer different normatively relevant properties or different
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weighing relations in explanation of the the same particular judgment. This
means that the notion of explanation is perhaps less clear-cut, because it may
be indeterminate in virtue of what set of normatively relevant properties a
given particular judgment holds. Consider again the various precisifications
of total hedonistic utilitarianism. “Pleasure” for these different theories will
refer to slightly different things. We can think of these as various different
pleasure properties: pleasure1, pleasure2, etc. So an action will be permissible
either in virtue of leading to the most pleasure1, and the most pleasure2, etc. If
two precisifications give different verdicts about some context, then insofar as
she is aware of that context, she will not form a determinate judgment about
this context herself, at least not if she is in reflective equilibrium. For if she did
form a judgment, then she could rule out as inadmissible those precisifications
that contradict this judgment.
The proposal also allows us to say that a theoretical principle can have impli-
cations for cases the agent has yet to consider. For example, suppose I take
myself to be committed to utilitarianism and that I come across, for the first
time, some purported counterexample to utilitarianism, say Foot’s case of the
surgeon who cuts up a healthy person in order to distribute their organs and
save the lives of five other people. In considering this case, I come to see
that my theoretical principle has implications I had not previously recognized,
namely that it would be obligatory for the surgeon to cut up the healthy per-
son. Indeed, I may even come to doubt my theoretical principle in the light of
these implications.
Problem
The main problem with this account is that it’s unclear how we determine
which particular set of reasons structures correspond to a given theoretical
principle. In other words, what determines the admissible precisifications of
“total hedonistic utilitarianism”? The problem becomes especially pressing in
light of the fact that a theoretical principle can have implications that the agent
hasn’t recognized. If the agent has not yet formed a judgment about some
case because she is not aware of it, then how can we tell whether her principle
implies one verdict rather than another?
A natural suggestion is to give a dispositional account of what it is for an
agent to believe a theoretical principle. More specifically, we can say that an
agent believes a theoretical principle in case she is disposed to form particular
judgments in accordance with the principle. Given that she can be disposed to
behave in some particular way even in cases she is not aware of, this allows us
to explain which specific theoretical principle the agent believes.
However, this suggestion ignores the fact that agents may sometimes, as a re-
sult of becoming aware of a new case, come to reject the theoretical principle
they previously accepted. Suppose an agent has formulated a theoretical prin-
ciple and that she comes across a new case she had not previously considered.
How can we distinguish between the following two cases?
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1. She believes theoretical principle T1 and forms the particular judgment
J about the new case. T1 entails J, so she can hold on to her original
principle.
2. She believes theoretical principle T2 and forms the particular judgment
J about the new case. However, J is inconsistent with T1, and she must
therefore give up her original theoretical principle.
For example, how do we distinguish between the case in which the agent
comes to reject utilitarianism in light of its implications in Foot’s example, and
the case in which she instead believed in some threshold deontological view
according to which rights violations are only permissible when the consequen-
tialist stakes are extremely high?
Given that she in both cases in fact forms the judgment that it would be imper-
missible for the surgeon to cut up the healthy person, it seems we should say
that she has the disposition to form this judgment in both cases. But if so, then
the dispositional solution is unable to account for the possibility that the agent
may initially believe in utilitarianism and then come to reject it in light of its
implications.
In response, we might suggest that one should consider a broader class of dis-
positions than just dispositions to form particular judgments. For example, if
the agent came to reject utilitarianism, she will then be disposed to say things
like “I used to be a utilitarian but now I see the error of my ways.” Or we
might suggest that an agent believes a theoretical principle just in case she is
under normal circumstances disposed to accept its verdicts, and then specify
a suitable notion of normality which rules out the relevant cases. However, I
will consider these suggestions in any more detail.
On a general level, the problem appears to be an instance of a familiar skepti-
cal worry about rule-following and meaning. Kripke (1982) takes Wittgenstein
(1953/2009) to present a certain sceptical challenge. Consider the following
question: in virtue of what is it that I mean addition when I use the ‘+’ symbol,
and not some other arithmetical operation? It is true that all of my past usage
of the symbol has been consistent with addition. But suppose that I’ve never
calculated “68+ 57” before. I perform the calculation and arrive at “125.” How
can I be sure that that my answer is correct?
It is true that adding 68 to 57 gives 125. But how can I be sure that when I used
the ‘+’ symbol in the past, I intended it to mean not addition but quaddition,
which we can denote ⊕. Quaddition is defined as follows: x ⊕ y = x + y if
x, y < 57; otherwise x ⊕ y = 5. Nothing about my past usage rules out the
possibility that I intended for ‘+’ to mean quaddition all along. So what else
can account for the fact that I mean addition and not quaddition? As we have
seen, dispositional accounts face difficulties. But if there is nothing in virtue
of I meant addition rather than quaddition, it seems there can be no fact of the
matter as to which of the two I meant.
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In our case then, the rule is not addition, but rather some theoretical principle
T that the agent takes herself to be committed to. She has applied this princi-
ple to various cases in the past, but now she has become aware of a new case.
Perhaps all along she has not meant to refer to T but rather to some other
theoretical principle T‘ which agrees with T on all past cases, but disagrees on
the new one. So how can she be sure whether the judgment she forms about
the new case is consistent with her theoretical principle?
This is not the place for a detailed examination of possible solutions to this
skeptical worry. I will assume that some solution exists, and formulate an
account of reflective equilibrium that is suitable to theoretical principles con-
strued as sets of reasons structures. Insofar as we take this to be a problem, the
problem is not particular to our choice of formal framework. Any account of
reflective equilibrium which allows that agents can believe principles that have
implications beyond those they have recognized will face the same problem.
4.6 bayesian reflective equilibrium
I have presented an informal survey of reflective equilibrium, and now given
definitions of particular judgments and theoretical principles. It’s time to put
all the pieces together and provide a formal account of reflective equilibrium. I
shall mainly be doing so in terms of the fine-grained account of judgments and
principles, but as we shall see, my notion of reflective equilibrium can easily
be extended to the coarse-grained account. Given that the account of reflective
equilibrium that I propose can be adapted to each of the three models of beliefs
we have considered, let us consider these in turn.
4.6.1 Categorical Reflective Equilibrium
In the case of categorical belief, an agent’s belief set B is in reflective equilib-
rium just in case it consists of some theoretical principle T together with some
set J of particular judgments such that T ⊂ J for each J ∈ J . In other words,
the theoretical principle entails all of the particular judgments. Moreover, T ex-
plains these particular judgments by citing the normatively relevant properties
in virtue of which this judgment holds. Recall that a particular judgment is
a context-specific evaluative claim, and that a theoretical principle is a single
reasons structure. So for example, if J is the judgment that option O1 is better
than option O2 in context K, then T explains J by (i) telling us what the norma-
tively relevant properties of the options are in the given context (i.e. N(O1, K)
and N(O2, K) respectively) and (ii) telling us via the weighing relation  that
(in virtue of their respective properties) O1 is better than O2.
Therefore, an agent is in categorical reflective equilibrium just in case (i) her be-
lief set contains some theoretical principle that entails all her moral beliefs, and
(ii) her belief set is coherently extendable. As should be clear, this definition
applies equally well if we use the coarse-grained for judgments and principles
instead. The particular judgments will now concern context types rather than
individual contexts, and the theoretical principle will now be a set of reasons
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structures rather than an individual one. But the theoretical principle must
still entail all her moral beliefs, and her belief set must still be coherently ex-
tendable.
Once we have this simple model in place, we can relax some of the assump-
tions. For example, we can consider what happens when the agent’s σ-algebra
consists not just of judgments and principles and combinations thereof, but
rather of any kind of moral claim. We are thus considering a σ-algebra that
contains arbitrary sets of reasons structures. However, the same notion of
reflective equilibrium is still applicable: we say that an agent is in reflective
equilibrium just in case her belief set contains some theoretical principle that
entails every element of her belief set.
We have not imposed any constraints on which theoretical principles may
count as explanatory. As long as it entails all of the judgments she holds
in reflective equilibrium, an agent may take any reasons structure to be a satis-
factory explanation of those judgments. But this means that agents may regard
reasons structures that strike us as utterly bizarre and unsystematic as provid-
ing a satisfactory account of their moral judgments. For example, according
to some reasons structures, murder is impermissible, except if the day of the
month is evenly divisible by 5. Clearly such a principle cannot be an ade-
quate account of an agent’s moral judgments. However, if they strike us as
bizarre, they will presumably strike the agent as bizarre as well, and she will
not consider them to provide a plausible explanation of her judgments. There
is certainly much to be said here, but we should not expect a formal account of
reflective equilibrium to tell us which features of theoretical principles make
them eligible to play an explanatory role. That is a task for substantive moral
inquiry.
Indeed, moral particularists such as Dancy (2004) maintain that although there
are various true moral claims, there are no true moral principles, at least if
moral principles are required to exhibit the sort of regularity that the bizarre
principle we just considered did not have. However, as long as she tells us
both her judgments about various cases and the reasons for those judgments,
we can still construe the particularist as believing in a theoretical principle
in the technical sense that there is some reasons structure that entails all of
her judgments. But of course, such a reasons structure would lack various
paradigmatic explanatory virtues. On the other hand, a particularist may not
have much interest in the present project to begin with:
for reflective equilibrium (whether wide or narrow) one is required
to establish a stable balance between particular judgments and gen-
eral principles, and this is something that no particularist is going
to see any need for (Dancy 2004:153).
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4.6.2 Relational Reflective Equilibrium
Recall that the basic judgments of relational belief are comparative confidence
judgments of the form “A is at least as likely as B,” which we write as AD B. A
relational doxastic state can be modelled as a relational belief set BD ⊆ F ×F
containg all the comparative confidence judgments she accepts. To make it
specific, suppose that we accept de Finetti’s axioms on qualitative probability
from section 3.4.2. What does reflective equilibrium look like for an agent
who makes qualitative probability judgments? Her belief set BD consists of
comparative claims, where the claims being compared are moral claims. More
specifically, they are either theoretical principles or particular judgments. The
first thing to note is that it’s no longer possible to require that agents in re-
flective equilibrium must believe a theoretical principle that entails all of their
other moral judgments by logical consequence. By construction, there is no the-
oretical principle T that she believes categorically, but rather a set of theoretical
principles T = {T1, T2, . . . } ordered by the qualitative probability relation.
However, given that we are not concerned with categorical belief, logical conse-
quence is no longer the appropriate consequence relation. Instead, we should
appeal to consequence with respect to the qualitative probability axioms. This
way, we can say that an agent is in relational reflective equilibrium just in case
her relational belief set is (i) coherently extendable with respect to the quali-
tative probability axioms, and (ii) contains claims that concern both particular
judgments and theoretical principles. The second condition is there to rule out
agents who have not yet attempted to systematize their particular judgments
by formulating theoretical principles. Each theoretical principle is still such
that, were she to believe it categorically, it would be able to entail some set of
categorically believed particular judgments. But as we are dealing with rela-
tional belief, we have to settle for qualitative probability consistency instead.
4.6.3 Bayesian Reflective Equilibrium
Finally, the basic judgments of quantitative belief are of the form “I believe A
to degree x.” Among quantitative models of belief, we are of course mainly
interested in the probabilistic one. We model an agent’s probabilistic doxastic
state as a probabilistic belief set BP ⊆ F ×R.
The general strategy for how to define a notion of reflective equilibrium suit-
able to the corresponding category of belief should now be familiar. An agent
is in probabilistic reflective equilibrium just in case her probabilistic belief set
is (i) coherently extendable with respect to the probability axioms, and (ii) con-
tains claims that concern both particular judgments and theoretical principles.
Suppose F initially consists only of some set of particular judgments J =
{J1, J2, . . . } (closed under complements and countable unions). These particu-
lar judgments are context-specific evaluate claims. In formulating a theoretical
principle, her algebra grows from F to F+, where F+ now contains some
theoretical principle T. Is this awareness growth by refinement or awareness
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growth by expansion? Given that we want T to entail each of the particular
judgments, it seems that it must be refinement. For in order for T to entail J,
we must have that T ⊂ J. Hence given that J ⊂ Ω, we must also have that
T ⊂ Ω. Therefore, T cannot have been formulated through awareness growth.
Recall now the principle of Awareness Rigidity, which says that for any A ∈
F ∩ F+, P+(A | Ω) = P(A). In cases of refinement, of course, P+(A | Ω) =
P+(A). So Awareness Rigidity entails that when an agent formulates theo-
retical principles, her credences in the particular judgments must remain un-
changed. But that seems to run counter to the whole idea of the reflective equi-
librium process, namely that reflecting on theoretical principles may cause the
agent to abandon or revise some of her earlier judgments. So it seems Aware-
ness Rigidity is not a plausible constraint on reflective equilibrium.
However, we could instead model this part of the reflective equilibrium proce-
dure as a two-step process. First, the agent’s awareness grows from F to F+,
and she initially assigns credences in accordance with Awareness Rigidity. At
this point, she is simply trying formulate theoretical principles that might be
able to account for her particular judgments. Therefore, her credences should
not change at this stage, for it is those very credences that the theoretical prin-
ciples are supposed to account for. However, at a later stage the agent may
reflect on the theoretical principles and as a result revise her credences in the
particular judgments, perhaps in accordance with Jeffrey conditionalization.
Of course, this still leaves the process rather unconstrained. But perhaps that
is as it should.
How does this proposal relate to the distinction between narrow and wide
reflective equilibrium? Nothing in our framework makes it strongly biased to-
wards the initial judgments: an agent could in principle end up in a reflective
equilibrium in which she rejects all of her initial judgments. So our notion
of reflective equilibrium is not narrow in this sense. On the other hand, we
have not required that she first carefully consider a set of prominent alterna-
tive moral principles, nor have we required that she study how her favoured
principle squares with well-established facts of human psychology, etc., so our
notion is not a wide one either. But it can serve as the starting point for an
account of wide reflective equilibrium. For example, we might require that
for wide reflective equilibrium the agent must have considered some set T of
prominent alternative theoretical principles. But I will leave such extensions
for another day.
You might wonder if this proposal is sufficiently stable and satisfying to really
count as reflective equilibrium. For example, an agent may be in reflective
equilibrium even though her credence is evenly divided among ten theoretical
principles, each one very different from the next. Should we wish to, we can
make various amendments to this basic account of Bayesian reflective equi-
librium. For example, we might for example take inspiration from Leitgeb’s
stability theory of belief and require that in order for an agent to be in reflective
equilibrium, there must in addition be some theoretical principle in which she
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has stably high credence, where a credence is stably high if it would remain
above some threshold were the agent to conditionalize on any one of a suitably
defined set of propositions. But I shall again leave extensions for the future.
4.7 conclusion
This chapter has covered a lot of ground, so a recap is in order. Our starting
point was probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty, and our question was
how probabilistic credences in moral claims should be updated over time. We
initially considered some cases in which (Jeffrey) conditionalization did appear
to be an adequate update rule for degrees of belief in moral claims, such as
relying on moral testimony, treating one’s own emotions as evidence, or con-
sulting the historical track record of claims made on behalf of some particular
moral theory.
However, I suggested that not all paradigmatic cases of moral reasoning can
be modelled as instances of (Jeffrey) conditionalization. Our first example con-
cerned thought experiments. I argued that many thought experiments play the
role of making agents realize that a moral principle they previously accepted
has implications they had not initially appreciated. Others play the role of
forcing agents to make a judgment about a case they had not previously con-
sidered. I argued that the best way to capture both of these aspects is to allow
agents to undergo awareness growth.
I then suggested that awareness growth is also necessary if we are to give a
Bayesian account of reflective equilibrium. I examined two accounts of par-
ticular judgments and theoretical principles. According to the fine-grained
account, particular judgments were context-specific evaluative claims, and the-
oretical principles were individual reasons structures. Although this account
makes both judgments and principles implausibly fine-grained, we neverthe-
less found it instructive as an objecte of study, because it affords us the useful
idealization of an agent who is able to make maximally fine-grained moral
judgments.
According to the coarse-grained account, particular judgments were evaluative
claims concerning context types, where a context type is a set of contexts. A
theoretical principle was a set of reasons structures whose extension is deter-
mined by the agent’s disposition to accept or reject various particular judg-
ments and other moral claims.
Using these accounts of particular judgments and theoretical principles, we
proposed a notion of reflective equilibrium suitable to each of the three types
of belief models we have considered. The general account goes as follows: an
agent is in reflective equilibrium just in case she has formulated an adequate
(set of) theoretical principles to account for her particular judgments, and her
belief set is coherently extendable. Plugging in the different notions of coher-
ent extendability, this gives us a definition of reflective equilibrium for each of
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categorical, relational, and probabilistic belief.
We have seen that the constraints on rational belief change are relatively weak
in the case of awareness growth. Two agents may start with the same probabil-
ity function P and undergo the same episode of awareness growth from F to
F+ and yet end up with radically different probability functions P+1 and P+2
afterwards. If I am right that awareness growth plays a more prominent role
in moral epistemology, it would seem to follow that our moral credences are
less constrained over time.
Part III
C O D A
5
C O N C L U S I O N
5.1 summary
Our starting point was the traditional Bayesian picture according to which
the structure of credence is given by probabilism, its objects are descriptive
propositions about the empirical world, and its dynamics are those of (Jeffrey)
conditionalization. We have explored three variations on this Bayesian theme.
Although the three essays concerned somewhat different topics, some general
lessons nevertheless emerge. But let us first briefly rehearse what I take to be
the main takeaways from each essay individually.
5.1.1 Imprecise Bayesianism and Global Belief Inertia
In chapter 2, we explored a variation in the structure of credence. Specifically,
we considered imprecise Bayesianism, which models the agent’s credal state as
a set of probability functions rather than a single one. We saw that imprecise
Bayesianism is often motivated by the evidentialist thought that our credences
shouldn’t be more precise than is called for by the evidence. We considered
Joyce’s (2005, 2010) way of spelling out this evidentialist thought in more detail,
and I argued that we should reject his view because it implausibly entails:
global belief inertia For any proposition A, a rational agent will have a
maximally imprecise credence in A unless her evidence logically entails
either A or its negation.
However, the conclusion to draw is not that we should reject imprecise Bayesian-
ism in its entirety. Nor is it even that we should reject all forms of evidentially-
motivated imprecise Bayesianism. The specific aspect of Joyce’s imprecise
Bayesianism which the objection concerns is the fact that it makes imprecision
of a particular kind rationally required in certain evidential situations. For ex-
ample, in unknown bias Joyce required that if you have no evidence at all as
to the bias of a coin, then your credence that it will come up heads should be
maximally imprecise.
By contrast, on a view according to which imprecise credences are rationally
permissible rather than rationally required, global belief inertia does not fol-
low. Moreover, such a permissive imprecise Bayesianism could also be given
an evidentialist motivation. For example, one possible view is that if P is the
set of all probability functions that are compatible with some given body of
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evidence E , then any subset of P is a rationally permissible credal state to
adopt in light of E . Granted, this view still makes global belief inertia ratio-
nally permissible. However, I think that making global belief inertia rationally
permissible is significantly less of a problem than is making it rationally re-
quired. Moreover, ruling out that global belief inertia is rationally permissible
appears to be a much more difficult task than ruling out that it is rationally
required. An agent who suffers from global belief inertia is more or less an in-
ductive skeptic: she is essentially unwilling to draw any conclusions from her
observations. Therefore, in order to show that global belief inertia is irrational,
we must show that inductive skepticism is irrational.
But even ruling out this strict form of inductive skepticism would not be
enough. We also want credences to change quickly enough in response to in-
coming evidence. In practice, an agent who after having seen a million heads
and zero tails has only become moderately more confident that the coin is ei-
ther two-headed or otherwise biased towards heads is barely any better than
an agent whose confidence does not change at all. We want agents to be able
make reasonable inductive inferences based on the limited amount of evidence
they will receive in their finite lifespan. Hence we would have to show not just
that credences are responsive to the evidence, but that they are sufficiently re-
sponsive to that evidence. But of course now the question becomes one of how
the rate at which one learns and commits oneself to definite beliefs should be
traded off against the risk of thereby committing oneself to false beliefs. And
here it seems that reasonable people may disagree. Indeed, we can view these
as instances of the two Jamesian goals of belief, pulling in different directions:
There are two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of opinion,–
ways entirely different, and yet ways about whose difference the
theory of knowledge seems hitherto to have shown very little con-
cern. We must know the truth; and we must avoid error,–these are
our first and great commandments as would be knowers; but they
are not two ways of stating an identical commandment [...] Believe
truth! Shun error!–these, we see, are two materially different laws;
and by choosing between them we may end by coloring differently
our whole intellectual life. We may regard the chase for truth as
paramount, and the avoidance of error as secondary; or we may,
on the other hand, treat the avoidance of error as more imperative,
and let truth take its chance (James 1896, Section VII).
If my belief that the coin will land heads is maximally imprecise, P(H) = [0, 1],
there is no risk of error, because I have not committed myself to any definite
belief about the outcome of the coin flip. The more precise I make my belief,
the greater risk I run of error. At the same time, of course, the greater chance
I have of committing myself to an accurate more precise belief. Therefore,
insofar as people may rationally disagree over the relative importance of the
two goals of belief, it seems that they may rationally differ in the precision of
the credences that they adopt in response to a given body of evidence.
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5.1.2 Moral Uncertainty and Arguments for Probabilism
In chapter 3, we explored a variation in the object of credence. We considered
whether the three standard arguments for probabilism—representation theo-
rem arguments, Dutch book arguments, and accuracy arguments—can also
establish this conclusion when the objects of credence are moral claims rather
than empirical claims. I first proposed that we can model moral claims as sets
of reasons structures, in analogy with the standard possible worlds semantics
for descriptive propositions. We then examined how the various arguments
for probabilism fare when the σ-algebra consists of sets of reasons structures.
I argued that decision-theoretic representation theorem arguments are more
problematic in the case of moral uncertainty than in the case of empirical un-
certainty, because in the former case they commit us to thinking that all moral
theories are intertheoretically comparable. Epistemic representation theorem
arguments do better, but I suggested that rationally permissible violations of
completeness may be more widespread in the case of moral uncertainty than
in the case of descriptive uncertainty. I then argued that if you take the deprag-
matized Dutch book argument to make a plausible case for probabilism with
respect to descriptive uncertainty, you should also find it persuasive with re-
spect to moral uncertainty, at least provided that it is not irrational to evaluate
bets in a way that is contrary to one’s moral convictions. Finally, I suggested
that moral uncertainty does not pose any particular problems for accuracy ar-
guments.
Overall, we found the case for probabilism to be somewhat less clear-cut for
moral uncertainty, but on balance still fairly good, especially if we allow for
imprecise credences. We can now see why the argument against imprecise
credences in the previous essay and the argument in favour of them in this one
are not in tension with one another: the former is an argument against a view
that makes a certain kind of imprecision rationally required, whereas the latter
is an argument in favour of a view that makes it rationally permissible. Finally,
we did not engage at sufficient length with non-cognitivism. The arguments
we considered make most intuitive sense on a cognitivist understanding, and
any conclusions established should therefore be read as holding conditional
on cognitivism. It may be that there are sound non-cognitivist readings of all
of these arguments, but we have not attempted to provide them.
5.1.3 Bayesian Moral Epistemology and Reflective Equilibrium
In chapter 4, we explored a variation in the dynamics of credence. Specifically,
we considered the role of awareness growth in giving a Bayesian account of
reflective equilibrium. Our starting point was the assumption that something
like probabilism holds for moral uncertainty. I argued that there are some cases
in which (Jeffrey) conditionalization does appear to be the correct update rule
for our moral credences, but that many paradigmatic cases of moral learning
are not covered by this rule. In particular, I argued that if we wish to make
room for reflective equilibrium in our Bayesian moral epistemology, then we
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must allow for awareness growth.
I then proposed two accounts of particular judgments and theoretical princi-
ples. According to the fine-grained account, a particular judgment is a context-
specific evaluative claim and a theoretical principle is a single reasons struc-
ture. According to the coarse-grained account, particular judgments instead
concern sets of contexts, and theoretical principles are non-singleton sets of
reasons structures. The first account is appropriate for idealized agents who
are capable of making maximally fine-grained judgments, whereas the second
account is appropriate for finite agents like ourselves.
The coarse-grained account ran into a difficulty concerning how to specify
which particular theoretical principle an agent believes, given that such a prin-
ciple is supposed to be able to have implications for cases beyond those the
agent has explicitly considered. I noted that the general difficulty appears to be
an instance of (Kripke’s) Wittgenstein’s skeptical worries about rule-following,
and argued that far from being unique to the particular formal framework I
have chosen to work with, any account of reflective equilibrium which allows
that agent can believe a theoretical principle without having recognized all of
its implications will be subject to the same difficulty. Given that this appears
to be a central feature of the methodology, any plausible account of reflective
equilibrium will therefore face the same problem.
I then gave a general account of reflective equilibrium: an agent is in reflective
equilibrium just in case (i) she has formulated adequate theoretical principles,
and (ii) her belief set is coherently extendable. An advantage of this account
is that it applies equally well to all of the three models of belief we have con-
sidered. And it applies equally well on both the fine-grained and the coarse-
grained account.
Finally, we saw that the constraints on rational credence appear to be much
weaker in the case of awareness growth than in the case of ordinary updating.
Therefore, insofar as awareness growth is indeed more central in moral epis-
temology than it is in descriptive epistemology, it follows that the rationality
constraints on moral credences are correspondingly weaker.
5.2 lessons and future directions
5.2.1 Coherent Extendability
In section 1.2, I introduced three models of belief: categorical, relational, and
quantitative. Although we have not had much to say about categorical belief,
we have extensively discussed both relational and quantitative belief. Epis-
temic representation theorems show us how relational belief and quantitative
belief relate to one another. In particular, in section 3.4.2 we saw both how
comparative confidence judgments relate to precise probability, and how they
relate to imprecise probability.
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If we don’t take completeness to be a rationality requirement on comparative
confidence judgments, then we will not take precise credences to be rationally
required either. But we can still require that the comparative confidence judg-
ments can be given an imprecise probability representation. If so, then the
notion of coherent extendability can provide a natural account of the way in
which imprecise Bayesianism is still distinctively Bayesian. In our discussion
of epistemic representation theorems we argued that even if completeness is
not rationally required of our comparative confidence judgments, it should
still be rationally permissible. But if an agent does become fully opinionated,
then the rationality assumptions guarantee that her beliefs can now be given a
probabilistic representation.
However, some think that complete comparative confidence judgments are not
always rationally permissible. I suggested that those who think so also tend
to think that at other times complete comparative confidence judgments are
in fact rationally permissible, and perhaps even rationally required. In par-
ticular, we might think that if all of an agent’s evidence consists of chance
propositions, and this evidence is extensive enough to determine, via the cor-
rect chance-credence principle, a unique value for each proposition in her σ-
algebra, then she is rationally permitted to adopt a precise credence function.
Furthermore, I suggested that any rational agent should at least in principle be
able to learn some body of evidence that would rationalize precise credences.
This means that we can replace coherent extendability with evidential extend-
ability: an agent is evidentially extendable just in case she could learn some
body of evidence that would rationalize precise credences without thereby be-
coming strictly inconsistent.
We also appealed to coherent extendability in our formal account of reflective
equilibrium. In particular, I suggested that an agent is in reflective equilibrium
just in case she has formulated suitable theoretical principles and her belief set
is coherently extendable. Given that coherent extendability can be specified in
different ways by specifying a different consequence relation, our concept of
reflective equilibrium can be usefully applied to all three models of belief. Here
too the notion allowed us to provide a natural account of what Bayesianism
required of agents with incomplete attitudes.
5.2.2 Awareness Growth
Awareness growth played a central role in my account of moral epistemology.
I introduced it by arguing that we need it to capture the role played by thought
experiments, and then suggested that we also need it to capture the process
of reflective equilibrium. Although I have emphasized the role of awareness
growth in moral epistemology, I do not mean to imply that it is unimportant
in the rest of epistemology. Indeed, I take it that any realistic application
of Bayesian epistemology must allow for awareness growth, regardless of the
subject matter. However, awareness growth is still a relatively unexplored
phenomenon, and much remains to be done.
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5.2.3 Bayesian Moral Epistemology
In considering the prospects for a Bayesian moral epistemology, we have been
exploring largely uncharted territory. Granted, the notion of probabilistic cre-
dences in moral claims figures in many existing discussions of moral uncer-
tainty. However, those discussions tend to focus on decision-making, and
therefore neglect to consider the epistemology of moral uncertainty in any
detail. Furthermore, they rarely if ever address the question of how our cre-
dences in moral claims should change over time as we acquire evidence and
engage in moral reasoning, thereby leaving out a crucial component of the
epistemology.
Why is it that we have a well-developed Bayesian scientific epistemology (i.e.
Bayesian confirmation theory) but not a well-developed Bayesian moral episte-
mology? Perhaps part of the reason is that the precision of traditional Bayesian-
ism appears almost comically ill-suited to the moral domain. It’s absurd to
imagine that an agent might have a credence of 0.345716 in utilitarianism, a
credence of 0.257321 in Kantianism, and so forth. Although the same objec-
tion has been raised for Bayesian confirmation theory, here it appears to be if
anything more forceful. But if I am right, then an imprecise moral epistemol-
ogy allows us to reap the rewards of Bayesianism without paying the price
of implausible precision. Moreover, this imprecise moral epistemology is still
essentially a Bayesian moral epistemology, because given the requirement of
coherent extendability, were the agent to become fully opinionated, she would
thereby commit herself to precise credences. So although our moral epistemol-
ogy is Bayesian, it still allows for the possibility that our moral beliefs may in
general be less precise than our descriptive beliefs.
It emerged from our discussion of reflective equilibrium that a Bayesian moral
epistemology may turn out to be less determinate than its descriptive counter-
part along another dimension as well. In particular, I suggested that awareness
growth may play a more central role in our moral reasoning than in our de-
scriptive reasoning. If this is right, it follows that the dynamics of rational
credence are less constrained when those credences concern moral matters, be-
cause there are fewer rationality constraints on updating by awareness growth
than there are on standard forms of updating.
If our moral beliefs are both less determinate and less constrained by the ev-
idence than are our descriptive beliefs, rational disagreement will be more
widespread in the moral domain than in the descriptive. More generally, we
might take it to indicate that developing true moral beliefs may be a rather
difficult undertaking. In light of this, perhaps the appropriate attitude to take
is one of moral humility.
For example, consider the argument from disagreement, which takes the fact
that moral disagreement is so widespread to indicate that there is no moral fact
of the matter. If I am correct that credences in moral claims are less constrained
in how they change over time, this might suggest a new way of responding to
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the argument, namely that the disagreement we observe may just as well be the
result of different agents drawing different conclusions from the same episodes
of awareness growth.
Of course, these are just the tentative conclusions of an initial exploration of
Bayesian moral epistemology. It may be that further examination reveals it to
be much more precise and constrained than I have suggested. And it may be
that we wish to impose more substantive constraints on reflective equilibrium
than those we have considered in our formal account. Indeed, the sketch of
Bayesian moral epistemology that I have provided leaves many questions un-
addressed. For example, how does the debate between subjective and objective
Bayesianism play out in the case of moral uncertainty? Do we have reason to
accept any of the further constraints on prior probability that were discussed
in section 1.4? Are there any further constraints on priors that are particular
to the moral domain? Once we begin to give Bayesian moral epistemology
serious consideration, several interesting new avenues of investigation open
up.
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